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Abstract
Title IX’s three-part test for measuring discrimination in the provision of ath-
letic opportunities to male and female students has generated heated controversy
in recent years. In this Article, Professor Brake discusses the theoretical under-
pinnings behind the three-part test and offers a comprehensive justification of this
theory as applied to the context of sport. She begins with an analysis of the test’s
relationship to other areas of sex discrimination law, concluding that, unlike most
contexts, Title IX rejects formal equality as its guiding theory, adopting instead
an approach that focuses on the institutional structures that subordinate girls and
women in sport.
The Article then elaborates upon and offers a justification for the theory of equal-
ity underlying Title IX’s three-part test. To support this theory, the Article surveys
existing feminist legal scholarship on sport and identifies a need for an analysis
of women’s position in sport that goes beyond a debate over assimilation versus
accommodation, to analyze how educational institutions participate in the con-
struction of sport as a fundamentally masculine domain.
To fill this void, the Article explores in detail the processes through which ed-
ucational institutions construct the different relationships of men and women to
sport, through their control over athletic opportunities and the culture of sport.
Finally, Professor Brake takes this theory and applies it to other aspects of Title
IX law, advocating specific doctrinal reforms that would make Title IX’s overall
application to athletics more consistent with the theory articulated in this Article.
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THE STRUGGLE FOR SEX EQUALITY IN SPORT AND THE 
THEORY BEHIND TITLE IX†
Deborah Brake*
Title IX’s three-part test for measuring discrimination in the provision of ath-
letic opportunities to male and female students has generated heated controversy 
in recent years.  In this Article, Professor Brake discusses the theoretical under-
pinnings behind the three-part test and offers a comprehensive justification of 
this theory as applied to the context of sport.  She begins with an analysis of the 
test’s relationship to other areas of sex discrimination law, concluding that, 
unlike most contexts, Title IX rejects formal equality as its guiding theory, adopt-
ing instead an approach that focuses on the institutional structures that 
subordinate girls and women in sport.  The Article then elaborates upon and of-
fers a justification for the theory of equality underlying Title IX’s three-part test.  
To support this theory, the Article surveys existing feminist legal scholarship on 
sport and identifies a need for an analysis of women’s position in sport that goes 
beyond a debate over assimilation versus accommodation, to analyze how educa-
tional institutions participate in the construction of sport as a fundamentally 
masculine domain.  To fill this void, the Article explores in detail the processes 
through which educational institutions construct the different relationships of 
men and women to sport, through their control over athletic opportunities and 
the culture of sport.  Finally, Professor Brake takes this theory and applies it to 
other aspects of Title IX law, advocating specific doctrinal reforms that would 
make Title IX’s overall application to athletics more consistent with the theory 
articulated in this Article. 
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Introduction 
Title IX is a federal statute that prohibits sex discrimination in educa-
tion programs and activities that receive federal funding.1 Although the 
 
1. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1994). This Article focuses on Title IX because it is the primary legal 
mechanism that purports to provide redress for discrimination against girls and women in sport. 
One disadvantage of this focus is that it does not address athletic opportunities outside of education 
programs, which may offer alternative visions of sport beyond the relatively elite and exclusive 
opportunities offered through schools and colleges. See Susan Birrell & Diana Richter, Is a Dia-
mond Forever? Feminist Transformations of Sport, in Women, Sport, and Culture 221, 241–42 
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statute itself says nothing about athletics, or any other specific type of 
educational activity, it has precipitated a virtual revolution for girls and 
women in sports. Title IX has paved the way for significant increases in 
athletic participation for girls and women at all levels of education. 
Since the enactment of Title IX, female participation in competitive 
sports has soared to unprecedented heights. Fewer than 300,000 female 
students participated in interscholastic athletics in 1971.2 By 1998–99, 
that number exceeded 2.6 million, with significant increases in each in-
tervening year.3 To put these numbers in perspective, since Title IX was 
enacted, the number of girls playing high school sports has gone from 
one in twenty-seven, to one in three.4 Sports participation among even 
younger girls has also changed dramatically; a 1998 report found that 
the number of girls ages six to eleven who regularly participate in vig-
orous sports such as soccer, volleyball and basketball increased eighty-
six percent since 1987, from 2 million to 3.8 million.5 Women’s com-
petitive athletic participation at the college level also has greatly 
expanded since Title IX was enacted, with the number of female inter-
collegiate athletes increasing from just below 32,000 in 1971, to nearly 
150,000 in 1998–99.6
These increased participation numbers alone do not capture the extent 
to which women’s relationship to sport has changed since Title IX’s en-
actment. More female athletes than ever before are competing in 
 
(Susan Birrell & Cheryl L. Cole eds., 1990) (criticizing feminist scholars in sport for focusing on 
“dominant” and elite structures of sport at the expense of alternative sport models). Nonetheless, 
Title IX’s central place in the legal response to sex discrimination makes it a critical component in 
an effort to use the law to secure equality for girls and women in sport. Cf. Jennifer Hargreaves, 
Sporting Females: Critical Issues in the History and Sociology of Women’s Sports 55–56 (1994) 
(noting the importance of education programs in the development of sports for girls and women). 
2. National Federation of State High School Associations, Annual Sports Participation Sur-
vey: High School Participation, Gender Equity in Sports, University of Iowa, at 
http://bailiwick.lib.uiowa.edu/ge/statistics.htm#220 (last modified Aug. 30, 2000) (on file with the 
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) [hereinafter Gender Equity in Sports]. 
3. National Federation of State High School Associations, Summary of Athletic Participa-
tion Totals by School Year, at http://www.nfhs.org/1999_part_index.htm#year (last visited July 7, 
2000) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (showing the precise num-
ber for 1998–99 was 2,652,796). 
4. See Michael Dobie, Evening the Score: Women’s Wide-Ranging Success as Athletes—
From Basketball to Ice Hockey—Is Redefining the World of Sports, Newsday (New York), July 11, 
1999, at A18. 
5. John Hanc, The Games Girls Play, Newsday (New York), Oct. 26, 1998, at B15 [herein-
after Hanc, Games]. 
6. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972; A Policy Interpretation: Title IX and In-
tercollegiate Athletics, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413, 71,419 (Dec. 11, 1979) [hereinafter Policy 
Interpretation] (listing women’s intercollegiate athletics participation in 1971 at 31,852); National 
Collegiate Athletic Association, 1998–99 Participation Study—Women’s Sports, at 
http://www.ncaa.org/participation_rates/ (last visited July 9, 2000) (on file with the University of 
Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (showing that 148,803 women participated in 1998–99). 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
97985-TEXT.NATIVE.1192655565 10/17/2007 2:14:06 PM
4 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [Vol. 34:1&2 
traditionally male athletic activities.7 For example, in 1997–98, there 
were 779 girls competing on high school football teams, 1,262 on high 
school baseball teams, and 1,907 on high school wrestling teams.8 Just 
fifteen years earlier, in the 1983–84 season, these numbers were 13, 137, 
and 0, respectively.9 Girls and women are increasingly making inroads 
into the terrain of traditionally male sports, including rugby, boxing, 
judo, wrestling, body-building, stock car driving, weightlifting, and 
throwing events.10 
These changes in women’s sports have been accompanied by in-
creased status and respect for female athletes and a growing enthusiasm 
for women’s sports in popular culture, fueled by recent public successes 
of elite female athletes.11 Women’s team sports took center stage in the 
1996 Olympics, with U.S. women winning gold medals in basketball, 
soccer, softball, gymnastics, and synchronized swimming.12 Women’s 
ice hockey made its Olympic debut in Nagano, Japan in 1998, and the 
U.S. women’s team won the event’s first gold medal in a nail-biting vic-
tory over the Canadians in the finals.13 Women’s soccer gained new 
attention in 1999 when the U.S. won the Women’s World Cup.14 In the 
2000 Olympics in Sydney, for the first time, women competed in the 
same number of team sports as men.15 
7. See Mariah Burton Nelson, Introduction: Who We Might Become, in Nike Is a Goddess: 
The History of Women in Sports, at ix, xvii (Lissa Smith ed., 1998) [hereinafter Nelson, Who We 
Might Become] (“Girls and women are pinning male opponents to wrestling mats, racing horses and 
cars and yachts alongside their brothers, and playing pro basketball against men. Almost a thousand 
girls are playing high school football. Women have pitched in college baseball games and kicked in 
college football games.”). 
8. Gender Equity in Sports, supra note 2. 
9. Id. 
10. See, e.g., Hargreaves, supra note 1, at 281–83; see also Harriet Barovick, Diamonds in 
the Ring: Boosted by the Daughters of Ali and Frazier, Women’s Boxing Is Losing Its Novelty-Act 
Status and Gaining Real Fans, Time, May 1, 2000, at 66 (discussing increasing interest and par-
ticipation in women’s boxing); Shawn Courchesne, Dupuis’ Dream Is on Track; Utilizes 
Opportunities on Stock Car Circuit, Hartford Courant, Apr. 27, 2000, at C1 (discussing NASCAR 
driver Renee Dupuis). 
11. Cf. Lucy Danziger, Conclusion: A Seismic Shift in the Culture, in Nike Is a Goddess, su-
pra note 7, at ___, 317 (“What happens among talented sportswomen at the elite levels makes its 
way into the culture. It’s our version of the trickle-down concept: When women get paid to play 
basketball in front of 17,000 spectators, the rest of us, contenders in our own world of sports, feel a 
little bit more legitimate and take our pursuits more seriously.”). 
12. See Nelson, Who We Might Become, supra note 7, at xvi. 
13. See Barbara Stewart, In from the Cold, in Nike Is a Goddess, supra note 7, at ___, 269–
72 (describing the drama of the United States win over Canada in women’s ice hockey in the 1998 
Olympics). 
14. See 25 Significant Events in Women’s Sports, The Women’s Sports Experience, Sept.–
Oct. 1999, at 12–13. 
15. Women’s Sports Foundation, Significant Events in Women’s Sports History Post  
Title IX History, at http://www.womenssportsfoundation.org/templates/res_center/ 
rclib/results_topics2.html?article=51&record=36 (last visited June 5, 2000) (on file with the 
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Women’s professional team sports also have had notable successes in 
recent years, particularly women’s basketball. After several earlier un-
successful attempts at starting a professional women’s basketball league 
in the United States,16 women’s professional basketball seems to have 
gained a firm foothold in the sports world. The Women’s National Bas-
ketball Association (WNBA) started its inaugural season in 1997 with 
50 million television viewers tuning in to one of three networks to 
watch.17 By the second and third seasons, nearly one million viewers a 
week watched the WNBA play on national television.18 Women’s soccer 
and ice hockey hold promise for attaining professional status in the near 
future.19 Meanwhile, women’s professional tennis has discovered a dy-
namic and exciting rivalry that has been missing in recent years, with 
sisters Venus and Serena Williams breathing new life and excitement 
into the sport while challenging its white, country-club image.20 
In short, opportunities for female athletes are at an all-time high, and 
public interest in and support for women’s sports has never been greater. 
The changes in women’s sports participation have been accompanied by 
significant cultural change.21 Both mothers and fathers typically support 
their daughters’ involvement in sports, and are increasingly disturbed by 
 
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (reporting that additional sports for women in-
clude modern pentathlon, taekwondo, triathlon, trampoline, water polo, cycling (500 meter track), 
shooting (ball trap and skeet), synchronized swimming (duo), and weightlifting, and two additional 
teams in the women’s handball and field hockey competitions).  
16. See David F. Salter, Crashing the Old Boys’ Network: The Tragedies and Triumphs of 
Girls and Women in Sports 96 (1996) (discussing previous failed attempts to establish professional 
women’s basketball leagues and stating that these efforts “never had a well-conceived plan of ac-
tion. Some former leagues have tried gimmicks like lowering the rims, using different colored 
basketballs, or having the players jaunt around in skin-tight uniforms. . . .No one has been able to 
identify and market the women’s game for what it is: a well-coached, fundamentally sound, team-
oriented game”). 
17. History of the WNBA, at http://www.wnba.com/basics/historyof_wnba.html (last visited 
July 7, 2000) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). 
18. Id. 
19. See Donna A. Lopiano, What’s Wrong with This Picture?  Am I Missing Something 
Here?, The Women’s Sports Experience, Mar.–Apr. 2000, at 12 (discussing struggles of women’s 
professional soccer, including pay disparities in men’s and women’s soccer salaries); Stewart, supra 
note 13, at 288–89 (noting “talk around the NHL of forming a women’s professional [ice hockey] 
league, along the lines of the Women’s National Basketball Association”). 
20. Linda Robertson, Venus’ Victory Recalls the Past, Foreshadows the Future of Tennis,
Miami Herald, July 12, 2000, at 1D; see also Grace Lichtenstein, Net Profits, in Nike Is a Goddess, 
supra note 7, at 57, 76–77 (discussing difficulties faced by women’s tennis in the 1990s and the 
potential for the Williams sisters to re-energize the game). 
21. See, e.g., Anne Driscoll, Giving Girls a Sporting Chance: Female Athletes Win More 
Than Points, Researchers Say, Boston Globe, Oct. 24, 1999, (Magazine), at 18 (discussing dra-
matic cultural change affecting girls’ and women’s sports participation since Title IX was passed); 
Hanc, Games, supra note 5 (discussing the “fundamental shift in public opinion over the past dec-
ade” regarding girls and women in sport). 
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ongoing inequities.22 Title IX has played a large, if unquantifiable role in 
this cultural shift and the new opportunities that made it possible.23
And yet, as is so often the case with the law’s relationship to social 
change,24 these successes tell only part of the story.25 Title IX has not 
succeeded in ending the long history of discrimination against girls and 
women in sport.26 Educational institutions continue to provide many 
 
22. Richard W. Riley & Norma V. Cantú, Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Title 
IX: 25 Years of Progress (1997) [hereinafter 25 Years of Progress] (reporting that eighty-seven 
percent of parents now feel “that sports are equally important for boys and girls”), available at 
http://www.ed.gov/pubs/TitleIX/title.html; see also Mike Fish & David A. Milliron, Taking on 
Districts, Atlanta J.-Const., Dec. 16, 1999, at 1G, available at 
http://www.accessatlanta.com/partners/ajc/reports/gender_equity/day5/ 
index.html (“With college scholarships at stake, parents increasingly are insisting [Georgia] 
high schools address disparities in opportunities that girl athletes receive.”); David Hill, Playing 
Hardball, Educ. Week on the Web (Sept. 4, 1996), at http:// 
www.edweek.org/ew/vol-16/01girls.h16 (last visited June 28, 2000) (on file with the University of 
Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (discussing parents’ activism in seeking equal athletic opportu-
nities for their daughters in Oklahoma high schools); Kerry A. White, Fla. Trying to Court Girls for 
Sports, Educ. Week on the Web (Oct. 13, 1999), at http:// 
www.edweek.org/ew/ewstory.cfm?slug=07sorts.h19) (last visited June 28, 2000) (on file with the 
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (discussing parents’ efforts to improve athletic 
equity for girls in Florida). 
23. See, e.g., Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155, 188 (1st Cir. 1996) (“One need look no 
further than the impressive performances of our country’s women athletes in the 1996 Olympic 
Summer Games to see that Title IX has had a dramatic and positive impact on the capabilities of 
our women athletes, particularly in team sports.”); 25 Years of Progress, supra note 22 (discussing 
dramatic changes in women’s and girls’ sports participation since the enactment of Title IX); Jere 
Longman, How the Women Won, N.Y. Times, June 23, 1996, (Magazine), at 23–24 (attributing 
increased women’s participation in the 1996 Olympics to Title IX). 
24. To borrow a quote from Wendy Williams, “To say that courts are not and never have been 
the source of radical social change is an understatement.” Wendy W. Williams, The Equality Crisis: 
Some Reflections on Culture, Courts, and Feminism, 7 Women’s Rts. L. Rep. 175, 175 (1982). 
25. See Deborah L. Rhode, Speaking of Sex: The Denial of Gender Inequality 61 (1997) 
[hereinafter Rhode, Speaking of Sex] (“[I]ronically, our recent progress obscures the problems that 
remain. Opportunities for women athletes have improved so dramatically that we no longer notice 
what chances they are still missing.”). 
26. There is some variance in academic writing on this subject in the use of the term “sport” 
versus “sports.” I have opted to use both terms distinctly to signify different meanings, based on my 
reading of the literature as using “sport” when speaking of sport as a social institution, set in a 
specific social context, and “sports” as the actually and potentially diverse activities in which peo-
ple participate. Thus, I discuss men’s and women’s relationship to “sport,” but women’s increasing 
participation in “sports.” See Pamela J. Creedon, Women, Media and Sport: Creating and Reflect-
ing Gender Values, in Women, Media and Sport: Challenging Gender Values 3, 3 (Pamela J. 
Creedon ed., 1994) (“I say ‘sport’ instead of ‘sports’ because I define sport as a cultural institution 
and sports as activities or games that are only one component of the institution of sport.”); cf. Har-
greaves, supra note 1, at 2 (“The term ‘sports’ is used through the book rather than ‘sport’ in order 
to take account of the diverse and non-essentialist nature of the activities.”).  Compare also Carole 
Oglesby, Epilogue to Sport, Men, and the Gender Order 243, 243 (Michael A. Messner & Donald F. 
Sabo eds., 1990), who criticizes scholars of sport for: 
us[ing] the word sport as if there were one universal meaning to the word, even in a gender 
context. This usage ignores what I have called sport-for-women, an invention of English and 
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more, and qualitatively distinct, opportunities for male than female ath-
letes at every level of education. Although female athletic participation 
in high school is at an unprecedented 2.6 million, it still lags far behind 
the 3.8 million high school males who participate in school sports.27 
Athletic participation at the college level is similarly skewed, with 
women composing fifty-three percent of undergraduate students nation-
wide, but only thirty-seven percent of all intercollegiate athletes.28 Many 
of the institutional practices that contribute to the disparate participation 
rates of male and female students have remained outside the reach of 
Title IX enforcement. At the same time, those aspects of the law that 
have been forcefully applied—namely, the requirement of nondiscrimi-
nation in access to athletic participation opportunities—are under 
attack.29 
The primary site of the legal struggle over the situation of women in 
sport has been the interpretation of Title IX as it relates to the number of 
opportunities for males and females to participate in competitive sport 
programs.30 Many supporters of Title IX contend that the law has not 
done enough to increase women’s opportunities to participate in sport.31
The law’s detractors argue that Title IX has gone too far in the other di-
rection and is now mandating affirmative action for female athletes, at 
the expense of men’s opportunities.32 The debate over Title IX interpre-
tation in this area has acquired a fever pitch in recent years. New 
 
American women physical educators of the late 19th and early 20th centuries . . . . [A] com-
plete sociology of gendered sport must be cognizant of at least two sports—traditional sport 
and sport-for-women. 
Id. 
27. National Federation of State High School Associations, 1999 Athletic Participation Sur-
vey Index, at http://www.nfhs.org/1999_part_index.htm (last visited Aug. 30, 2000) (on file with 
the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). 
28. Gender Equity in Sports, supra note 2. 
29. See, e.g., Welch Suggs, Foes of Title IX Try to Make Equity in College Sports a Cam-
paign Issue, Chron. Higher Educ., Feb. 4, 2000, at A55, http://chronicle.com/weekly/v46/ 
i22/22a05501.html. 
30. See Renee Forseth et al., Comment, Progress in Gender Equity?: An Overview of the 
History and Future of Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972, 2 Vill. Sports & Ent. L.F. 
51, 53 (1995) (“The central issue in most Title IX litigation is whether a university provides equal 
opportunities for both women and men to participate in intercollegiate athletics.”). 
31. Cf. Sudha Setty, Leveling the Playing Field: Reforming the Office for Civil Rights to 
Achieve Better Title IX Enforcement, 32 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 331, 355 (1999) (recommend-
ing enforcement of Title IX in middle schools and high schools). 
32. John Weistart, Equal Opportunity? Title IX and Intercollegiate Sports, 16 Brookings 
Rev. 37, 38 (1998) [hereinafter Weistart, Equal Opportunity?] (“The particular rhetorical flourish 
that rallies these groups [that oppose Title IX] is the declaration that present policies under Title IX 
are ‘affirmative action’—a not-so-subtle attempt to push the claims of women for recognition of 
their athletic aspirations into the swirl of anger that makes racial preferences such a political hot 
spot.”). 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
97985-TEXT.NATIVE.1192655565 10/17/2007 2:14:06 PM
8 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [Vol. 34:1&2 
advocacy groups have sprung up with the sole or primary purpose of 
reversing the interpretation of Title IX that has developed over the past 
twenty-eight years.33 In addition, several existing conservative advocacy 
organizations have put the repeal or modification of Title IX’s participa-
tion standard on their agendas.34 Men’s athletic associations, too, are 
taking Title IX to task, urging reversal of the law’s core provisions.35 
Over the past few years, these groups have, with increasing urgency, 
stepped up their efforts to lobby Congress to amend Title IX and/or to 
pressure the enforcing agency, the Department of Education Office for 
Civil Rights (OCR), to retreat from its interpretation of Title IX.36
Critics of Title IX blame the law for a perceived demise of men’s 
sports programs and a reduction in opportunities for male athletes.37 
33. See, e.g., Americans Against Quotas, at http://www.aaq2000.org (last visited Aug, 30, 
2000) (urging political involvement to eliminate quotas that encourage colleges to cut wrestling 
programs); Iowans Against Quotas, at http://www.iaq2000.org/purpose.htm (last visited Aug. 30, 
2000) (same). 
34. See Curt A. Levey, Title IX’s Dark Side: Sports Gender Quotas, USA Today, July 12, 
1999, at A17 (representing the Center for Individual Rights); Feminists Blitz College Football 
Teams, Feminist Follies, Winter 1998, Clare Boothe Luce Policy Institute, at 
http://www.cblpolicyinstitute.org/winter1998.htm (last visited Aug. 30, 2000) (on file with the 
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (“Thanks to criticism from groups like the Clare 
Boothe Luce Policy Institute, a number of groups including the NCAA are asking Congress to look 
at how they enforce this strange law.”); Independent Women’s Forum, Gender Equity and Title IX,
at http://www.iwf.org/issues/titleix/index.html (last visited Aug. 30, 2000) (on file with the Univer-
sity of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (“IWF continues to expose the misguided applications 
and unintended consequences of Title IX.”).  
35. See, e.g., Salter, supra note 16, at 50–52 (describing College Football Association’s ef-
forts to oppose Title IX’s three-part test); Weistart, Equal Opportunity?, supra note 32, at 39 (“A 
common refrain from coaches in men’s wrestling, swimming, and gymnastics teams, all sports that 
have experienced waning fortunes in recent years, is that Title IX is ‘promoting discrimination.’”); 
Amateur Athletic Union Wrestling, at http://www.aauwrestling.org (last visited Aug. 30, 2000) (on 
file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (including articles opposing Title IX 
on the ground that it reduces the number of athletic opportunities for males); Indiana St. Wrestling 
Assoc. of USA Wrestling, Inc., at http://www.iswa.com (last visited Aug. 30, 2000) (on file with the 
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (criticizing Title IX as a quota that eliminates male 
sport opportunities and urging viewers to sign a petition to abolish the “proportionality rule.”). 
36. See, e.g., Americans Against Quotas, supra note 33 (providing links to members of Con-
gress and encouraging viewers to contacting these members and voice their concerns that Title IX is 
“morally wrong”); Indiana St. Wrestling Assoc. of USA Wrestling, Inc., supra note 35 (organizing a 
petition drive asking the next President to abolish the proportionality rule, culminating in a “million 
man” march, and listing other organizations opposed to Title IX); Iowans Against Quotas, supra 
note 33 (same as Americans Against Quotas); The Mat, Title IX Task Force, at 
http://www.themat.com/etc/title9/042298.asp (last visited June 3, 2000) (advocating a Congres-
sional bill that would require universities to alert incoming students to any sport program 
eliminations or reductions); see also Mary Jo Festle, Playing Nice: Politics and Apologies in 
Women’s Sports 279–80 (1996) (discussing conservative Congressional opposition to Title IX). 
37. See, e.g., Ira Berkow, Baseball; The Other Side of Title IX, N.Y. Times, May 19, 1999, at 
D2 (criticizing so-called “quota” under Title IX for elimination of Providence College baseball 
team); Craig L. Hymowitz, Losers on the Level Playing Field; How Men’s Sports Got Sacked by 
Quotas, Bureaucrats and Title IX, Wash. Post, Sept. 24, 1995, at C05 (criticizing quotas under Title 
IX that discriminate against male athletes); Levey, supra note 34 (criticizing “quota-based” en-
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Several legal scholars have taken up this refrain, criticizing Title IX as a 
law that goes beyond merely requiring an end to discrimination and in-
stead mandating affirmative action for female athletes.38 Professors Earl 
Dudley and George Rutherglen, for example, argue that Title IX dis-
criminates against men by presuming that men and women have equal 
levels of interest in participating in sports, and then using that assump-
tion as a baseline for  
allocating an equal share of male and female athletic opportunities.39 
They contrast this approach with the legal standards that have developed 
in the workplace where a “qualified labor pool” standard defines dis-
crimination based on women’s underrepresentation in certain jobs.40 The 
unspoken assumption in these critiques is that the only legitimate inter-
pretation of discrimination law is one that requires the equal treatment 
of persons who are alike in their athletic interests—a perspective re-
ferred to here as formal equality. 
While I take issue with the reasoning and conclusions of Title IX’s 
critics, I agree with them in one respect: Title IX’s interpretation of dis-
crimination in athletics participation goes beyond the narrow reach of a 
formal equality standard. Unlike those areas of sex discrimination law 
that follow a model of formal equality, Title IX’s prohibition on dis-
crimination is not so easily derailed by pointing out differences in 
existing male and female interests.41 Rather, Title IX holds institutions 
 
forcement of Title IX, and claiming that men participate in sports more than women because men 
are more interested in sports than women); George Will, Extortion Holds a Nation Hostage, Chi. 
Sun-Times, Feb. 26, 2000, at 21 (criticizing Title IX as an example of “the New Executive State”).  
38. See, e.g., Earl Dudley & George Rutherglen, Ironies, Inconsistencies, and Intercollegiate 
Athletics: Title IX, Title VII, and Statistical Evidence of Discrimination, 1 Va. J. Sports & L. 177, 
179–80 (1999) (arguing that Title IX requires affirmative action for female athletes); Note, Taking a 
Shot at the Title: A Critical Review of Judicial and Administrative Interpretations of Title IX as 
Applied to Intercollegiate Athletic Programs, 27 Conn. L. Rev. 943, 977 (1995) (criticizing Title 
IX’s participation standards as discrimination against males and a “quota system”); David 
Aronberg, Crumbling Foundations: Why Recent Judicial and Legislative Challenges to Title IX 
May Signal its Demise, 47 Fla. L. Rev. 741, 762–66 (1995) (criticizing proportionality as not re-
quired under Title IX language, and claiming that universities faced with proportionality 
requirements must cut men’s sports because their budgets do not allow for expansion); George A. 
Davidson & Carla A. Kerr, Title IX: What is Gender Equity?, 2 Vill. Sports & Ent. L. F. 25, 49 
(1995) (criticizing Title IX’s three-part test as reverse discrimination against males, and concluding 
that “[w]hatever merits the proportional to enrollment test may have as a matter of social policy, the 
test awaits the analytical foundation which would give it legitimacy”); Michael Straubel, Gender 
Equity, College Sports, Title IX and Group Rights: A Coaches’ View, 62 Brook. L. Rev. 1039, 
1041–42 (1996) (arguing that men are more interested in participating in sports than women and 
that Title IX should be modified to account for these different interest levels).  
39. See Dudley & Rutherglen, supra note 38, at 195–99. 
40. See id. at 207–10 (contrasting Title IX standard with the qualified labor pool analysis 
used in cases decided under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). 
41. Cf. Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 Cal. L. Rev. 1279, 1282 
(1987) [hereinafter Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality] (“In legal analysis, courts routinely 
find women’s ‘difference’ a sufficient justification for inequality, constructing at the same time a 
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accountable for their role in constructing and perpetuating such differ-
ences.42 By taking a broader view of discrimination and the myriad of 
ways in which it plays out, Title IX law avoids some of the pitfalls that 
have shortened the reach of sex discrimination law in other contexts.  
Title IX’s contested legal standards have yet to be fully explored by 
courts or feminist legal scholars. Prevailing court decisions have par-
tially explained their interpretation of Title IX in terms consistent with 
persuasive scholarly approaches to sex equality, but have stopped short 
of spelling out the law’s theoretical basis or exploring its implications. 
Feminist legal scholarship has not filled in the theoretical gaps left by 
the courts, nor has it accorded substantial attention to the further devel-
opment of legal standards governing sex equality in sports. 
Notwithstanding several notable and important writings, feminist legal 
scholars have largely ignored Title IX as compared with other applica-
tions of discrimination law that affect women’s lives.  
Existing scholarly discourse on Title IX fails to appreciate the extent 
to which the law focuses on the institutional structures that suppress and 
discourage women from expressing and developing their athletic inter-
ests and abilities. In this respect, the law reflects strains of feminist legal 
theory not widely embodied in sex discrimination law. In particular, the 
three-part test of Title IX compliance is influenced by structuralism, a 
theoretical approach which emphasizes the need to critically examine 
the structures and cultures of institutions that differently situate men and 
women and result in the subordination of women. Only by recognizing 
and exploring Title IX’s theoretical grounding can we adequately ex-
plain and justify the interpretation of Title IX that has generated such 
fierce controversy. At the same time, a better theoretical grounding will 
provide a firmer basis from which to analyze Title IX’s successes and 
shortcomings as a law that strives to secure sexual equality for girls and 
women in sports. 
This Article explores the theory behind Title IX’s standard for meas-
uring equality in athletic participation, and examines its implications for 
further Title IX analysis. In the process, it seeks to better integrate Title 
IX into feminist legal theory and provide a more complete account of 
women’s inequality in sport and how the law can address it. 
Part I of this Article lays the foundation for a theoretical analysis of 
Title IX by providing an overview of how sex discrimination law gener-
ally stands in relation to feminist legal theory. This section contends that 
 
specious ‘sameness’ when applying phallocentric standards ‘equally’ to men and women’s different 
reproductive biology or economic position to yield (not surprisingly) unequal results for women.”). 
See generally discussion infra Part I.A (discussing the theory behind formal equality including the 
challenges and alternatives to that theory).  
42. See discussion infra at Part II.A. 
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the dominant framework of sex discrimination law is one of formal 
equality, in which the goal of discrimination law is to require identical 
treatment of men and women when they are similarly situated in relation 
to the treatment at issue. Alternative feminist perspectives that focus on 
the structures and practices that create and perpetuate women’s subordi-
nate status have had less of an influence on sex discrimination doctrine, 
although they have made some mark on the development of the law at 
the margins. 
Part II argues that, unlike the dominant strain of sex discrimination 
law, Title IX’s participation test transcends formal equality and focuses 
instead on the institutional structures that create, perpetuate and rein-
force women’s different and subordinate place in athletics. This section 
examines the development of Title IX’s participation standard and ar-
gues that it reflects a structuralist theory of equality that makes an 
institution’s role in shaping and contributing to the subordination of 
women fundamental to a discrimination analysis. 
Part III seeks to provide a more complete theoretical justification for 
Title IX’s participation test. This section begins with a discussion of 
existing feminist legal scholarship on women in sport. It argues that 
feminist legal scholarship on sport must go beyond a debate over 
whether equal treatment or asymmetrical treatment will best guarantee 
sex equality and instead work toward developing the law to reach the 
institutional practices that masculinize sport and devalue women’s sport 
participation. The remainder of the section offers a detailed account of 
the role educational institutions play in confining women’s sport oppor-
tunities and shaping the culture of sport as fundamentally masculine. 
These practices contribute to the construction of sport itself as a male 
domain. 
Finally, Part IV applies the theory behind Title IX’s participation 
standard and the analysis of how institutions construct and sustain male 
dominance in sport to advocate doctrinal reform in other aspects of Title 
IX interpretation. This section argues that the legal standards governing 
the treatment of female athletes and the institutional practices that police 
and construct gender boundaries in sport have not kept pace with the 
courts’ understanding of institutional accountability in athletic participa-
tion. 
I. An Overview of Sex Discrimination Law Through  
the Lens of Feminist Legal Theory 
As even a cursory examination of sex discrimination law shows, Title 
IX, in its application to athletics, takes an approach to sex equality that 
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is markedly different from the dominant approach reflected in sex dis-
crimination law generally. Title IX’s departure from sex discrimination’s 
dominant legal framework is best understood through the lens of femi-
nist legal theory. 
A. Formal Equality and Its Discontents 
Sex discrimination law is often thought to embrace a conception of 
equality identified by some feminist legal scholars as formal equality.43 
The guiding principle in formal equality is that men and women should 
be treated alike if they are similarly situated for purposes of the policy 
or practice that is being challenged.44 Scholars and advocates working 
within this approach emphasize the overriding similarity between the 
sexes for the purposes of defining access to societal benefits and privi-
leges.45 Legal challenges premised upon formal equality seek to 
minimize and destabilize what are typically regarded as “real” sex dif-
ferences, and to identify and eradicate stereotypes that traditionally have 
been used to justify discriminatory treatment.46 The core inquiry is 
 
43. See, e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett, Gender Law, 1 Duke J. Gender L. & Pol’y 1, 2–3 (1994). 
Other feminist legal scholars use different terminology to describe a similar approach to equality. 
For example, Catharine MacKinnon has described the law’s focus on treating similarly situated 
persons alike as the “sameness/difference” approach. See Catharine MacKinnon, Difference and 
Dominance: On Sex Discrimination (1984), reprinted in Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life 
and Law 32, 32 (1987) [hereinafter MacKinnon, Difference and Dominance]. Ruth Colker has 
styled this the “anti-differentiation” approach, which she contrasts with anti-subordination. See 
Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 
1003, 1003 (1986). Martha Chamallas uses the term “liberal feminism” to describe the approach to 
equality in which sex differences are minimized to secure equal treatment. See Martha Chamallas, 
Introduction to Feminist Legal Theory 24–25 (1999) [hereinafter Chamallas, Feminist Legal The-
ory]. For the purposes of this discussion, I use the term formal equality, without intending to 
distinguish substantively between these varying perspectives. 
44. See Chamallas, Feminist Legal Theory, supra note 43, at 57; Bartlett, supra note 43, at 2. 
45. See, e.g., Nadine Taub & Elizabeth M. Schneider, Women’s Subordination and the Role 
of Law, in Feminist Legal Theory: Foundations, 9, 13–20 (D. Kelly Weisberg ed., 1993) (critiquing 
the use of sex difference to justify the differential treatment of women); Williams, supra note 24, at 
175;  
46. See Chamallas, Feminist Legal Theory, supra note 43, at 24, 33–35. Not all feminist 
theorists view formal equality, or liberal feminism, as premised upon the minimization of relevant 
sex difference. For example, Martha Nussbaum’s brand of liberal feminism combines liberalism’s 
emphasis on the equal worth and dignity of individuals with attention to the social construction of 
individual preferences that underlie sex differences. See Martha Nussbaum, Sex and Social Justice 
6–13 (1999). However, as discussed below, the embodiment of formal equality in sex discrimina-
tion doctrine typically does not look beneath sex difference to explore its relationship to specific 
social and institutional structures. See discussion infra Part I.B.; see also Nussbaum, supra, at 68 
(acknowledging that “liberalism has sometimes been taken to require that the law be ‘sex-blind,’ 
behaving as if the social reality before us were a neutral starting point,” but arguing that liberalism 
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whether the asserted differences between men and women, once 
stripped of archaic stereotypes and overbroad generalizations, are suffi-
cient to support treating the sexes differently, are or instead mere 
remnants of traditional views about the proper place of men and 
women.47 
One notable feature of formal equality is its focus on remedying the 
harm to individuals who are disadvantaged by sex-based criteria. The 
focus on the individual, rather than on the relative social power of 
groups, renders men and women fungible for purposes of the legal 
analysis.48 Men who are denied advantageous treatment on the basis of 
an insufficiently supported sex-based classification have as powerful a 
claim to formal equality under the law as women who have been bur-
dened by sex-based discrimination.49 
Formal equality is also characterized by its emphasis on same-
treatment solutions to sex-based inequality, with a primary emphasis on 
breaking down the overt and covert use of sex-based stereotypes to limit 
women’s and men’s opportunities.50 The goal of this project is to expose 
and refute the stereotypes and assumptions underlying the categorical 
sorting of the men and women by gender, leaving in place gender-
neutral structures and institutions.51
As is evident from this description of formal equality, one difficulty 
with this formula is that it only provides relief from inequality where 
persons are thought to be similarly situated with respect to the treatment 
at issue.52 Where persons are viewed as dissimilar in ways defined to be 
relevant, the framework does not provide a remedy to unequal treatment.  
For nearly two decades, critics of formal equality have questioned its 
capacity to secure meaningful equality for women, and have expressed 
concern that, in light of the different social and economic power of men 
 
is not monolithic and that the intellectual tradition of liberalism includes thinkers who have rejected 
a “purely formal notion of equality”). 
47. See Chamallas, Feminist Legal Theory, supra note 43, at 26. 
48. See id. at 35. 
49. See, e.g., David Cole, Strategies of Difference: Litigating for Women’s Rights in a Man’s 
World, 2 Law & Ineq. 33, 34 (1984) (observing that most winning sex discrimination plaintiffs are 
men). 
50. See Bartlett, supra note 43, at 2–3; Mary Anne Case, Symposium: Discrimination and 
Inequality Emerging Issues: The Very Stereotype the Law Condemns: Constitutional Sex Discrimi-
nation Law as a Quest for Perfect Proxies, 85 Cornell L. Rev. 1447, 1447–78 (2000) (favoring 
“sameness” solutions to problems of sex inequality). 
51. See, e.g., Wendy W. Williams, Equality’s Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treat-
ment/Special Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 325, 329–31 (1984–1985); see 
also Deborah L. Rhode, Occupational Inequality, 1988 Duke L.J. 1207, 1207–08 (1988) [hereinaf-
ter Rhode, Occupational Inequality]. 
52. See Bartlett, supra note 43, at 2; MacKinnon, Difference and Dominance, supra note 43, 
at 32–33. 
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and women, formal equality may legitimate or even exacerbate existing 
inequalities.53 Feminist legal scholars have proposed, analyzed and de-
bated numerous alternative approaches to equality, with a multiplicity of 
substantive and strategic variations among them.54 One widely discussed 
alternative to formal equality is known as anti-subordination.55 This ap-
proach distinguishes itself from formal equality in several key respects. 
Unlike formal equality, its core concern is the relative power of social 
groups, not the differential treatment of individuals.56 Anti-
subordination is as concerned with the perpetuation of existing disad-
vantages through formally neutral structures as it is with formal barriers 
to equality.57 It does not ask whether men and women who are otherwise 
similarly situated are being treated differently; rather, the central ques-
tion is whether the challenged rule or practice perpetuates the 
 
53. See, e.g., Linda J. Krieger & Patricia N. Cooney, The Miller-Wohl Controversy: Equal 
Treatment, Positive Action and the Meaning of Women’s Equality, 13 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. 513, 
436–57 (1983); MacKinnon, Difference and Dominance, supra note 43, at 32–40; Rhode, Occupa-
tional Inequality, supra note 51, at 1207–08; Ann Scales, The Emergence of Feminist 
Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95 Yale L.J. 1373, 1374–80 (1986); see also Martha Chamallas, Deepen-
ing the Legal Understanding of Bias: On Devaluation and Biased Prototypes, 73 S. Cal. L. Rev. 
(forthcoming 2001) (manuscript at 1–9, on file with author) [hereinafter Chamallas, Deepening 
Legal Understanding of Bias] (discussing the failure of equality law to reach the majority of the 
manifestations of bias and discrimination in society today).  But see Nussbaum, supra note 46, at 
55–80 (articulating and defending her version of liberal feminism that accounts for and examines 
the social construction of preferences). Similar criticisms have been leveled at formal equality ap-
proaches to race discrimination. See, e.g., Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination 
Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 Minn. L. Rev. 
1049, 1052–57; see also Chamallas, Feminist Legal Theory, supra note 43, at 142 (“Most critical 
race scholars regard the legal commitment to colorblindness as perpetuating rather than decreasing 
racial subordination.”). 
54. See generally Chamallas, Feminist Legal Theory, supra note 43 (reviewing and analyzing 
feminist legal scholarship from the 1970s through the 1990s). 
55. See Colker, supra note 43, at 1028; Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the 
Transformation of Workplace Norms, 42 Vand. L. Rev. 1183, 1191 (1989); see also Chamallas, 
Feminist Legal Theory, supra note 43, at 53 (describing this approach as “dominance feminism”); 
MacKinnon, Difference and Dominance, supra note 43, at 32, 40 (referring to this as the “domi-
nance approach”). 
56. See Chamallas, Feminist Legal Theory, supra note 43, at 57–58; Owen M. Fiss, Groups 
and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 107, 157 (1976). 
57. See Lucinda M. Finley, Sex-Blind, Separate But Equal, or Anti-Subordination? The Un-
easy Legacy of Plessy v. Ferguson for Sex and Gender Discrimination, 12 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 1089, 
1123 (1996).  Finley describes anti-subordination as an approach to equality that: 
transcends the supposedly oppositional status of the individualistic focus of the similarly 
situated approach and the countervailing “group-based discrimination” approach, because it 
can embrace both depending on the context. It also overarches the “sameness-difference” 
debate in which sex equality jurisprudence has been mired, because it does not put the ques-
tion in those terms. Thus, it can recognize that sometimes facial distinctions along race or 
gender lines are subordinating, but sometimes presumed neutrality can be subordinating. 
Id.; see also Andrew Koppelman, Antidiscrimination Law and Social Equality 57–99 (1996). 
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subordination of women.58 Under this approach, the identification of 
difference in the situations of men and women does not immunize a 
practice from legal challenge.59
The tension between formal equality and anti-subordination theories 
is particularly evident in their respective approaches to sex difference. 
Advocates of formal equality minimize difference and argue that men 
and women are alike for virtually all purposes relevant in law and public 
policy, and therefore deserve equal treatment. Anti-subordination theo-
rists object to the very framing of the question in terms of difference, 
contending that power, not difference is at the heart of inequality. In-
stead of using sex difference as a basis to deny equal treatment, or even 
accommodating sex difference to avoid disadvantage, anti-subordination 
theory views difference as beside the point, and the critical issue as 
dominance.60 
The controversy surrounding the meaning of sex difference and its 
role in equality law has received tremendous attention in feminist legal 
discourse. Feminist scholars have produced a multitude of theories and 
strategies for approaching real or perceived sex difference in the law.  
One strain of feminist legal theory that has emerged from this effort 
seeks to re-evaluate the meaning of difference so that difference is not 
turned into social disadvantage. Sometimes called different voice, or 
cultural or relational feminism, this take on equality focuses less on 
minimizing sex difference and more on how difference is valued.61 Cul-
tural or relational feminists seek to embrace and value women’s 
experiences and perspectives equally to those of men.62 
Feminists working within both relational and anti-subordination ap-
proaches have focused on how gender difference is socially 
constructed.63 One school of thought, particularly relevant for Title IX 
analysis, is loosely identified as structuralism, or new structuralism, and 
takes a critical approach to differences between men and women and 
their significance in equality law.64 It analyzes difference not as inher-
 
58. See MacKinnon, Difference and Dominance, supra note 43, at 40–45. 
59. See Chamallas, Feminist Legal Theory, supra note 43, at 57–58. 
60. See MacKinnon, Difference and Dominance, supra note 43, at 40–45. 
61. See Chamallas, Feminist Legal Theory, supra note 43, at 62, 65. 
62. See Adelaide H. Villmoare, Feminist Jurisprudence and Political Vision, 24 Law & Soc. 
Inquiry 443, 453–54 (1999) (discussing the centrality of Carol Gilligan’s research to cultural legal 
feminism, and surveying the works of feminist legal scholars writing in this tradition, such as Car-
rie Menkel-Meadow, Robin West, and Ann Scales). 
63. See, e.g., Martha Minow, Making All the Difference: Inclusion, Exclusion, and American 
Law 50–53 (1990); Kathryn Abrams, Sex Wars Redux: Agency and Coercion in Feminist Legal 
Theory, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 304, 354 (1995) [hereinafter Abrams, Sex Wars Redux]. 
64. See Kathryn Abrams, Symposium: Discrimination and Inequality Emerging Issues Af-
terword: Critical Strategy and the Judicial Evasion of Difference, 85 Cornell L. Rev. 1426, 1437 
n.52 [hereinafter Abrams, Judicial Evasion of Difference] (defining “post structuralism” as opposed 
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ent, but as constructed through social relationships and institutional 
practices.65 The social construction of difference in men’s and women’s 
preferences and choices plays a central role in this approach.66 Scholars 
working within a structuralist framework emphasize the need to “un-
pack” women’s chosen identities and preferences in order to illuminate 
the institutional structures that constrain those choices.67 Structuralist 
approaches are reluctant to center equality law around the equal valua-
tion of women’s preferences when those preferences themselves may be 
the products of social constraint rather than authentic choices.68 Instead, 
a structuralist interpretation of discrimination law centers the legal 
analysis on how institutions and organizations construct sex difference 
and inequality.69 
One influence of structuralism on feminist legal theory is a more so-
phisticated understanding of sex difference in men’s and women’s 
respective choices, preferences and life experiences.70 Unlike formal 
 
to “structuralism,” as “emphasiz[ing] the variety, complexity, and contingency of the discursive 
influences that shape subject formation”); Martha Chamallas, Structuralist and Cultural Domina-
tion Theories Meet Title VII: Some Contemporary Influences, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 2370, 2378–85 
(1994) [hereinafter Chamallas, Structuralist and Cultural Domination Theories] (discussing “struc-
turalist” approach to analyzing women and the workplace); Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About 
Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations of Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases 
Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1749, 1825–26 (1990) [hereinafter 
Schultz, Telling Stories] (discussing “new structuralism”). Scholars working in a structuralist 
framework typically draw on sociological research to explain the connections between institutional 
practices and the construction of preference. 
65. Minow, supra note 63, at 50–53; see also Chamallas, Feminist Legal Theory, supra note 
43, at 180 (explaining that structuralism’s focus on “how perceptions of difference originate and are 
maintained . . . . has much in common with theories such as Martha Minow’s relational approach to 
difference”). 
66. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Free Markets and Social Justice (1997) (discussing the 
complexity and contingency of peoples’ “choices” and “preferences,” and how they are shaped by 
social norms and law). 
67. See Chamallas, Feminist Legal Theory, supra note 43, at 174; see also Elizabeth Cham-
bliss, Organizational Determinants of Law Firm Integration, 46 Am. U. L. Rev. 669, 673, 685–96 
(1997) (discussing organizational characteristics of law firms that affect composition of women and 
minorities in law firms and shape their individual attainment); Rhode, Occupational Inequality,
supra note 51, at 1216–25 (discussing how workplace structures and unconscious bias constrain 
individual choice and create inequality).  
68. For example, Catharine MacKinnon, whose early work on sexual harassment emphasized 
how workplace structures facilitate the sexual harassment of women, has questioned the authentic-
ity of women’s “different voice,” stating that “the damage of sexism is real, and reifying that into 
difference is an insult to our possibilities.” MacKinnon, Difference and Dominance, supra note 43, 
at 39; see also Catharine A. MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment of Working Women 144 (1979). 
69. See Chamallas, Feminist Legal Theory, supra note 43, at 176–80; Chamallas, Structural-
ist and Cultural Domination Theories, supra note 64, at 2384; see also Nancy E. Dowd, Work and 
Family: The Gender Paradox and the Limitations of Discrimination Analysis in Restructuring the 
Workplace, in Applications of Feminist Legal Theory to Women’s Lives 549–70 (D. Kelly Weisberg 
ed., 1996) (offering a structuralist account of women’s inequality in the workplace). 
70. See Chamallas, Structuralist and Cultural Domination Theories, supra note 64, at 2382 
(“Perhaps the most important contribution of the structuralist approach is its ability to explain 
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equality, which implicitly assumes that individuals can achieve equality 
by accessing gender-neutral opportunities through which they may real-
ize their aspirations, structuralism views women’s choices as falling 
along a continuum between agency and constraint.71 Viewed through a 
structuralist lens, women are neither free, unencumbered agents nor pas-
sive victims, but choose their identities and life experiences while 
operating within societal and cultural constraints.72 This understanding 
leaves room for individual resistance and social change, while analyzing 
and addressing the forces that constrain and distort women’s choices.73
Thus, the condition of women has been described in the literature as one 
of “partial agency.”74 
In addition to analyzing the concrete institutional practices that di-
rectly regulate individuals within the institution, structuralist legal 
scholars also have identified a need to examine the cultures and values 
within institutions to complete the discrimination analysis.75 By explor-
ing how institutions create and reinforce cultures of domination, the 
analysis enables a greater understanding of how institutions participate 
in constructing an ideology of dominance and privilege, as well as in 
subordinating certain social groups.76 
Of the theories briefly touched upon here, formal equality is without 
question the dominant paradigm in sex discrimination doctrine. Alterna-
 
difference without naturalizing it.”); see also Bartlett, supra note 43, at 14 (describing the individ-
ual as “’constituted’ from multiple institutional and ideological forces”); Joan W. Scott, 
Deconstructing Equality-Applications of Feminist Legal Theory to Women’s Lives, in Applications, 
supra note 69, at 611–23. 
71. Cf. Chamallas, Feminist Legal Theory, supra note 43, at 174 (discussing feminist schol-
arship deconstructing women’s economic choices).  Compare also Martha Nussbaum who 
acknowledges that many economists within the liberal tradition do not closely analyze the meaning 
of individual preferences. See Nussbaum, supra note 46, at 149. Nonetheless, she argues that: 
[M]ost Utilitarian thinkers recognize that preferences may be distorted by a variety of fac-
tors in such a way that they will fail to be the individual’s own “true” or “authentic” 
preferences. And most hold that democratic deliberation must try very hard to separate the 
“authentic” from the “inauthentic” preferences, basing social choice on the former rather 
than the latter when this can be done. 
Id. at 146. 
72. See Chamallas, Feminist Legal Theory, supra note 43, at 102–06; Rhode, Occupational 
Inequality, supra note 51, at 1214, 1216; Schultz, Telling Stories, supra note 64, at 1825. Kathryn 
Abrams labels this approach, which recognizes the complexity and contingency of how human 
subjects are formed, “post structuralism.” Abrams, Judicial Evasion of Difference, supra note 64, at 
1437 n.52. 
73. See Abrams, Sex Wars Redux, supra note 63, at 352. 
74. See id. 
75. See Chamallas, Structuralist and Cultural Domination Theories, supra note 64, at 2385–
90 (discussing how institutions unconsciously continue to impose majority culture while simulta-
neously supporting affirmative action). 
76. See id. 
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tives to formal equality have made some mark on sex discrimination 
law, but their impact has been more limited.  
B. Sex Discrimination Law in Feminist Legal Theory 
For the most part, sex discrimination doctrine, in both the constitu-
tional and statutory arenas, can be characterized as falling within the 
umbrella of formal equality.77 Constitutional law, in particular, draws 
little from alternative frameworks such as anti-subordination or structur-
alism.78 Despite early race discrimination cases in which the Court 
expressed a suspicion of rules and practices that stigmatize African 
Americans and perpetuate a social caste, this dicta has never secured a 
strong foothold in the Court’s doctrine.79 Aside from relying on histori-
cal discrimination against a subordinated group to justify applying a 
higher level of scrutiny, the Court’s modern equal protection jurispru-
dence reflects as its guiding principle the neutral treatment of 
individuals, consistent with formal equality.80 
Equal protection as applied to sex-based classifications had its moor-
ings in a formal equality perspective from the beginning.81 A majority of 
the Supreme Court first adopted intermediate scrutiny for sex-based 
classifications in an equal protection challenge to discrimination against 
men.82 Although the Court’s sex discrimination jurisprudence has con-
 
77. See, e.g., Chamallas, Feminist Legal Theory, supra note 43, at 44–45; Bartlett, supra 
note 43, at 2–3; see also Rhode, Occupational Inequality, supra note 51, at 1207 (noting that the 
result of legal prohibitions on sex-based discrimination “has been a large measure of equality in 
formal treatment of the sexes, but a continued disparity in their actual status”). 
78. See, e.g., Finley, supra note 55, at 1091 (arguing that “most sex equality jurisprudence 
has failed seriously to wrestle with or wholly adopt the anti-subordination or anti-caste principle 
that is at the heart of Justice Harlan’s dissent” in Plessy v. Ferguson). 
79. See id. at 1123 (describing the Court’s focus on the stigmatizing practices of segregation 
and anti-miscegenation laws in Brown v. Board of Education and Loving v. Virginia as “moments 
of serious engagement” with anti-subordination analysis); Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste Princi-
ple, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 2410, 2422–29 (1994) (criticizing formal equality foundation of equal 
protection law and advocating an alternative anti-caste principle). 
80. See Abrams, Judicial Evasion of Difference, supra note 64, at 1429–32 (discussing the 
judicial evasion of group-based analysis in constitutional equal protection law); David Strauss, 
Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 935, 954 (1989). 
81. See Chamallas, Feminist Legal Theory, supra note 43, at 33–35; Case, supra note 50, at 
1448–52 (discussing the development of constitutional law of sex discrimination as a jurisprudence 
centered on the elimination of the use of sex as a proxy for some other characteristic). 
82. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210 (1976) (invalidating state statute permitting eighteen 
to twenty-one year old women, but not men, to buy 3.2% beer). Although the Court began its move 
toward heightened scrutiny in equal protection challenges to sex-based classifications that disad-
vantaged women, a majority of the Court did not explicitly adopt heightened scrutiny until it was 
presented with a case of discrimination against males in Craig v. Boren. See id. at 197–99; see also 
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tained hints of an anti-subordination analysis, the Court’s doctrine has 
remained squarely within the confines of formal equality. For example, 
the Court has often justified its protection of men from sex-based classi-
fications with a nodding recognition of the additional group-based harm 
that such classifications inflict on women.83 And, the Court’s justifica-
tion for applying a higher level of scrutiny to sex-based classifications 
in the first instance depended in part on its recognition of the historic 
discrimination against women as a group.84 Nevertheless, once the level 
of equal protection scrutiny was fixed, concerns about the status of 
women as a group receded into the background, and the Court primarily 
concerned itself with remedying the disadvantageous treatment of indi-
viduals because of their sex.85 
Throughout its equal protection jurisprudence, the Court has empha-
sized that the equal protection clause protects individuals who have 
been treated differently because of their sex, and not socially subordi-
nated groups.86 Thus, the Court treats classifications that disadvantage 
members of a socially dominant group on the same footing as discrimi-
 
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973) (plurality opinion) (applying strict scrutiny to 
strike down rule requiring female, but not male, service members to prove spousal dependency in 
order to receive increased military allowance); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) (purporting to 
apply rational basis to state law favoring males over equally qualified females as administrators of 
estates, but finding the rule, though “not without some legitimacy,” to be insufficiently related to 
state interest in reducing administrative burdens on probate courts). 
83. The Court has done this by explicitly recognizing that sex stereotypes that are, in the first 
instance, directed against men, nevertheless function as double-edged swords which also negatively 
affect women. See, e.g., Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 729–30 & n.15 (1982); 
Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 143–147 (1980); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 
U.S. 199, 205–07 (1977); Weinberger v. Weisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 645 (1975).  
84. See Craig, 429 U.S. at 199, 202 (recognizing past history of discrimination against 
women as a justification for applying heightened scrutiny to sex-based classifications); Frontiero,
411 U.S. at 684–86 (same); see also Colker, supra note 43, at 1024–26, 1028 (describing the 
Court’s reliance on historic group-based discrimination to justify heightened scrutiny as an em-
bodiment of the anti-subordination principle). 
85. See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 140–43 (1994) (holding litigant’s 
gender-based peremptory challenges unconstitutional and finding the litigant’s rationale to perpetu-
ate gender stereotypes); see also Finley, supra note 57, at 1125 (discussing J.E.B. as a case “locked 
within a comparative equality framework” because it focuses on whether sex classifications are 
based on “real” differences or stereotypes, and keeps the focus on “women rather than on the opera-
tive male-normed institutions.”). 
86. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532 (1996) (“[T]he Court has repeat-
edly recognized that neither federal nor state government acts compatibly with the equal protection 
principle when a law or official policy denies to women, simply because they are women, full citi-
zenship stature . . . .”); J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 152 (1994) (“The neutral 
phrasing of the Equal Protection Clause, extending its guarantee to ‘any person’, reveals its concern 
with rights of individuals, not groups . . . .”) (Kennedy, J., concurring); Miss. Univ. for Women v. 
Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (“[S]tatutory classifications 
that distinguish between males and females are ‘subject to scrutiny under the Equal Protection 
Clause.’ ”) (quoting Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75 (1971)). 
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nation against members of a socially subordinate group, even when the 
purpose of the classification is to remedy past discrimination.87
In addition to the focus on the individual, another feature of constitu-
tional sex discrimination law that is consistent with formal equality is its 
primary concern with the sex-neutral formulation of policies and prac-
tices rather than the subordinating impact of such policies and practices 
on socially disadvantaged groups. Sex-based different treatment, either 
in the form of a facial sex-based classification or intentional discrimina-
tion, is a prerequisite for heightened scrutiny of sex discrimination 
claims under the equal protection clause.88 Policies and practices that 
are formally neutral, however burdensome to women, are beyond the 
reach of meaningful equal protection review absent proof of an intent to 
discriminate.89 
A final feature of constitutional sex discrimination law that is consis-
tent with formal equality is its approach to sex difference. Where sex-
based discrimination is at issue, the Supreme Court permits so-called 
“real differences” between men and women to justify even explicitly 
sex-based different treatment.90 The existence of such “real differences,” 
as perceived by the Court, validates the sex-based classification being 
challenged without regard to whether it perpetuates the subordination of 
women, and without regard to whether the perceived sex differences 
themselves stem from social inequality.91 
Taken together, these features of equal protection doctrine render 
constitutional law ill-suited at the present time to address the far-
reaching inequality experienced by women. The constitutional case that 
 
87. See Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235–36 (1995) (applying strict scrutiny 
to race-based affirmative action and espousing the need for parity in scrutinizing all race-based 
classifications); see also id. at 247 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting anomaly created by majority 
opinion in that sex-based affirmative action will be analyzed under the intermediate scrutiny stan-
dard applied to sex-based discrimination, while race-based affirmative action will have to pass 
strict scrutiny). But see United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533–34 (1996) (distinguishing sex-
based classifications that are designed to compensate for women’s economic and social disadvan-
tages, which are permissible, from those that disadvantage women based on impermissible sex-
based stereotypes, which are constitutionally invalid). 
88. See Personnel Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 274 (1979). 
89. See id. at 279 (upholding under rational basis review preference for veterans for state 
civil service jobs despite devastating adverse impact on women’s job opportunities where plaintiffs 
failed to establish that the measure was enacted “because of,” rather than “despite,” its negative 
impact on women). 
90. See, e.g., Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 434–37 (1998); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 
57, 76–79 (1981); Michael M. v. Super. Ct. of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464, 469 (1981); see also 
Ann E. Freedman, Sex Equality, Sex Differences, and the Supreme Court, 92 Yale L.J. 913, 922–60 
(1983) (criticizing the Court’s approach to sex difference in sex discrimination cases). 
91. See, e.g., Frances Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis, 63 Tex. 
L. Rev. 387, 413–28 (1984) (critiquing the Court’s use of “real differences” in the Michael M. 
decision from an anti-subordination perspective). 
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most famously illuminates the limits of formal equality is Geduldig v. 
Aiello,92 in which the Court engaged in a tortured effort to force preg-
nancy into terms that formal equality could comprehend.93 Because men 
and women are not similarly situated with respect to the capacity to be-
come pregnant, the Court reasoned, a rule that singles out pregnancy for 
worse treatment than all other medically disabling conditions is sex-
neutral.94 In the Court’s view, since no persons, male or female, received 
pregnancy benefits, the classification merely distinguished between 
pregnant persons and non-pregnant persons.95 Thus, equal protection 
was satisfied because the benefits policy treated all non-pregnant per-
sons (male and female) the same.  
The impact of this particular embarrassment to the Court’s version of 
formal equality was mediated to some extent by the Pregnancy Dis-
crimination Act (PDA), which amended Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 to recognize pregnancy discrimination as a form of sex dis-
crimination under the statute.96 However, even under the PDA, formal 
equality remains the primary lens through which Title VII evaluates 
workplace structures that penalize women who become pregnant.97 The 
PDA broadened the comparison groups used in Geduldig—which placed 
pregnancy in a class by itself—by defining pregnancy as comparable to 
other medically disabling conditions.98 The statute does not set a floor 
 
92. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).  
93. See id. at 492–97; see also Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. 
Pa. L. Rev. 955, 983 (1984) (noting that criticism of the Geduldig decision has become a “cottage 
industry”). 
94. Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496–97 n.20. Although the statute technically exempted disabili-
ties resulting from “the individual’s court commitment as a dipsomaniac, drug addict, or sexual 
psychopath,” in practice, the only disabling condition exempted from statutory coverage was preg-
nancy. Id. at 499 n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting). It also covered conditions only or primarily affecting 
men, “such as prostatectomies, circumcision, hemophilia, and gout.” Id. at 501 (Brennan, J., dis-
senting). 
95. Id. at 496–97 n.20. 
96. Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA), Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified 
at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994)). 
97. Although, in theory, disparate impact doctrine provides an additional basis for challeng-
ing workplace structures that disadvantage pregnant women, in practice, such challenges are 
difficult to prove. See Barbara Allen Babcock et al., Sex Discrimination and the Law: History, 
Practice, and Theory 559–61 (2d ed. 1996). Disparate impact doctrine and its departure from for-
mal equality is discussed infra.
98. The PDA added the following language to Title VII: 
The terms “because of sex” or “on the basis of sex” include, but are not limited to, because 
of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions; and women af-
fected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for 
all employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe benefits pro-
grams, as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work. . . . 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994). 
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for the level of benefits to be afforded medically disabled persons; it 
simply requires employers to treat persons disabled by pregnancy the 
same as persons disabled by other medical conditions. Thus, under the 
PDA, employers who deny job accommodations and medical leave 
across the board do not violate the Act when they deny such benefits to 
pregnant women. Depending on where the employer chooses to set the 
baseline for accommodating workers’ medical problems and family re-
sponsibilties, men who choose to have children may not face the same 
work-family conflict as women who choose to do so.99
Like equal protection doctrine, statutory law on sex discrimination 
generally has followed a formal equality course.100 Courts applying Title 
VII of the Civil Rights of 1964, the federal law governing sex-based 
discrimination in the workplace, have often taken an approach to sex 
difference that draws from formal equality, permitting the socially con-
structed different situations of men and women to justify rules and 
practices that disadvantage women.101 
One example of formal equality’s influence on Title VII jurispru-
dence is EEOC v. Sears Roebuck & Co.102 In Sears, the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) used a group-based dis-
parate treatment theory to challenge the relative dearth of women 
holding higher-paying and higher status sales commission jobs at Sears, 
compared to the overrepresentation of women in the company’s lower-
paying non-commission sales jobs.103 The EEOC argued that the lower 
 
99. See Chamallas, Feminist Legal Theory, supra note 43, at 49; Dowd, supra note 69, at 
550–55. Although the PDA does not take this approach, formal equality also could be consistent 
with a substantive standard that raises the level of treatment for the comparison groups. For exam-
ple, the Family Medical Leave Act guarantees a minimum level of unpaid leave to all workers with 
certain family and medical justifications. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2654 (1994). However, any sub-
stantive guarantee of better treatment must come from an independent normative principle other 
than the formal equality directive to treat likes alike. Cf. Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 
U.S. 272, 284–90 (1987) (upholding a state law that required employers to make special accommo-
dations for pregnancy as consistent with the PDA, even though the PDA itself would permit 
employers to deny accommodations to all medically disabled workers). 
100. See Chamallas, Feminist Legal Theory, supra note 43, at 180 (stating that the structural-
ist approach has not reshaped Title VII doctrine); id. at 309–10 (stating that disparate treatment, a 
formal equality approach, is used most frequently under Title VII); Tracey E. Higgins & Laura A. 
Rosenbury, Symposium: Discrimination and Inequality Emerging Issues: Agency, Equality, and 
Antidiscrimination Law, 85 Cornell L. Rev. 1194, 1205–13 (2000) (discussing trend in Title VII 
cases toward group-blindness and formal neutrality). 
101. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 336 (1977) (attributing the risk of rape of 
female prison guards to their “very womanhood,” and permitting prison to exclude women from 
contact positions guarding male inmates based on this risk). 
102. 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988). 
103. Id. at 333–34. Between 1973 and 1980, Sears’ commission sales jobs paid about twice as 
much as Sears’ non-commission sales jobs. Schultz, Telling Stories, supra note 64, at 1752 n.5. See 
generally Int’l Bd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977) (providing a general discus-
sion of the requirements for proving group-based disparate treatment claims under Title VII). 
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share of women in sales commission jobs compared to the proportion of 
women who applied for all sales jobs at Sears raised an inference of dis-
crimination in hiring for the higher status and more lucrative 
commission sales jobs.104 The court rejected the EEOC’s argument, find-
ing more persuasive the employer’s position that the groups of male and 
female employees that the EEOC compared were differently situated in 
their relative levels of interest in holding commission sales jobs.105 The 
court credited testimony from Sears managers that women were less 
interested than men in holding high pressure commission sales jobs in-
volving the sale of durable goods.106 The court accepted Sears’ assertion 
that differences in the interest and qualifications of potential male and 
female applicants for the jobs negated any inference of discrimina-
tion.107 The court also faulted the EEOC for failing to put forward 
anecdotal evidence in the form of testimony of individual women who 
 
104. Sears, 839 F.2d at 312. The EEOC presented exhaustive statistical evidence to support 
this claim, including regression analyses based on information from employment applications of 
rejected sales applicants and Sears’ computerized payroll records from 1973 through 1980. Id. The 
EEOC bolstered its statistical proof with evidence of the subjective nature of Sears’ hiring process 
and testing practices. Id. at 331. This evidence included Sears’ documents evincing gender-
stereotyping in defining the jobs themselves and the employees who hold them. For example, Sears’ 
Retail Testing Manual included a description of an ideal commission salesperson as “active,” “has a 
lot of drive,” possesses “considerable vigor,” and “likes work which requires physical energy.” Id. 
In addition, the EEOC established that Sears used a testing practice that included a “vigor” scale, 
which asked questions more likely to be answered affirmatively by men, such as, “Have you played 
on a football team?” Id. at 332. 
105. See id. at 319. Sears did not undertake its own regression analysis, or introduce its own 
statistical evidence to counter that submitted by the EEOC. Id. at 312. Rather, Sears based its de-
fense on the lack of interest argument, which it used to undermine the validity of the EEOC’s 
statistical evidence. Id. 
106. Id. at 320. In support of its lack of interest argument, Sears relied on the testimony of 
Sears store managers, personnel managers, and other store officials; a study based on interviews of 
women in nontraditional jobs at Sears; national surveys and polls regarding the changing status of 
women in America; morale surveys of their employees; national labor force data; an analysis of 
Applicant Interview Guides which attempts to measure differences between men and women; and 
evidence of its hiring figures, as well as general evidence regarding the characteristics of commis-
sion salespersons. Id. at 312–13. The appellate court upheld the district court’s dismissal of EEOC 
expert testimony that no significant differences existed between men and women in regard to inter-
ests and career aspirations, affirming the District Court’s finding that this evidence was “not 
credible, persuasive or probative.” Id. at 320–21. The court found Sears’ analysis to be “more help-
ful on the question of differences,” finding that there were various reasons for women’s lack of 
interest in commission selling (including increased pressure, and fear or dislike of being perceived 
as overly competitive), and that commission-based saleswomen were generally less happy in their 
jobs. Id. 
107. See id. at 334, 340. The EEOC had contended that even with adjustments for differences 
in men’s and women’s interest levels, the disparities were still statistically significant. Id. at 334. 
However, the appellate court affirmed the district court’s determination that Sears’ interest evidence 
“substantially reduced” the EEOC’s alleged disparities. Id. at 334–35. The court did not reject the 
district court’s finding that Sears’ analysis of the Career Aspiration Questionnaires administered to 
Sears employees demonstrated that interest alone could not account for the disparities computed 
under the EEOC’s statistical analysis. Id. at 337. 
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had been denied access to a commission sales job, despite having inter-
est in the position.108
The decision is firmly entrenched within a formal equality framework 
in several respects. First, the Court’s search for individually identifiable 
victims of discrimination reflects formal equality’s focus on the denial 
of equal treatment to individual men and women. Indeed, the court’s 
focus on individual victims of discrimination is all the more remarkable 
given that the EEOC brought the case as a systemic disparate treatment 
case.109 Second, the court focused on the potential for the differenetial 
treatment of men and women within a subjective hiring process.110 The 
effect of Sears’ practices on women was not the issue. Finally, and most 
significantly for the purposes of this discussion, the relevance of the 
comparison groups was at the heart of the court’s inquiry.111 Once the 
court accepted the alleged dissimilarity of male and female employees 
and the existence of sex difference in worker interest levels, Title VII 
offered no recourse.112 Sears’ role in shaping the culture and structures 
in the workplace that may have distorted women’s and men’s interest in 
the jobs at issue was not touched upon in the court’s analysis.113
The Seventh Circuit’s approach to sex difference in EEOC v. Sears is 
typical of the formal equality perspective that dominates Title VII doc-
trine. In Vicki Schultz’s study of Title VII cases addressing the lack of 
interest defense, slightly over half of the decisions ultimately rejected 
the defense.114 However, even these more liberal courts operated within 
a formal equality perspective. They rejected the employer’s view that 
women were not interested in the jobs, but accepted the premise that 
interest is fully formed independent of workplace structures.115 Thus, the 
decisions merely applied formal equality, finding that since men and 
 
108. Id. at 310–11. The court stated that such a group of “disappointed witnesses who pre-
ferred commission selling but were rebuffed” would have assisted the EEOC in its argument that 
lack of opportunity, rather than lack of interest, was the explanation for women’s underrepresenta-
tion in the jobs. Id. at 322. However, as Vicki Schultz points out, evidence from individual women 
who were interested in yet denied commission sales jobs is wholly irrelevant to a group-based dis-
parate treatment claim. See Schultz, Telling Stories, supra note 64, at 1797–98. 
109. See Schultz, Telling Stories, supra note 64, at 1797–98. 
110. See Sears, 839 F.2d at 331–32. 
111. See id. at 334. 
112. See id. at 334–35; see also Chamallas, Feminist Legal Theory, supra note 43, at 69–71 
(discussing Sears as a case where different voice feminism backfired, lending credence to argu-
ments that men and women were not sufficiently similar so as to be comparable for Title VII 
purposes). 
113. See Schultz, Telling Stories, supra note 64, at 1804–05 (arguing “that the gendered char-
acteristics Sears ascribed to the commission sales position” signaled to potential employees that 
such jobs required “masculine” traits). 
114. Id. at 1776–77. 
115. See id. at 1785–88. 
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art73
97985-text.native.1192655565 10/17/2007 2:14:06 PM 
Fall 2000–Winter 2001] The Struggle For Sex Equality 25 
women were similarly situated for the jobs at issue, Title VII provided a 
remedy.  
In two notable, but ultimately limited, respects, Title VII law has been 
more receptive than equal protection doctrine to alternative theories of 
sex equality that go beyond the limits of formal equality. One important 
exception to the statute's emphasis on formal inequality is the recogni-
tion of disparate impact as a form of unlawful sex discrimination.116 
Disparate impact doctrine, as opposed to disparate treatment—which 
focuses on sex-based different treatment—enables women (and men) to 
challenge sex-neutral rules that have a disproportionate adverse effect 
on the employment opportunities of persons of one sex.117 If the plaintiff 
or plaintiffs can identify a specific employment practice (or, under some 
circumstances, a group of practices) with a disparate impact on women, 
the practice will violate Title VII unless the employer justifies it under a 
business necessity standard.118 
Disparate impact doctrine departs from formal equality in that it fo-
cuses on the harm to social groups rather than solely to individuals, and 
it recognizes the capacity for facially neutral rules and practices to dis-
advantage members of a protected group.119 However, disparate impact, 
like formal equality, has the potential to become derailed when con-
fronted with sex difference. Proof of disparate impact depends on 
establishing a disparity by comparing the challenged practice’s effect on 
men and women in relevant comparison groups. Evidentiary battles in 
disparate impact cases typically center on whether the relevant compari-
son is men and women in the general population or within a more 
narrowly constructed labor pool, taking into account relevant qualifica-
tions and interest.120 So constructed, the available labor pool operates as 
a similarly situated requirement in disparate impact cases: proof of dis-
parity only counts if the men and women compared are otherwise 
comparable with respect to the jobs at issue.121 Thus, the potential for 
 
116. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (stating Title VII reaches “not 
only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation.”). 
117. See, e.g., Int’l. Bd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977) (defin-
ing disparate treatment as the treatment of “some people less favorably than others because of their 
[sex],” and disparate impact as “employment practices that are facially neutral in their treatment of 
different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on one group than another and cannot be justified 
by business necessity.”). 
118. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (2000). 
119. See Colker, supra note 43, at 1019–20 (viewing disparate impact doctrine under an anti-
subordination paradigm). 
120. See, e.g., Barbara J. Flagg, Was Blind, But Now I See: White Race Consciousness and 
the Law 91 (1998) (noting that key issues in disparate impact challenges “include the choice of 
comparison groups—e.g., general population versus qualified labor force”) (endnote omitted). 
121. See Dowd, supra note 69, at 559 (discussing the failure of disparate impact law to ad-
dress women’s work-family conflict, and observing that the doctrine permits an employer to argue 
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disparate impact doctrine to reach policies and practices that disadvan-
tage women depends on whether the available labor pool is defined in 
such a way that it does not replicate women’s disadvantage in the work-
place. If the available labor pool itself has been shaped by institutional 
bias and workplace structures, the use of that pool in the analysis may 
hide the discriminatory impact of the challenged practice.122 
For example, if the EEOC had brought a disparate impact challenge 
in the Sears case, it would have had to demonstrate that a particular em-
ployment practice selected a significantly lower share of women than 
men from the pool of workers interested and able to perform commis-
sion sales jobs. If Sears, through its workplace structures and 
institutional practices, had already suppressed women’s level of interest 
in the labor pool for such jobs, a comparison of the practice’s impact on 
men and women within the “available labor pool” would not capture the 
full extent of women’s disadvantage in the workplace.123 
When confronted with arguments about sex difference in women’s in-
terest and abilities, the potential for disparate impact doctrine to 
transcend the limits of formal equality depends on the capacity of courts 
to critically analyze the role of difference and its connection to institu-
tional structures. In some Title VII disparate impact cases, courts have 
taken a more sophisticated approach to the problem of sex difference 
and have looked beyond women’s lower representation in the available 
labor pool to see whether the employer participated in constructing that 
difference. If the court believes that the employer itself has shaped the 
sex composition of the constructed labor pool, it will not allow the exis-
tence of sex difference within that pool to defeat a disparate impact 
claim. Courts that take such approach adopt a structuralist analysis that 
critically examines the role employers play in constructing sex differ-
ence. 
An example of a Title VII disparate impact case that more closely re-
sembles a structuralist approach is Dothard v. Rawlinson,124 a case 
 
that worker choice, rather than any policy of the employer, caused the disparity); Higgins & Rosen-
bury, supra note 100, at 1205–07 (discussing courts’ increasing resistance to disparate impact as a 
viable theory for proving discrimination, and noting the potential for disputes about the level of 
interest in the relevant labor pool to defeat a disparate impact claim).  
122. Cf. Flagg, supra note 120, at 94–95 (discussing small sample size of individuals in the 
workplace affected by the challenged practice as substantial barrier in disparate impact claims); 
Clark Freshman, What Ever Happened to Anti-Semitism? How Social Science Theories Identify 
Discrimination and Promote Coalitions Between “Different” Minorities, 85 Cornell L. Rev. 313, 
339–43 (2000) (discussing the small numbers problem in proving disparate impact discrimination). 
123. See Flagg, supra note 120, at 96 (discussing problems of proof of disparity in the em-
ployer’s actual workforce); see also id. at 171 n.15 (noting that the Supreme Court has rejected 
“workforce stratification— overrepresentation of whites in higher job classifications and overrepre-
sentation of nonwhites at lower levels—as a method of proving disparate impact”). 
124. 433 U.S. 321 (1977)  
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involving a female plaintiff’s challenge to a state prison’s use of height 
and weight requirements to screen out employees for certain prison se-
curity jobs.125 The Court permitted the plaintiff to establish disparate 
impact by showing how the requirements would affect men and women 
in the general population, rather than using the pool of men and women 
who actually applied for the positions.126 The Court reasoned that the 
height and weight requirements themselves would have the effect of dis-
torting or suppressing the proportion of women in the applicant pool, 
because women could readily see that they would not meet the employer 
qualifications and would not apply for the jobs.127 In such a situation, 
the employer could not insist on proof of disparate impact within the 
applicant pool when the employer itself had participated in constructing 
the sex composition of the applicant pool.128 By recognizing the em-
ployer’s role in shaping women’s expressed interest in prison guard 
jobs, the Court did not permit differences in male and female representa-
tion in the applicant pool to undermine the plaintiff’s case.129 
Courts have been more inclined to take such a structuralist approach 
when dealing with objective and quantifiable employment criteria such 
as height and weight requirements and standardized tests.130 They have 
been less likely to critically examine how institutions shape the pool of 
interested and able employees when dealing with higher level jobs and 
more complex, subjective decision-making processes.131 The effective-
ness of disparate impact doctrine depends on the ability of courts to 
critically examine arguments based on sex difference in worker interests 
and abilities, and to recognize workplace structures that shape and dis-
tort women’s relationship to the jobs at issue. 
 
125. Id. at 323–24. 
126. Id. at 330. 
127. Id. 
128. See id. 
129. Justice White, in a dissenting opinion, viewed the employer’s argument more favorably, 
stating that he was not “convinced that a large percentage of the actual women applicants, or of 
those who are seriously interested in applying, for prison guard positions would fail to satisfy the 
height and weight requirements.” Id. at 348. Like the Court in Sears, 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988), 
Justice White did not consider how the prison’s structuring of the job and its requirements would 
affect male and female interest levels. 
130. See also Ramona L. Paetzold & Rafael Gely, Through the Looking Glass: Can Title VII 
Help Women and Minorities Shatter the Glass Ceiling?, 31 Hous. L. Rev. 1517, 1526–1549 (1995) 
(discussing Title VII’s failure to enable women to break through the glass ceiling); cf. Flagg, supra 
note 120, at 97 (discussing tendency of courts to find that a challenged practice did not cause the 
disparate impact if members of the disadvantaged group could have changed their behavior to meet 
the employer’s requirements). See generally Daniel Gyebi, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: Favoring 
Women and Minorities in Disparate Impact Discrimination Cases Involving High-Level Jobs, 36 
How. L.J. 97, ___ (1993). 
131. See Elizabeth Bartholet, Application of Title VII to Jobs in High Places, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 
947, 948–50 (1982). 
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Disparate impact doctrine is an important but limited counterpoint to 
the dominant strain of formal equality in sex discrimination law.132 De-
spite its promise for transforming workplaces that disadvantage women, 
disparate impact law has made less of a mark on sex inequality than one 
might expect.133 In addition to the law’s potential for insulating institu-
tionally constructed sex difference from disparate impact challenges, 
disparate impact doctrine contains further obstacles that render it in-
complete as an alternative model to formal equality. The requirement 
that plaintiffs identify a specific practice that caused the disparate im-
pact is a high hurdle for employees faced with complex employment 
selection processes.134 Moreover, even if disparate impact is established, 
the disparity may still be justified if the challenged practice falls within 
the business necessity defense.135 For example, if the employer demon-
strates that a certain level of experience is necessary to do the job, the 
employer may require such experience even if structures or cultures 
within its workplace have limited the capacity of women to obtain such 
experience. Taken together, these difficulties have meant that disparate 
impact doctrine has had only a limited impact on women’s ability to 
challenge inequality in the workplace.136 
A second area of sex discrimination law that strays from the bounda-
ries of formal equality is sexual harassment law. Sexual harassment 
doctrine reflects an amalgam of formal equality and anti-subordination, 
sharing features of both.137 The analysis for determining whether the 
 
132. See, e.g., Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination: The Reality of Supreme 
Court Rhetoric, 86 Geo. L.J. 279, 335–38 (arguing that the category of cases in which the distinc-
tion between disparate impact and disparate treatment proves decisive is quite narrow). 
133. See John J. Donahue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment Dis-
crimination Litigation, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 983, 989 (1991) (noting that disparate impact cases 
accounted for less than two percent of federal employment discrimination cases in 1989); Linda 
Hamilton Kreiger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination 
and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 1161, 1162 n.3 (1995) (noting that the vast 
majority of Title VII challenges are disparate treatment cases). 
134. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 105(a), 105 Stat. 1074 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(k)(1)(A)(i)-(B(i)) (requiring the complaining party to identify the specific employment practice 
that causes disparate impact, but providing that a plaintiff may challenge a multi-component proc-
ess if its elements “are not capable of separation for analysis”); Flagg, supra note 120, at 97 
(explaining how this requirement places a high burden on disparate impact plaintiffs). 
135. See Selmi, supra note 132, at 287 n.31 (noting that courts deciding disparate impact 
cases show a strong willingness to accept employer justifications, so that “disparate impact cases 
are notoriously difficult to prove and infrequently brought”). 
136. See Flagg, supra note 120, at 98 (concluding that while none of the individual hurdles 
facing disparate impact claimants is insurmountable, “the cumulative effect of these obstacles is 
significant”). 
137. Cf. Chamallas, Feminist Legal Theory, supra note 43, at 54–55 (discussing roots of sex-
ual harassment in anti-subordination theory, but noting that the courts have never fully accepted 
this theory); Abrams, Judicial Evasion of Difference, supra note 64, at 1431 (noting that sexual 
harassment law under Title VII reflects a “fuller appreciation of group-based difference” and “ac-
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conduct at issue was sexual harassment starts from a formal equality 
premise. To be actionable, the harassment must occur because of the sex 
of the target, requiring the plaintiff to demonstrate that she (or he) was 
singled out for harassment because of her (or his) sex. This requirement 
is consistent with formal equality, as it focuses on whether the individ-
ual who experienced the harassment was treated differently on the basis 
of his or her sex.138 However, in applying this standard, courts have not 
strictly required proof of differential treatment on the basis of sex, and 
have instead focused on the disadvantageous effect of the harassment on 
its victims.139 At least with respect to male-female conduct of a sexual 
nature, courts typically presume that the harassment occurred because of 
sex.140 Thus, although the inquiry into whether the plaintiff was harassed 
because of her sex fits well within a formal equality framework, the test 
for sex-based treatment is applied more loosely, focusing on sex-linked 
disadvantages rather than different treatment. Some courts have even 
more explicitly drawn on structuralist interpretations to ground the sex-
based nature of the harm in employment structures that render women 
more vulnerable to workplace harassment.141
Sexual harassment law transcends the limits of formal equality in an-
other respect as well. The standard for institutional liability for sexual 
harassment is not the typical formal equality standard. Title VII holds 
employers liable for sexual harassment—even by persons who are not 
regarded as agents of the employer—if the employer failed to take rea-
sonably responsive action after receiving notice of the harassment.142 
This standard requires employers to do more than treat all harassment 
victims the same regardless of their sex, as formal equality would re-
quire. Employers cannot successfully argue that they treat men and 
 
knowledges power inequalities between men and women,” in contrast to the general “difference 
evasion” in discrimination law). 
138. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998) (emphasizing that 
sexual harassment plaintiffs must always demonstrate that the harassing conduct occurred because 
of their sex). 
139. See Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 Yale L.J. 1683, 1716–20 
(1998) (demonstrating that courts are much less inclined to find that nonsexual harassment oc-
curred on the basis of the target’s sex than they are to find that sexual harassment occurred because 
of the target’s sex). 
140. See, e.g., Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 756 (1998) (stating that “[s]exual 
harassment under Title VII presupposes intentional conduct”); Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80 (stating that 
it is reasonable for courts to presume, in cases involving male-female harassment of a sexual nature, 
that the conduct occurred because of sex). 
141. See Chamallas, Structuralist and Cultural Domination Theories, supra note 64, at 2399–
2401 (discussing structuralist influences in Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 
1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991), a hostile environment sexual harassment case). 
142. See Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 256 (4th Cir. 1983); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 
897, 905 (11th Cir. 1982); EEOC—Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 
1604.11(d)-(e) (2000). 
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women alike by ignoring all sexual harassment, regardless of the sex of 
the victim. Sexual harassment doctrine under Title IX takes a similar 
approach, although it adopts a more stringent standard for institutional 
liability, requiring actual notice and deliberate indifference.143 By focus-
ing on how institutions perpetuate discriminatory cultures, this standard 
goes beyond formal equality, requiring more than the identical treatment 
of similarly situated men and women.144 
Despite important exceptions in the areas of disparate impact doctrine 
and sexual harassment, alternative approaches to formal equality have 
not taken root in sex discrimination law on a widespread basis.145 In 
light of this picture, one might expect that Title IX would approach sex 
equality in sport from a formal equality perspective. Yet, the test that has 
developed for measuring participation opportunities in school athletic 
programs, and the way courts have applied it, draws more from anti-
subordination and structuralist analysis than formal equality. The re-
mainder of this Article attempts to elaborate and justify the theory of 
equality underlying Title IX and to explore the implications of this theo-
retical grounding. 
II. The Law of Title IX: Beyond Formal Equality and Toward a More 
Critical Analysis of Sex Difference 
Commentators who have examined Title IX’s relationship to feminist 
theory have generally concluded that Title IX is a liberal feminist law 
that requires only formal equality.146 At most, they view Title IX as a 
 
143. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999). 
144. See Deborah Brake, School Liability for Peer Sexual Harassment After Davis: Shifting 
from Intent to Causation in Discrimination Law, 12 Hastings Women’s L.J. (forthcoming 2001) 
(manuscript on file with author); Deborah Brake, The Cruelest of the Gender Police: Student-to-
Student Sexual Harassment and Anti-Gay Peer Harassment Under Title IX, 1 Geo. J. Gender & L. 
37, 50–51 (1999).  
145. See Chamallas, Structuralist and Cultural Domination Theories, supra note 64, at 2371 
(stating that while structuralist and cultural domination theories have had some impact on Title VII 
doctrine, their influences “are still at the margins of Title VII”); Rhode, Occupational Inequality,
supra note 51, at 1208 (“In part, the difficulty stems from the law’s traditional focus on gender 
differences rather than gender disadvantage. Its primary objective has been to secure similar treat-
ment for those similarly situated; less effort has centered on remedying the structural factors that 
contribute to women’s dissimilar and disadvantaged status.”). 
146. Jessica E. Jay, Women’s Participation in Sports: Four Feminist Perspectives, 7 Tex. J. 
Women & L. 1, 19 (1997) (“Title IX is a formal equality law, subject to some exceptions which are 
still based on this model.”); see also Birrell & Richter, supra note 1, at 222–23 (characterizing Title 
IX as a “liberal” approach to “remedy . . . women’s exclusion from sport [that] has merely resulted 
in incorporation and has failed to accomplish the far-reaching changes in sport some feminists had 
advocated”); Michael A. Messner & Donald F. Sabo, Toward a Critical Feminist Reappraisal of 
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slight departure from formal equality because it accommodates sex dif-
ference through the authorization of sex-separate teams, thus 
supplementing formal equality with special treatment in certain circum-
stances.147 Although this understanding is consistent with the law’s early 
applications,148 it does not account for modern developments in Title IX 
law. In recent years, the case law evaluating Title IX compliance has 
surpassed the limits of formal equality, most significantly in the ap-
proach to sex difference in the area of athletic participation. 
The most litigated and contested part of Title IX’s application to ath-
letics, and its most notable departure from formal equality, is the 
standard for measuring equality in the allocation of athletic participation 
opportunities.149 This aspect of Title IX compliance examines whether 
the number of opportunities provided to male and female athletes dis-
criminates on the basis of sex.150 The test for measuring discrimination 
in this area—commonly known as “the three-part test”—comes from the 
statute’s regulations and the interpretations by the agency primarily re-
sponsible for enforcing Title IX, the Department of Education Office for 
Civil Rights (OCR). 
 
Sport, Men, and the Gender Order, in Sport, Men, and the Gender Order, supra note 26 [hereinaf-
ter Messner & Sabo, Toward a Feminist Reappraisal] (describing Title IX as “a decidedly liberal 
initiative,” and defining liberal feminism as an approach to equality that stresses sex similarities 
and the individual’s right to equal opportunity); Wendy Olson, Beyond Title IX: Toward an Agenda 
for Women and Sports in the 1990’s, 3 Yale J.L. & Feminism 105, 116–17 (1990) (analyzing Title 
IX as based on an “equality” model that uses male sports as the standard); Note, Cheering on 
Women and Girls in Sports: Using Title IX to Fight Gender Role Oppression, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 
1627, 1634–35 (1997) (stating that Title IX comes out of a formal equality model, defining equal 
opportunity as opening up access to male structures).  
147. Cf. Bartlett, supra note 43, at 4–6 (discussing substantive equality as a strain of feminist 
legal theory in which sex difference is recognized and accommodated through sex-specific treat-
ment). 
148. See Diane Heckman, Scoreboard: A Concise Chronological Twenty-Five Year History of 
Title IX Involving Interscholastic and Intercollegiate Athletics, 7 Seton Hall J. Sport L. 391, 398 
(1997) [hereinafter Heckman, Scoreboard] (discussing Title IX litigation on “cross-over” cases, in 
which girls or boys attempt to play on a team that is offered to members of the other sex). 
149. See Anne Bloom, Financial Disparity as Evidence of Discrimination Under Title IX, 2
Vill. Sports & Ent. L.F. 5, 11 (1995) (noting that most Title IX litigation has focused on the three-
part test to increase women’s share of athletic participation opportunities); B. Glenn George, Title 
IX and the Scholarship Dilemma, 9 Marq. Sports L.J. 273, 275, 278 (1999) [hereinafter George, 
Scholarship Dilemma] (noting that litigation in the 1990s “focused primarily on the issue of par-
ticipation rates,” and contending that the next wave of Title IX enforcement is focusing on the 
equitable allocation of athletic scholarships). 
150. See generally Policy Interpretation, supra note 6 (establishing standards for measuring 
equal accommodation of student interests and abilities in the provision of athletic participation 
opportunities). 
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A. The Development of Title IX Standards in 
Athletics and the Three-Part Test 
Title IX itself does not specify any standards for identifying sex dis-
crimination in school athletic programs or in any other specific context. 
The statute’s prohibition of sex discrimination is framed generally and 
comprehensively: “No person in the United States shall, on the basis of 
sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be 
subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity re-
ceiving Federal financial assistance. . .”151 
Title IX’s standards governing athletics derive from the regulations 
and interpretations issued by the federal agency charged with enforcing 
Title IX, previously the Department of Health, Education and Welfare 
(HEW), and now the Department of Education (DOE).152 The Title IX 
regulations that were issued in 1975 pursuant to congressional authori-
zation remain controlling today.153 These regulations reflect the agency’s 
assessment that equality in this context requires more than an equal right 
for male and female students to try out for the same teams. Instead of 
adopting such a classic formal equality stance, the regulations permit 
schools to offer separate athletic teams for male and female athletes, and 
set standards for measuring equal opportunity in the context of sex-
separate programs.154 
The resulting set of standards divide Title IX compliance into three 
main areas, which must be independently evaluated.155 The three areas 
 
151. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1994). 
152. The former Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) was the primary en-
forcement agency for Title IX until 1979, when HEW was abolished and the Department of 
Education assumed primary responsibility for Title IX enforcement. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 
F.2d 888, 895 (1st Cir. 1993) (discussing history of federal responsibility for Title IX enforcement). 
153. See id. (deferring to Title IX regulations and noting the particularly high degree of defer-
ence afforded because Congress specifically authorized HEW to prescribe standards for athletics 
programs). The regulations were the result of a congressional compromise known as the “Javits 
Amendment,” that, in lieu of attempting to exempt revenue-producing sports from Title IX, in-
structed the agency to issue regulations implementing Title IX, “includ[ing] with respect to 
intercollegiate athletic activities reasonable provisions considering the nature of particular sports.” 
Education Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380, § 844, 88 Stat. 484, 612 (1974); see also 
Heckman, Scoreboard, supra note 148, at 395 (describing the political events leading up to the 
Title IX regulations). 
154. The regulations explicitly permit institutions to provide separate-sex athletic teams 
“where selection for such teams is based upon competitive skill or the activity involved is a contact 
sport.” 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(b) (1999). Because intercollegiate and interscholastic athletic teams are 
nearly always selected on the basis of competitive skill, these programs are typically provided on a 
sex-segregated basis. 
155. Institutions covered by Title IX must comply with each of these three areas in order to be 
in compliance with Title IX; they may not “trade off” compliance in one area with a violation in 
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are, broadly speaking: participation, scholarships, and the treatment and 
benefits provided to male and female athletes.156 Of these, by far the 
most litigated, and arguably the most important, is participation, which 
addresses the allocation of opportunities to play competitive sports 
among male and female students.157 In the terms used by the regulations, 
the relevant inquiry asks “[w]hether the selection of sports and levels of 
competition effectively accommodate the interests and abilities of mem-
bers of both sexes.”158 Compliance in this area has come to be measured 
by a three-part test developed by HEW in a Policy Interpretation that the 
agency issued in 1979.159 Under the three-part test, an institution may 
comply with Title IX by meeting any one of the following three stan-
dards: 
(1) [providing] intercollegiate level participation opportuni-
ties for male and female students . . . in numbers 
substantially proportionate to their respective enroll-
ments; or 
(2) show[ing] a history and continuing practice of program 
expansion which is demonstrably responsive to the de-
veloping interest and abilities of the members of [the 
underrepresented] sex; or 
(3) demonstrat[ing] that the interests and abilities of the 
members of [the underrepresented] sex have been fully 
and effectively accommodated by the present pro-
gram.160 
another, or meet two out of three. See Roberts v. Colo. St. Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 828 (10th 
Cir. 1993); Cohen, 991 F.2d at 897. 
156. See generally Ellen J. Vargyas, Breaking Down Barriers: A Legal Guide to Title IX 15–30 
(1994) (explaining Title IX athletics framework). 
157. See, e.g., George, Scholarship Dilemma, supra note 149, at 275–76 (“The question of 
participation opportunities understandably took precedent— issues like financial aid, equipment 
budgets, and practice facilities were irrelevant unless women’s teams existed to enjoy those bene-
fits.”). 
158. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c). The other nine factors listed in the regulation for determining 
“equal athletic opportunity” relate to the treatment of and benefits provided to male and female 
athletes, which are evaluated separately from the allocation of participation opportunities. Id. These 
factors include the scheduling of games, availability of facilities, coaching, and equipment and 
uniforms, among others. Id. 
159. Policy Interpretation, supra note 6, at 71,414. The Policy Interpretation was issued to 
provide greater clarity in response to university questions after the agency had received nearly 100 
complaints alleging discrimination in intercollegiate athletics. Id. at 71,413. 
160. Id. at 71,418. The plaintiff has the burden of proof on prongs one and three of the test; 
the university has the burden of proof under prong two. See Brown, 991 F.2d at 901–02. 
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Although the test is phrased in terms of intercollegiate athletics, it also 
applies to other types of athletic programs, including elementary and 
secondary competitive sports, club sports and recreational sports.161
The test’s focus on the situation of the “underrepresented sex” re-
flects the agency’s concern with expanding opportunities for female 
athletes and avoiding measures of interest that would have the effect of 
suppressing the growth of women’s athletic participation.162 Throughout 
the Policy Interpretation, the agency acknowledged that female sports 
participation has been and continues to be limited by institutional dis-
crimination.163 The document states that, in determining student athletic 
interest, care must be taken to ensure that the measurement of interest 
does not disadvantage the underrepresented sex.164 It explicitly recog-
nizes the connection between the athletic interests and abilities that girls 
and women possess and the presence of discrimination in the opportuni-
ties available to them.165 
Read as a whole, the Policy Interpretation reflects a critical approach 
to sex difference that does not accept existing differences in male and 
female interest levels as either inherent or independent of past and pre-
sent opportunity structures. The test and the rationale behind it mark a 
 
161. Id. at 71,413–14 (“This Policy Interpretation is designed specifically for intercollegiate 
athletics. However, its general principles will often apply to club, intramural, and interscholastic 
athletic programs, which are also covered by regulation. Accordingly, the Policy Interpretation may 
be used for guidance by the administrators of such programs when appropriate.”); see also Horner 
v. Ky. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 43 F.3d 265, 274 (6th Cir. 1994) (applying three-part test to Title 
IX challenge to interscholastic athletic opportunities). 
162. Although in theory, “the underrepresented sex” might in some instances refer to males, it 
was commonly understood that in the context of athletics, this meant women. See Policy Interpreta-
tion, supra note 6, at 71,419 app. A (discussing widespread discrimination against women in 
intercollegiate athletics). 
163. See id. at 71,414 (discussing the obligation to effectively accommodate the interests and 
abilities of male and female students, and stating that “[i]n most cases, this will entail development 
of athletic programs that substantially expand opportunities for women to participate and compete 
at all levels”); id. at 71,419 (“Participation in intercollegiate sports has historically been empha-
sized for men but not women. Partially as a consequence of this, participation rates of women are 
far below those of men.”). 
164. The Policy Interpretation specifically directs institutions that they may assess student in-
terest and ability:  
[B]y nondiscriminatory methods of their choosing provided. . . . [that] [t]he processes take 
into account the nationally increasing levels of women’s interests and abilities. . .[and] [t]he 
methods of determining interest and ability do not disadvantage the members of an under-
represented sex. . .[and] [t]he methods are responsive to the expressed interests of students 
capable of intercollegiate competition who are members of an underrepresented sex.  
Id. at 71,417. 
165. See id. at 71,419 (citing data documenting discrimination against women’s athletic pro-
grams in the numbers of participation opportunities offered, scholarship dollars, and other benefits 
provided to female athletes including recruiting and coaching). 
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departure from formal equality by targeting the structures that have re-
sulted in different levels of athletic interest and participation, rather than 
accepting male-female difference as a legitimate basis for allocating re-
sources and opportunities. Court decisions applying the three-part test 
even more clearly articulate this perspective. 
B. The Three-Part Test in the Courts 
In several significant cases, the courts have elaborated upon the inter-
relation between institutional structures and the respective situations of 
men and women in athletics.166 To date, courts have adopted the three-
part test as the governing standard for measuring Title IX compliance in 
the area of athletics participation, despite challenges to the test’s legiti-
macy.167 The most significant challenge to the three-part test, and the 
most comprehensive explanation of the rationale underlying the test, are 
found in the district court and First Circuit decisions in Cohen v. Brown 
University.168 
This protracted litigation was initiated by a class of female athletes, 
including lead plaintiff Amy Cohen, a gymnast who lost her team when 
Brown eliminated university funding for its varsity women’s gymnastics 
and volleyball teams as part of a budget-cutting plan to reduce athletic 
 
166. Title IX is enforceable in court or through the Office for Civil Rights. See Cannon v. 
Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 717 (1979). The substantive standards for evaluating Title IX 
compliance do not depend on the route of enforcement, although the available remedies and the 
procedures for complaining vary. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 76 (1992) 
(upholding availability of damages remedy under Title IX for private cause of action alleging inten-
tional discrimination); Setty, supra note 31, at 339–46 (comparing difficulties involved in 
enforcing Title IX through litigation and through the Office for Civil Rights and urging reforms of 
OCR to facilitate better Title IX enforcement). 
167. Every circuit that has considered the issue has adopted the three-part test as the control-
ling test for Title IX compliance in the area of athletic participation opportunities. See Cohen v. 
Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1993), remanded to, 879 F. Supp. 185 (D.R.I. 1995), aff’d in 
part and rev’d in part, 101 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1186 (1997); Kelley v. 
Bd. of Trs., 35 F.3d 265, 268 (7th Cir. 1994); Favia v. Ind. Univ. of Pa., 7 F.3d 332, 335–36 (3d Cir. 
1993); Pederson v. La. St. Univ., 213 F.3d 858, 879 (5th Cir. 2000); Neal v. Bd. of Trs. of Cal. St. 
Univs., 198 F.3d 763, 767–68 (9th Cir. 1999); Boucher v. Syracuse Univ., 164 F.3d 113, 117 (2d 
Cir. 1999); Horner v. Ky. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 43 F.3d 265, 274 (6th Cir. 1994); Roberts v. 
Colo. St. Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 828–29 (10th Cir. 1993); see also Beasley v. Ala. St. Univ., 
966 F. Supp. 1117, 1122 (M.D. Ala. 1997) (explaining Title IX requirements using the three-part 
test); Bryant v. Colgate Univ., No. 93-CV-1029, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8393, at *26–38 (N.D.N.Y. 
June 11, 1996) (applying the three-part test to decide motion for summary judgment).  
168. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 809 F. Supp. 978 (D.R.I. 1992), aff’d, 991 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 
1993), remanded to, 879 F. Supp. 185 (D.R.I. 1995), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 101 F.3d 155 
(1st Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1186 (1997). 
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expenditures.169 The case began in 1991 when Brown, facing a budget 
crunch, demoted the two women’s varsity teams to “donor-funded var-
sity status”—a move that effectively would have ended varsity level 
competition for the two teams.170 At the same time, Brown also demoted 
men’s water polo and golf to donor-funded status.171 
Although at face value, the cuts appeared gender-neutral, the reality is 
more complex. The elimination of the two women’s teams in a program 
already disproportionately slanted in favor of male athletes exacerbated 
the situation of female athletes at Brown by further reducing the number 
of participation opportunities available to them.172 Moreover, the budg-
etary impact of the cuts was far from neutral. Cutting the women’s 
teams would have resulted in a net savings of $62,000 per year, while 
the cuts in the men’s teams netted only $16,000 per year.173 The reason 
for the disparity was that the men’s teams had a strong donor base of 
supportive alumni, and were already primarily funded by donations.174 
The four teams were told that they could continue to play at the varsity 
level if they could find donations to make up for the lost university 
funds.175 While both men’s and women’s donor-funded teams are at a 
comparative disadvantage to university-funded teams, the men’s donor-
funded teams generally enjoy a wider donor base by virtue of having 
existed for a longer period of time.176 Thus, the teams were differently 
situated with respect to the cuts.177 
169. Brown, 101 F.3d at 161. 
170. Id. 
171. Id. 
172. Id. at 163 (accepting plaintiffs’ contention that, because men retained a disproportionate 
share of intercollegiate athletic opportunities at Brown both before and after the demotions, “what 
appeared to be the even-handed demotions of two men’s and two women’s teams, in fact, perpetu-
ated Brown’s discriminatory treatment of women in the administration of its intercollegiate athletics 
program”). 
173. Lynette Labinger, Title IX and Athletics: A Discussion of Brown University v. Cohen by 
Plaintiffs’ Counsel, 20 Women’s Rts. L. Rep. 85, 89 (1998). Interestingly, as a statement of Brown’s 
priorities, the year before Brown cut the four teams in response to budget pressures, it spent 
$250,000 to buy out and replace its entire football coaching staff mid-contract in the middle of a 
losing football season. Id.; see also id. at 95 (estimating that Brown spent “at least $1 million, and 
probably closer to $2 million, if not more, to defend this case,” not including the costs of comply-
ing with the settlement and the court order, all to save $80,000 per year by cutting the four teams); 
John C. Weistart, Can Gender Equity Find a Place in Commercialized College Sport?, 3 Duke J. 
Gender L. & Pol’y 191, 220 (1996) [hereinafter Weistart, Gender Equity] (noting that at the time of 
the cuts, Brown spent $4.74 million on varsity sports, and that of this, “three men’s sports—
football, basketball and hockey—received 42 percent of the available funds”). 
174. Labinger, supra note 173, at 89. 
175. See id. 
176. See Brown, 879 F. Supp. at 201 n.30 (citing coach’s testimony that women’s teams, al-
though they invested the same amount of efforts into fundraising, met with much lower success in 
the fundraising arena because men typically control household finances and men’s teams had many 
more alumni due to their much longer history at Brown). 
177. Id. 
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In defending the lawsuit, Brown launched a full-scale assault on the 
three-part test and its underlying philosophy.178 Brown argued that, by 
focusing on raising the opportunities available to the underrepresented 
sex, the three-part test discriminates against male athletes because men 
as a group are more interested in playing sports than women.179 As an 
alternative to the three-part test, Brown proposed measuring the relative 
levels of interest expressed by men and women in playing intercolle-
giate sports, and then providing opportunities to both sexes 
commensurate with their relative interest levels.180 Brown argued that its 
proposal would treat men and women equally because their expressed 
interest in athletics would be accommodated to the same extent. For ex-
ample, if, as Brown argued, twice as many male students than female 
students were interested in playing intercollegiate sports, Title IX should 
permit it to maintain approximately twice as many athletic opportunities 
for male than female athletes.181 
The First Circuit twice rebuffed Brown’s challenge to the three-part 
test and its proposed alternative, first in affirming the district court’s 
preliminary injunction ordering Brown not to cut the two women’s 
teams,182 and second in affirming the district court’s post-trial decision 
finding Brown in violation of Title IX.183 Both First Circuit opinions in 
the case resoundingly rejected Brown’s argument that Title IX should 
measure equality in participation opportunities based on the actual, ex-
pressed interest levels of male and female students.184 
The First Circuit’s second decision in the case, affirming the district 
court’s determination of liability, provides the most comprehensive 
analysis and defense of the three-part test by a court to date. This deci-
sion upheld the district court’s ruling, which it made after a trial on the 
merits in which the relative interest argument was extensively litigated, 
that Brown failed to comply with each prong of the three-part test.185 
First, Brown failed prong one of the test because the evidence showed 
that women held a disproportionately low share of Brown’s intercolle-
giate athletic participation opportunities, constituting thirty-eight 
percent of the school’s athletes, compared to fifty-one percent of the 
 
178. Id. at 205. 
179. Brown made this argument at all levels and in various forms throughout the protracted 
litigation. See Cohen v. Brown Univ., 809 F. Supp. 978, 987 (D.R.I. 1992), aff’d, 991 F.2d 888, 
899 (1st Cir. 1993), remanded to 879 F. Supp. 185, 204–06 (D.R.I. 1995), aff’d in part and rev’d 
in part, 101 F.3d 155, 169 (1st Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1186 (1997). 
180. Brown, 879 F. Supp. at 204. 
181. Id. at 204 n.40. 
182. See Brown, 991 F.2d at 907. 
183. See Brown, 101 F.3d at 187. 
184. See Brown, 101 F.3d at 174; Brown, 991 F.2d at 899. 
185. See Brown, 879 F. Supp. at 211–13. 
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student body.186 Second, Brown failed prong two of the test because it 
could not show that it had “maintained a continuing practice” of pro-
gram expansion for women; in fact, other than adding one new women’s 
team in the 1980s, Brown had not increased its women’s program since 
the 1970s, when it first launched a women’s athletic program at the 
school.187 Finally, Brown failed prong three of the test because there 
were women on campus with sufficient interest and ability to field addi-
tional intercollegiate teams not offered at the school.188 
In its defense, Brown attacked the legitimacy of the three-part test it-
self.189 The First Circuit’s response to these attacks, and its justification 
and explanation of the three-part test, constitute the most enduring and 
far-reaching parts of its opinion. The court first addressed Brown’s ar-
gument that the test amounted to affirmative action and preferential 
treatment for female athletes and rebuked Brown for its “persistent in-
vocation of the inflammatory terms ‘affirmative action,’ ‘preference,’ 
and ‘quota.’”190 As the court saw it, “this is not an affirmative action 
 
186. Id. at 211, aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 101 F.3d at 166. Because institutions largely 
control the number of athletic positions available to men and women when they decide to offer 
single-sex teams, decide what teams to sponsor, and allocate funding and a coaching staff for those 
teams, the court measured participation opportunities by counting the number of actual partici-
pants. Brown, 101 F.3d at 164. Brown’s argument that there existed a certain number of “unfilled 
slots” on the women’s teams that should be counted as participation opportunities was rejected by 
the court and refuted by the testimony of Brown’s coaches, who stated that they recruited the num-
ber of athletes that the team could support. Id. at 164, 167; Brown, 879 F. Supp. at 202–04. 
187. Brown, 879 F. Supp. at 191, aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 101 F.3d at 166. In determin-
ing program expansion, the court disregarded evidence of contraction in the men’s athletic program, 
holding that program expansion for the underrepresented sex may not be satisfied by reducing the 
opportunities available to the overrepresented sex. Id.; see also Labinger, supra note 173, at 89 
(discussing history of women’s athletics at Brown and noting that between 1979 and the time of the 
lawsuit, Brown added only one women’s sport—women’s track in 1982). 
188. See Brown, 879 F. Supp. at 190, aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 101 F.3d at 180. The first 
circuit noted that: 
[W]hile the question of full and effective accommodation of athletics [sic] interests and 
abilities is potentially a complicated issue where plaintiffs seek to create a new team or to 
elevate to varsity status a team that has never competed at the varsity level, no such diffi-
culty is presented here, where plaintiffs seek to reinstate what were successful university-
funded teams right up until the moment the teams were demoted. 
Brown, 101 F.3d at 190. In addition to the two demoted teams, the plaintiffs also established unmet 
interest in women’s fencing, skiing, and water polo, sports that were not offered at the varsity level. 
Id. at 190, n.16; Labinger, supra note 173, at 91–92; see also Heckman, Scoreboard, supra note 
148, at 420–21 n.142 (discussing successful litigation brought by female athletes seeking to up-
grade club sports to varsity status). 
189. See Brown, 101 F.3d at 162. 
190. Id. at 169. 
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case.”191 Rather, the court explained, the plaintiffs sought neither prefer-
ential treatment nor affirmative action, but an end to discrimination.192
As the court seemed to recognize, Brown’s characterization of the 
three-part test as an affirmative action requirement stemmed from 
Brown’s constricted view of the meaning of discrimination. Because 
Brown equated “discrimination” with the formal equality standard of 
treating similarly situated persons the same, Brown saw the three-part 
test as going beyond merely ending discrimination and requiring instead 
the preferential treatment of female athletes.193 Critics of the three-part 
test since the Brown litigation have continued to attack the three-part 
test as an affirmative action  
requirement, sharing Brown’s more limited conception of discrimina-
tion.194 
The First Circuit viewed Title IX as ending discrimination rather than 
requiring affirmative action because it took a more searching approach 
to the existence of sex difference and its role in a discrimination analy-
sis.195 The court rejected Brown’s implicit assumption that the sex 
differences that it identified were inherent or natural, and independent 
of institutional structures. Instead, it found that the differences Brown 
cited were, to some extent, the product of the very institutional practices 
that were being challenged.196 As the court explained: 
Interest and ability rarely develop in a vacuum; they evolve as a 
function of opportunity and experience. . . . Thus, there exists the 
danger that, rather than providing a true measure of women’s inter-
est in sports, statistical evidence purporting to reflect women’s 
interest instead provides only a measure of the very discrimination 
that is and has been the basis for women’s lack of opportunity to 
participate in sports. . . .We conclude that, even if it can be empiri-
cally demonstrated that, at a particular time, women have less 
interest in sports than do men, such evidence, standing alone, can-
not justify providing fewer athletics opportunities for women than 
for men.197 
The First Circuit’s understanding of the connection between opportu-
nity structures and men’s and women’s interest levels benefited greatly 
 
191. Id. 
192. Id. at 170–72. The court also noted that Brown had not demonstrated that the enforcement of 
Title IX compliance in the case would adversely impact male athletes. Id. at 172. 
193. See id. at 169. 
194. See, e.g., Dudley & Rutherglen, supra note 38, at 212. 
195. Brown, 101 F.3d at 174–80. 
196. See id. at 178–81. 
197. Id. at 179–80. 
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from the district court’s findings on the subject in its post-trial decision 
on the merits.198 The district court rejected each of Brown’s proposed 
measures of male and female interest levels on the grounds that they 
were not independent of existing differences in opportunities.199 The 
court first rejected Brown’s use of student surveys to prove women’s 
lower level of athletic interest because any survey of Brown’s student 
body would be distorted by the existing athletic opportunities at 
Brown.200 As the court explained, “[w]hat students are present on cam-
pus to participate in a survey of interests has already been 
predetermined through the recruiting practices of the coaches.”201 In ad-
dition, the district court rejected Brown’s reliance on surveys of 
applicants to Brown since these measurements also would be influenced 
by Brown’s existing opportunities.202 Students seriously interested in 
sports not offered at Brown would be less likely to apply to Brown.203 
Finally, and most significantly, the district court found that no measure-
ment of existing interest levels would be reliably independent of 
existing opportunity structures.204 The court concluded that as long as 
institutions such as Brown allocate a greater share of athletic resources 
and opportunities to males, the very allocation decisions that are being 
challenged shape the relative interest of men and women in playing 
sports.205 
The First Circuit’s appreciation of the interdependence between op-
portunity structures and interest levels enabled it to hold Brown 
accountable for the different opportunities that it provided to male and 
female students. The court believed that accepting Brown’s position 
would be tantamount to letting the university off the hook for differ-
ences in interest levels that Brown itself had participated in 
constructing.206 Moreover, the court concluded, if Title IX standards 
were altered to adopt Brown’s position, Title IX’s potential as an anti-
discrimination law would be severely limited.207 As the court explained, 
 
198. See Brown, 879 F. Supp. at 206. 
199. See id. at 206–07. 
200. Id. at 206. 
201. Id. 
202. Id. at 206–07. 
203. Id. at 206 
204. Id. at 207 (concluding that surveying the relative interest levels of men and women in 
playing intercollegiate athletics cannot “account for the extent to which opportunities drive inter-
est”). The court cited crew as an example of a sport in which interest commonly develops only after 
matriculation at college. Id. 
205. Id. (citing testimony of Brown’s expert, who, when asked, “Would you agree with the fol-
lowing statement? If Brown provides far more opportunities for women, then maybe the percentage 
of interested women will rise?” answered, “Sure, I don’t see anything wrong with that.”). 
206. Brown, 101 F.3d at 169. 
207. Id. at 176. 
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Brown’s “relative interests standard would entrench and fix by law the 
significant gender-based disparity in athletics opportunities found by the 
district court to exist at Brown.”208 Brown ultimately settled the case 
and agreed to provide guaranteed levels of funding to women’s gymnas-
tics, fencing, skiing, and water polo.209 The terms of the settlement 
require Brown to maintain the percentage of female athletes within 
3.5% of men’s share of participation.210 
The decisions in Brown represent an important step toward a more 
sophisticated analysis of the meaning and relevance of difference in dis-
crimination law. The approach taken by the district court and the First 
Circuit represents a significant departure from formal equality in two 
respects. First, both courts rejected the notion that treating male and fe-
male athletes the same, by accommodating their expressed interests to a 
similar degree, is sufficient under equality law.211 Second, the courts 
critically probed the meaning of sex difference in athletic interest, find-
ing that institutions such as Brown were at least in part responsible for 
constructing men’s and women’s relative interests in athletics.212 In do-
ing so, they refused to simply attribute the asserted sex differences to 
nature or to general societal forces, and instead focused on the ways in 
which institutions such as Brown shape athletic interest.213 Taken to-
gether, the opinions in the case are a powerful indictment of a formal 
equality perspective that accepts the existence of sex difference as a ba-
sis for limiting the reach of equality law. 
Other courts have followed the reasoning of the Brown decisions. In a 
recent opinion, the Fifth Circuit ruled against Louisiana State University 
(LSU), rejecting LSU’s argument that women are less interested in par-
ticipating in sports than men.214 The court went so far as to chastise LSU 
for taking such a position, stating that, “advancing this argument is re-
markable, since of course fewer women participate in sports, given the 
voluminous evidence that LSU has discriminated against women in re-
 
208. Id. The court concluded that Brown’s proposal would have the effect of “‘limiting re-
quired program expansion for the underrepresented sex to the status quo level of relative 
interests.’ ” Id. at 174. 
209. Labinger, supra note 173, at 94. Brown had already agreed to continue to fully fund 
women’s varsity volleyball at the varsity level on the eve of trial in 1994. Id. at 91. 
210. Id. at 94. This margin assumes that Brown does not eliminate any women’s teams or add 
any men’s teams without also adding women’s teams; otherwise, if Brown alters its program in any 
way that would reduce either women’s absolute number or relative share of athletic opportunities, 
the permissible disparity drops to 2.25%. Id. 
211. See Brown, 879 F. Supp. at 206–07, aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 101 F.3d at 178–79. 
212. See id. 
213. See Brown, 101 F.3d at 180 (stating that “the tremendous growth in women’s participa-
tion in sports since Title IX was enacted disproves Brown’s argument that women are less interested 
in sports for reasons unrelated to lack of opportunity”). 
214.  Pederson v. La. St. Univ., 213 F.3d 858, 878 (5th Cir. 2000). 
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fusing to offer them comparable athletic opportunities to those it offers 
its male students.”215 While other courts have been less explicit in their 
rationales, they have uniformly applied the three-part test in Title IX 
challenges to inequality in participation opportunities.216 
In addition to the arguments made by educational institutions defend-
ing their programs from Title IX challenges brought by female athletes, 
opposition to the three-part test also has come from male athletes whose 
teams have been cut, arguing that the test discriminates against males. In 
such cases, male athletes, as plaintiffs, have attacked the three-part test 
using the same theory as that advocated by Brown: that males are more 
interested in participating in sports than females and therefore deserve a 
larger share of athletic opportunities.217 In this context too, courts have 
rejected the relative interest argument, emphasizing the importance of 
context to the determination of interest and the role of institutional 
structures in differently situating men and women in athletics.218 Like 
the courts in Brown, courts that have considered reverse discrimination 
claims by male athletes have rejected a formal equality approach that 
would treat the claims of male athletes (the overrepresented sex) identi-
cally to discrimination claims by female students (the underrepresented 
sex).219 Instead, they have recognized that male athletes overall retain a 
disproportionately large share of the institution’s athletic opportunities, 
even if individual male athletes are denied an opportunity to participate 
in the sport of their choice.220 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Neal v. Board of Trustees of the Cali-
fornia State Universities221 is representative of the approach courts have 
taken in reverse discrimination claims by male athletes.222 In Neal, the 
Ninth Circuit rejected a claim brought by male wrestlers whose posi-
tions were eliminated when the university decreased the size of its 
men’s athletic teams, as part of a plan to comply with Title IX by raising 
 
215. Id. 
216. See cases cited supra note 167. 
217. See, e.g., Neal v. Bd. of Trs. of Cal. St. Univs., 198 F.3d 763, 768 (9th Cir. 1999); Boula-
hanis v. Bd. of Regents, Ill. St. Univ., 198 F.3d 633, 637 (7th Cir. 1999); Kelley v. Bd. of Trs. of 
Univ. of Ill., 35 F.3d 265, 270–72 (7th Cir. 1994); Harper v. Bd. of Regents, Ill. St. Univ., 35 F. 
Supp. 2d 1118, 1122–23 (C.D. Ill. 1999); Gonyo v. Drake Univ., 879 F. Supp. 1000, 1006 (S.D. 
Iowa 1995). 
218. See, e.g., Neal, 198 F.3d at 768–69; Boulahanis, 198 F.3d at 638; Kelley, 35 F.3d at 269, 
272; Harper, 35 F. Supp. 2d at 1122; Gonyo, 879 F. Supp. at 1004–05. 
219. See, e.g., Neal, 198 F.3d at 767–69; Boulahanis, 198 F.3d at 638; Kelley, 35 F.3d at 272; 
Harper, 35 F. Supp. 2d at 1122; Gonyo, 879 F. Supp. at 1006. 
220. See Neal, 198 F.3d at 768; Boulahanis, 198 F.3d at 639; Neal, 198 F.3d at 768–70; Kel-
ley, 35 F.3d at 269; Harper, 35 F. Supp. 2d at 1122–23; Gonyo, 879 F. Supp. at 1004. 
221. 198 F.3d 763 (9th Cir. 1999). 
222. See cases cited in n. 217, supra.
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women’s disproportionate share of participation opportunities.223 Echo-
ing the First Circuit in Brown, the Ninth Circuit rejected the claim that 
men’s greater interest in athletics warranted the allocation of a larger 
percentage of athletic opportunities to male athletes.224 Calling Title IX 
a “dynamic statute,” the court acknowledged the complex, reciprocal 
relationship between changing societal expectations and women’s inter-
est in sports: 
[W]here society has conditioned women to expect less than their 
fair share of the athletic opportunities, women’s interest in partici-
pating in sports will not rise to a par with men’s overnight. . . . 
Title IX has altered women’s preferences, making them more in-
terested in sports, and more likely to become student athletes.225 
But the Ninth Circuit did not limit its insight into the social construction 
of interest to changes in society generally. Instead, the court, like the 
courts in Brown, recognized the capacity for institutional practices to 
contribute to the construction of interest levels and, in turn, shape the 
social norms that influence interest and expectations. The court stated 
that: 
[T]he creation of additional athletic spots for women would 
prompt universities to recruit more female athletes, in the long run 
shifting women’s demand curve for sports participation. As more 
women participated, social norms discouraging women’s participa-
tion in sports presumably would be further eroded, prompting 
additional increases in women’s participation levels.226 
The court decisions in this area are consistent with the most recent offi-
cial guidance by OCR, which continues to stand by the three-part test. In 
a 1996 policy clarification, the Office for Civil Rights expressed its ap-
proval of recent court interpretations of the three-part test.227 In a letter 
accompanying the policy clarification from Norma Cantu, the Assistant 
 
223. Id. at 765–66. 
224. See id. at 767–69. 
225. Id. at 769. 
226. Id. at 768 n.4. 
227. Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Clarification of Intercollegiate Athletics Pol-
icy Guidance: The Three-Part Test, available at http://www.ed.gov/offices/OCR/clarific.html (Jan. 
16, 1996). The Clarification responded to requests for clarification of the three-part test by critics of 
the test who professed “confusion” about the test’s requirements. See Deborah Brake & Elizabeth 
Catlin, The Path of Most Resistance: The Long Road Toward Gender Equity in Intercollegiate 
Athletics, 3 Duke J. Gender L. & Pol’y 51, 69–73 (1996) (describing the background to the Policy 
Clarification). The real agenda behind the request was to urge the agency to jettison the existing 
three-part test for something closer to the standard advocated by Brown University. Id. 
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Secretary for Civil Rights, the Department explicitly rejected the charge 
of critics that the test is a “quota,” explaining that in the context of sex-
separate athletic opportunities, any test for equality must look at the 
numbers of opportunities available to men compared to the numbers 
available to women.228 The Policy Clarification essentially adopts the 
reasoning of the First Circuit in Cohen v. Brown University and reaf-
firms the three-part test, while providing a greater level of detail about 
how to apply the test than had been provided in the Policy Interpreta-
tion.  
C. Continuing Controversy Over the Three-Part Test 
The uniformity of the courts’ and OCR’s interpretation of the stan-
dards for measuring discrimination in the allocation of athletic 
participation opportunities has resulted in a stable body of law in this 
area. To date, the Supreme Court has indicated no interest in reviewing 
these standards,229 and persistent efforts to amend Title IX or obtain 
other congressional action disapproving of the three-part test have been 
unsuccessful.230 
The consistency of interpretive authority in this area, while reassuring 
to Title IX supporters, has not quieted the ongoing attacks on Title IX 
which derive from arguments that the three-part test discriminates 
against men and mandates affirmative action for women.231 These critics 
take measures of existing athletic interest as their baseline and argue 
that the three-part test discriminates against men because it does not 
similarly accommodate existing male and female interest levels.232 Their 
perspective is that of formal equality: men and women should be treated 
the same (with an equal allocation of athletic opportunities) only to the 
extent that they are alike (have the same current level of athletic inter-
 
228. Letter from Norma V. Cantú, Assistant Secretary, Office for Civil Rights U.S. Dep’t of 
Educ., (Jan. 16, 1996), available at http://www.ed.gov/offices/OCR/clarific.html (accompanying 
the Clarification). 
229. See, e.g., Boulahanis v. Bd. of Regents of Ill. St. Univ., 198 F.3d 633 (7th Cir. 1999), 
cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 2762 (2000); Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1996), cert. 
denied, 520 U.S. 1186 (1997); Kelley v. Univ. of Ill., 35 F.3d 265 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 
U.S. 1128 (1995); Roberts v. Colo. St. Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824 (10th Cir. 1993), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 580 (1993). 
230. See supra notes 32–40 and accompanying text (discussing recent efforts of Title IX op-
ponents to roll back Title IX’s legal standards); see also Brake & Catlin, supra note 227, at 69–74 
(discussing failed efforts to revise Title IX in Congress). 
231. See, e.g., Dudley & Rutherglen, supra note 38, at 212; see also supra notes 33–36 (dis-
cussing advocacy groups that have mobilized around this issue). 
232. See, e.g., Dudley & Rutherglen, supra note 38. 
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est).233 What the critics fail to appreciate, however, is that the three-part 
test as applied by the courts and OCR is not moored in a formal equality 
perspective.234 The First Circuit, for example, rejected formal equality 
when it refused to assume that any difference in men’s and women’s 
athletic interests is independent of the  
conditions of inequality that limit women’s opportunities in  
athletics.235 As the court explained, those who call the test a “quota” fail 
to acknowledge the extent to which universities themselves determine 
the gender ratio of their athletic participation.236 By offering a fixed 
number of athletic opportunities separately to male and female athletes, 
and then recruiting male and female athletes to fill those slots, universi-
ties predetermine the gender composition of the pool from which they 
select their athletes.237 For this reason, the Brown court explained, re-
jecting the three-part test in favor of a standard modelled on a Title VII 
qualified labor pool analysis that uses the share of men and women cur-
rently interested in playing sports as a baseline for setting participation 
levels, would simply reproduce existing inequality in opportunities.238 
The defense of the three-part test adopted by Brown and other court 
decisions is on solid ground, both theoretically and doctrinally. How-
ever, while rejecting formal equality, the courts have not yet explicitly 
articulated the theory of equality that does underlie the three-part test 
nor have they fully explored its implications.239 Court decisions adopt-
ing the three-part test have not looked beyond the disparities in 
 
233. [DB add FN] (To be deleted?) 
234. [DB add FN] (To be deleted?) 
235. Cf. Rhode, Occupational Inequality, supra note 51, at 1211–12 (stating that “[i]t is not 
self-evident that proportional representation in all employment sectors is the ultimate ideal.” How-
ever, such “questions about the precise degree of sex-role differentiation in the ideal society” can 
remain open without ignoring the disadvantages that face women). 
236. Brown, 101 F.3d at 177. 
237. See id; see also Weistart, Gender Equity, supra note 173, at 234 (“[M]ost schools in Di-
vision I and Division II create interest in their programs. They do this by recruiting. Their 
coaches. . .search out appropriate athletic candidates, who are then cajoled, entreated, and given 
special considerations solely to induce them to come to school to play sports.”). 
238. The court explicitly addressed Brown’s use of a Title VII analogy to argue for a more nar-
rowly defined athlete pool than the student body as follows: 
[W]hile Title VII “seeks to determine whether gender-neutral job openings have been filled 
without regard to gender[,] Title IX. . .was designed to address the reality that sports teams, 
unlike the vast majority of jobs, do have official gender requirements, and this statute ac-
cordingly approaches the concept of discrimination differently from Title VII.”. . . 
Accordingly . . . the Title VII concept of the “qualified pool” has no place in a Title IX 
analysis of equal opportunities for male and female athletes because women are not “quali-
fied” to compete for positions on men’s teams, and vice-versa.  
Brown, 101 F.3d at 176, 177. 
239. (new fn) (To be deleted?) 
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participation opportunities to more fully understand the relationship be-
tween how sport programs are structured and the shaping of men’s and 
women’s interest in sport.240 The next section takes a closer look at how 
institutions construct sex inequality in sport, with the objective of 
strengthening the legitimacy of the three-part test and further developing 
the theoretical basis for Title IX’s departure from formal equality. 
III. Understanding Title IX Through Feminist Theory and Developing a 
More Complete Account of  
Sex Inequality in Sport 
A. Existing Feminist Legal Scholarship on Women and Sport: The 
Search for Equality Beyond Assimilation or Accommodation 
In the past two decades, a substantial body of nonlegal scholarship has 
developed that analyzes sport from a feminist perspective.241 This litera-
ture includes historical, sociological, and political analysis of how sport 
structures and reinforces gender relations.242 Feminist analysis of sport 
explores both the contradictions and conflicts that face female athletes, 
and how sport constructs and shapes male and female identities.243 The 
use of sport to “naturalize” sex difference and perpetuate male dominance 
is also acknowledged and discussed.244 Some feminist analyses of sport 
 
240. Cite to Cohen v. Brown, and other decisions cited previously in note 167 upholding 
the 3-part test. 
241. See, e.g., Messner & Sabo, Toward a Feminist Reappraisal, supra note 146, at 1, 2 (dis-
cussing historic feminist neglect of sports and relatively recent growth of feminist scholarship in 
this area). For two excellent recent anthologies of feminist writings on sport, see generally Women, 
Sport, and Culture, supra note 1, and Sport, Men, and the Gender Order, supra note 26. For schol-
arly textbooks on women in sport, see generally Women and Sport: Interdisciplinary Perspectives 
(D. Margaret Costa & Sharon R. Guthrie eds., 1994) and Women in Sport: Issues and Controversies 
(Greta L. Cohen ed., 1993). 
242. See, e.g., Mary A. Boutilier & Lucinda SanGiovanni, The Sporting Woman (1983); Susan 
K. Cahn, Coming on Strong: Gender and Sexuality in Twentieth-Century Women’s Sport (1994); 
Creedon, supra note 26; Festle, supra note 36; Hargreaves, supra note 1; Helen Lenskyj, Out of 
Bounds: Women, Sport & Sexuality (1986). 
243. See, e.g., Cheryl L. Cole, Resisting the Canon: Feminist Cultural Studies, Sport, and 
Technologies of the Body, in Women, Sport, and Culture, supra note 1, at 5, 6. 
244. See, e.g., Lois Bryson, Challenges to Male Hegemony in Sport, in Sport, Men, and the 
Gender Order, supra note 26, at 173, 175–176 [hereinafter Bryson, Challenges to Male Hegemony]
(discussing how sport constructs a dominant masculinity by supporting the ideology of male physi-
cal dominance and “inferiorizing the ‘other’”); Paul Willis, Women in Sport in Ideology, in Women, 
Sport, and Culture supra note 1, at 34, 41–44 (discussing the power of sport more than other social 
institutions to naturalize gender difference and reinforce the ideology of male superiority because 
sport is perceived to be more free and voluntary since it is set apart from the confines of work or 
family life). 
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struggle with the question of how or whether women can transform 
sport from a male-dominated and socially masculine institution into 
something more useful for women.245 Much of this scholarship exposes 
the institutional processes though which sport itself becomes gendered. 
Feminist legal scholarship, however, has not kept pace with the con-
tributions made by sports scholars or with the legal developments under 
Title IX. Compared to other topical areas, such as employment discrimi-
nation, sexual harassment, reproductive issues, sexual exploitation and 
violence against women, athletics has received relatively little attention 
by feminist legal scholars. Yet, while it is relatively sparse, existing 
feminist legal scholarship on athletics makes important contributions 
toward an understanding of women’s situation in sport and lays the 
groundwork for further analysis of Title IX.  
A common theme in feminist legal analysis of sport is an emphasis on 
the need to equally value women’s sport perspectives, rather than forc-
ing women to adopt men’s athletics as the guiding standard.246 
Professors Catharine MacKinnon and Christine Littleton have both ex-
plored this theme and argued for an interpretation of equality law that 
accepts and values women’s distinct athletic perspectives, rather than 
simply treating men and women the same.247 Their writings reflect the 
 
245. See, e.g., Mariah Burton Nelson, Are We Winning Yet? How Women Are Changing 
Sports and Sports Are Changing Women 9 (1991) [hereinafter Nelson, Are We Winning Yet?] (dis-
cussing the emergence of a “partnership model” of sport and citing Riane Ensler, The Chalice and 
the Blade: Our History, Our Future (1987) to observe that “[p]ower is understood not as power-over 
(power as dominance) but as power-to (power as competence)”); Birrell & Richter, supra note 1, at 
221–44 (discussing model of sport played by feminist softball players as valuing teamwork, skill, 
inclusiveness, physicality and cooperation); Nancy Theberge, Toward a Feminist Alternative of 
Sport as a Male Preserve, in Women, Sport, and Culture, supra note 1, at 181, 181–92 (proposing 
the development of sport as a feminist social practice in which sport is an integrated physical and 
mental process that gives meaning to women’s experience and enables them to experience their 
bodies as powerful); David Whitson, The Embodiment of Gender: Discipline, Domination and 
Empowerment, in Women, Sport, and Culture, supra note 1, at 360, 353–71 [hereinafter Whitson, 
Embodiment of Gender] (discussing the potential for women’s empowerment through “mastery 
play,” the development and self-discovery of skills that women can draw on when necessary and 
enjoy for their own sake); Willis, supra note 244, at 44 (urging women to “offer much more 
strongly their own version of sports reality which undercuts altogether the issues of male supremacy 
and the standards which measure it,” by emphasizing a form of activity that is not competitive and 
that expresses values of human similarity and individual well-being). 
246. I use the term “women’s sport perspectives” here to refer to the ways in which women de-
fine, value, and experience sport. It draws from MacKinnon’s suggestion that women have “a 
contribution of perspective” to make in sport that is distinct, “neither a sentimentalization of our 
oppression as women nor an embrace of the model of the oppressor.” Catharine MacKinnon, 
Women, Self-Possession, and Sport, in Feminism Unmodified, supra note 43, at 123 [hereinafter 
MacKinnon, Women, Self-Possession, and Sport]. 
247. See Christine Littleton, Equality Across Difference: A Place for Rights Discourse? 3 
Wis. Women’s L.J. 189, 208–11 (1987) [hereinafter Littleton, Equality Across Difference]; Chris-
tine A. Littleton, Equality and Feminist Legal Theory, 48 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1043, 1058–59 (1987) 
[hereinafter Littleton, Equality and Feminist Legal Theory]; Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual 
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influence of different voice feminism and its approach to varied mascu-
line and feminine life experiences and values. 
Catharine MacKinnon’s essay, Women, Self-Possession, and Sport in 
her 1982 book, Feminism Unmodified, argues that sport, like other male-
dominated institutions, has been used to construct a dominant male 
sexuality, and that the role of women in sport has been limited by the 
social meaning of being female.248 MacKinnon applauds female athleti-
cism for its challenge to dominant notions of femininity, which force on 
women a passive vulnerability.249 At the same time, she recognizes and 
exposes the socially constructed conflict facing female athletes in a so-
ciety where “[f]emininity has contradicted, [and] masculinity has been 
consistent with, being athletic.”250 MacKinnon observes that when 
women participate in sport as athletes, their very assertion of ownership 
of their bodies provokes hostility by the dominant culture that equates 
female athleticism with lesbianism and the absence of femininity.251 
MacKinnon’s vision of equality in this context would enable women 
to develop and experience their own distinct physicality through sport. 
MacKinnon warns against an approach to equality that forces women to 
“emulat[e] the existing image of the athlete, which has been a male im-
age.”252 Instead, she urges a feminist transformation of sport which 
recognizes that women “have a distinctive contribution to make to sport 
that is neither a sentimentalization of our oppression as women nor an 
embrace of the model of the oppressor.”253 Her analysis of women in 
sport bears a strong resemblance to “different voice” feminism because 
it acknowledges and values women’s different athletic perspectives.254 
Her analysis in this context is in some tension with the body of her work 
generally, which views the existence of female perspectives critically as 
inextricably intertwined with and the product of male dominance.255 
Equality, supra note 41, at 1312–13; MacKinnon, Women, Self-Possession, and Sport, supra note 
246, at 117–24. 
248. MacKinnon, Women, Self-Possession, and Sport, supra note 246, at 119. 
249. See id. at 121 (“For women, when we have engaged in sport . . . it has meant claiming 
and possessing a physicality that is our own . . . This physical self-respect and physical presence 
that women can get from sport is antithetical to femininity. It is our bodies as acting rather than as 
acted upon.”). 
250. Id. at 120. 
251. Id. at 122. 
252. Id. at 119. 
253. Id. at 123. 
254. See Note, Cheering on Women and Girls, supra note 146, at 1628 n.11 (concluding that 
MacKinnon’s discussion of women in sport draws as much from different voice feminism as it does 
from antisubordination or dominance feminism). 
255. A dialogue between Catharine MacKinnon and Carol Gilligan, who is often associated 
with different voice femininism (see generally Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological 
Theory and Women’s Development (1982)), illustrates the tension between MacKinnon’s views on 
equality for women in sport and her views on women’s subordination generally: 
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Although MacKinnon traces women’s different perspective in sports 
to social inequality, she does not analyze the social circumstances that 
have constructed men’s and women’s existing sport perspectives; her 
focus instead is on the need to place a higher value on the sport experi-
ences that women have embraced.256 Nor does she discuss the role that 
educational institutions—the actors with primary legal responsibility for 
discrimination against women in sports—play in reinforcing and per-
petuating different male and female perspectives on sport. She mentions 
Title IX only in noting that she grew up in “pre-Title IX America,”257
and states that Title IX has not eliminated the socially constructed con-
flict between femininity and athleticism.258 
Like MacKinnon, Christine Littleton seeks to formulate a vision of 
equality for women in sport that allows sufficient room for female ath-
letes to construct their own model of athletics and would require this 
model to be equally valued.259 She calls her approach “equality as ac-
 
MacKinnon: Power is socially constructed such that if Jake [exemplifying the “male” voice] 
simply chooses not to listen to Amy [exemplifying the “female” voice], he wins; but if Amy 
simply chooses not to listen to Jake, she loses. In other words, Jake still wins because that is 
the system . . . . 
Gilligan: Your definition of power is his definition. 
MacKinnon: That is because the society is that way, it operates on his definition, and I am 
trying to change it. 
Gilligan: To have her definition come in? 
MacKinnon: That would be part of it, but more to have a definition that she would articulate 
that she cannot now, because his foot is on her throat. 
Gilligan: She’s saying it. 
MacKinnon: I know, but she is articulating the feminine. And you are calling it hers. That’s 
what I find infuriating. 
Gilligan: No, I am saying she is articulating a set of values which are very positive. 
MacKinnon: Right, and I am saying they are feminine. And calling them hers is infuriating to 
me because we have never had the power to develop what ours really would be. 
Feminist Discourse, Moral Values, and the Law—A Conversation, 34 Buff. L. Rev. 11, 74–75 
(1985). 
256. See MacKinnon, Women, Self-Possession, and Sport, supra note 246, at 121–22. 
257. Id. at 117. 
258. Id. at 122. 
259. See Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, supra note 41, at 1296–97; see also Little-
ton, Equality Across Difference, supra note 247, at 208–11; Littleton, Equality and Feminist Legal 
Theory, supra note 247, 1058–59 (discussing applications of “equality as acceptance”, including in 
the context of athletics). 
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ceptance,” and argues that it is preferable to a formal equality, or a 
“symmetrical” approach that requires equality for women only to the 
extent that they are already “like” males.260 Littleton’s approach would 
require institutions to accept and value women’s perspectives as much 
as they value culturally-coded male perspectives, on the theory that 
“male and female ‘differences’ must be costless relative to each 
other.”261 Applied to athletics, Littleton interprets equal acceptance to 
require equal resources for male and female sports programs, regardless 
of whether women choose to compete in the same sports as men, and 
regardless of any differences in male and female participation rates.262 In 
order to ensure that women are not disadvantaged due to their asymmet-
rical position in sport, she suggests that institutions may have to provide 
equal support for three types of programs: men’s sports, women’s sports 
and “genuinely co-ed sports.”263 
Littleton’s project is less concerned with the construction of sport 
perspectives as male or female and how institutions participate in con-
structing masculinity and femininity in sport than it is with the values 
placed on these perspectives.264 She takes men’s and women’s existing 
sport preferences as the legal starting point and requires institutions to 
equally value them.265 Once these perspectives become “costless” in 
relation to one another, she believes that the gendered boundaries of 
“male” and “female” experience in sport will become more fluid, per-
haps ultimately decoding the gender of the experiences themselves, and 
enabling the development of a more varied spectrum of human sport 
experiences.266 Littleton’s approach shares the vision of equality ex-
 
260. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, supra note 41, at 1285. 
261. Id. at 1285. 
262. Id. at 1312–13; see also Lyn Lemaire, Women and Athletics: Toward a Physicality Per-
spective, 5 Harv. Women’s L.J. 121, 122 (1982) (arguing for an approach to athletic equity that 
would revalue women’s place in athletics rather than forcing women to assimilate within a male 
model of athletics). 
263. Littleton, Equality and Feminist Legal Theory, supra note 247, at 1058. 
264. See Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, supra note 41, at 1313. For example, Lit-
tleton acknowledges that her framework would “provide little support” for modifying traditionally 
male sports, such as football, to accommodate women. Id. 
265. That is not to say that the equal acceptance model takes as its starting point the premise 
that sex difference in sport is natural or fixed. Littleton explicitly states that she does not view sex 
differences as inherent or independent of social interactions. Rather, she explains, “[a]s social facts, 
differences are created by the interaction of person with person or person with institution; they 
inhere in the relationship, not in the person.” Id. at 1297. Littleton’s approach thus allows for the 
linking of sex difference to institutional practices of dominance and exclusion, and, in this respect, 
is consistent with the more structuralist approach taken in this Article. However, the approach ad-
vocated here differs in its emphasis on how institutional practices create, shape, and reinforce—as 
well as differently value—male and female perspectives in sport. 
266. See id. at 1332–34. 
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pressed by MacKinnon in this context—a vision that recognizes and 
values women’s distinct sport perspectives.267
In athletics, as in other areas of feminist concern, there is a tension 
among feminist scholars about how best to respond to conditions of ine-
quality and the resulting different situations of men and women in 
society.268 Contrary to Littleton and MacKinnon, Professor Karen To-
karz has taken a position more in line with formal equality and has 
argued that women will not achieve equality in athletics until they com-
pete on the same terms as men.269 Tokarz criticizes the sex-segregation 
of athletics as inconsistent with the norms of equality law, and questions 
the legitimacy of any interpretation of discrimination law that measures 
equality from the starting point of sex-separation.270 She argues that sex 
segregation in athletics, much like “separate but equal” in the context of 
race, is inherently unequal because its major premise is the inferiority of 
female athletes as a class.271 She contends that the harm of sex-
segregation in athletics is twofold: female athletes are stigmatized as 
second-class athletes and, at the same time, sex-segregation reinforces 
the exclusivity of the male role in sports as aggressive, violent, and 
combative.272 
Tokarz’s proposal for responding to women’s inequality is to elimi-
nate forced sex-segregation in athletics, substituting sex-neutral criteria 
for sports participation, such as competitive skill and ability, height, 
weight or strength.273 Recognizing that the shift to sex-neutral rules 
could, at least in the short term, reduce the participation and competitive 
success of female athletes overall, she would allow for some all-female 
teams as a form of permissible affirmative action, but limit the discrimi-
nation principle to mandating coeducational, merit-based teams.274 Her 
proposal thus would mean that all-female teams could exist as a form of 
 
267. Other feminist commentators writing on women in sport also have focused on the need to 
redefine sport to better fit with women’s experiences. See, e.g., Lemaire, supra note 262, at 134–42 
(advocating a “physicality” model of sport for women and focusing on the value of athletic partici-
pation per se, rather than winning or losing, and contrasting this model with the traditional, 
combative male model of sport); Olson, supra note 146, at 137–46 (criticizing a separate but equal 
model of athletics that assimilates female athletes into an athletic program that is modeled on men’s 
competitive athletics, and arguing that there must be room for women to develop their own model 
of sport). 
268. See, e.g., Chamallas, Feminist Legal Theory, supra note 43, at 47–53; see also Littleton, 
Reconstructing Sexual Equality, supra note 41, at 1292–1301 (summarizing feminist debates over 
symmetrical versus asymmetrical models of equality). 
269. Karen L. Tokarz, Separate but Unequal Educational Sports Programs: The Need for a 
New Theory of Equality, 1 Berkeley Women’s L.J. 201, 206 (1985). 
270. See id. at 232–33. 
271. Id. at 232. 
272. Id. at 239–40. 
273. Id. at 244. 
274. See id. at 206, 244–45. 
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affirmative action for an unspecified period of time, but all other athletic 
programs would have to be open to both sexes on identical terms.275
The differences in the approaches taken by Littleton, MacKinnon and 
Tokarz reflect ongoing debates within the feminist legal community 
about how equality law should respond to sex inequality and the asym-
metrical positions of women and men in society. Each of these scholars 
offers important insights into the problem of sex inequality in sport and 
the implications for Title IX analysis. Littleton and MacKinnon appro-
priately recognize that any meaningful interpretation of equality must 
account for women’s distinct relationship to sport. Treating men and 
women under a single standard, for example, by limiting Title IX to a 
requirement that athletic teams be equally open to both sexes, or equally 
accommodating men’s and women’s relative interest in sports, could 
further marginalize women in sports by fostering the ideology that 
sports participation should be determined by sex-blind standards. Such a 
result would serve to naturalize current sex inequality in sport. More-
over, it would force women to conform to a model of sport that they 
have not chosen, denying them the space and resources to develop their 
own, distinctive athletic identities and experiences. 
Tokarz’s approach, while vulnerable to Littleton’s and MacKinnon’s 
criticisms of an equality model that would force women to assimilate 
into structures and institutions designed by and for men, nevertheless 
raises an important concern: how to disarm the cultural identification of 
sports as “quintessentially masculine.”276 Tokarz’s proposal reflects her 
concern that the organization of sports by sex perpetuates dichotomous 
and unequal gender roles by protecting the masculinity of sport while 
relegating female athleticism to the sidelines.277 
In the final analysis, neither equal acceptance nor equal treatment 
through sex-blind standards sufficiently challenges the layers of institu-
tional structures that continue to construct sex inequality in sport. What 
is missing is a critical analysis of the construction of men’s and 
women’s relationship to sport and the inequality that results from it. 
Equal acceptance of women’s athletic choices will not eradicate sex 
inequality in sport as long as institutions continue to shape and structure 
 
275. Id. at 244–45. 
276. Id. at 202. 
277. See id. at 232–33, 239–40. Tokarz would allow for the existence of separate women’s 
teams to compensate for women’s lower level of sports participation, but would do so under the 
guise of voluntary affirmative action. Id. at 244–45. The approach advocated in this Article differs 
in that it analyzes the structuring of athletic programs, not limited to the provision of sex-separate 
programs, under a discrimination analysis. As discussed infra in Section III.B–C, I view the sex-
segregation of athletic teams not as inherently stigmatizing to women, but as dependent on the 
context. My analysis focuses on the broader ways in which institutions use sex and gender to organ-
ize and construct their athletics programs beyond the sex segregation of teams. 
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those choices.278 The contention that the gender-coding of men’s and 
women’s sport experiences will cease to disadvantage women once 
those different experiences are rendered “costless” is appealing, but ul-
timately unpersuasive.279 Equally valuing men’s and women’s sports by 
requiring parity in concrete measures of support (such as the funding 
provided to athletic programs) will not put an end to less tangible ine-
qualities in the social and cultural values placed on male and female 
athletic experiences.280 Although rendering male and female perspec-
tives “costless” may, in theory, go a long way toward eliminating the 
forces that direct men and women toward different sport choices, those 
choices will never be costless in noneconomic terms as long as institu-
tions continue to shape and define sport itself as fundamentally male. 
The approach advocated in this Article would embrace equality as ac-
ceptance by equally valuing women’s athletic experiences, but at the 
same time, would challenge the construction of what is “masculine” and 
“feminine” in sport. The equal valuation of women’s athletic experi-
ences and the interruption of the institutional practices that construct 
masculine and feminine sport practices are complementary strategies. 
The construction of sport as masculine, and the corresponding devalua-
tion of the feminine in sport, are reinforcing and interrelated 
mechanisms for preserving male dominance in sports. A legally ade-
quate response to these mechanisms must focus more sharply on how 
institutions both construct and value male and female sport experiences. 
This approach requires a more complete analysis of how institutions 
participate in the construction and valuation of masculinity and feminin-
ity in sport beyond that recognized by the courts.  
B. The Need for a Critical Analysis of How Schools Construct Male and 
Female Athletic Interests and Experiences 
The relationship between institutional practices and the extent and 
nature of women’s athletic interest and experience is complex. It in-
 
278. Littleton’s “equality as acceptance” would challenge the overvaluation of what is “male” 
without distinguishing between the role of society at large and that of specific institutions (such as 
employers) in coding the perspective at issue as “male.” Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality,
supra note 41, at 1312. In contrast, the approach taken in this Article emphasizes how the institu-
tions covered under discrimination laws have contributed to the gender-coding at issue, and argues 
for greater institutional accountability under the law. 
279. See id. at 1333–34. 
280. For example, I do not think that the different social status of male football players and 
female field hockey players would be equalized by providing equal financial and tangible support 
for both teams. 
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cludes, but goes well beyond, the sheer number and proportion of the 
athletic participation opportunities provided to women—a connection 
appropriately recognized by the district court and the First Circuit in the 
Brown litigation.281 Educational institutions discourage and impede the 
full participation of women in sport in a myriad of ways. The treatment 
of athletes, the allocation of resources, publicity and promotion, the 
treatment of women’s coaches, the gender composition of the athletic 
administration, and the culture of the athletic program as a whole fun-
damentally influence both the ability of women to participate 
meaningfully in athletics and how they choose to participate.282 Rather 
than focusing exclusively on early socialization or societal discrimina-
tion as immutable factors in shaping women’s athletic interest, legal 
analysis of sex inequality in sport should analyze and expose the role 
that institutions play in the construction of women’s athletic interest and 
experience. Through this process of “unpacking women’s choices,” we 
can better understand the constraints that shape these choices.283 
The work of Professor Vicki Schultz in analyzing the interplay be-
tween employment structures and women’s job aspirations has 
important implications for understanding how educational institutions 
affect women’s athletic interests and sport identities.284 Schultz’s cri-
tique challenges the typical assumption made by courts that women’s 
job preferences are formed independent of the structures and cultures of 
the workplace.285 She criticizes courts which have found in Title VII 
cases that work interests are either natural or stem from early socializa-
tion, rather than understanding such work interests to reflect 
institutional practices.286 According to Schultz, many Title VII courts, 
including the court in EEOC v. Sears,287 have wrongly attributed 
women’s lower level of participation in nontraditional jobs to a lower 
level of interest among women in holding such jobs.288 Even those more 
liberal judges who suspect that women’s underrepresentation in nontra-
ditional jobs is not the result of a lack of interest limit their 
discrimination analysis to scrutiny of employer policies and practices 
 
281. See discussion supra Part II.B. 
282. See discussion infra at pp. ___. 
283. See Chamallas, Feminist Legal Theory, supra note 43, at 20–21 (using this term to de-
scribe the feminist “move” in which feminist scholars investigate the constraints under which 
women make choices); see also discussion supra at ___ (discussing structuralist influence on the 
analysis of women’s choices in feminist legal scholarship). 
284. See Schultz, Telling Stories, supra note 64, at 1824–39. 
285. Id. at 1750. 
286. Id. 
287. 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988). 
288. Schultz, Telling Stories, supra note 64, at 1754. Professor Schultz states that about half 
the courts to date that have considered the lack of interest argument have accepted it as a justifica-
tion for women’s disadvantaged position in the workplace. Id. 
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that exclude women from these jobs.289 Like more conservative courts, 
these more liberal judges share the view that women’s interests in non-
traditional jobs are preexistent and independent of the labor market.290
This stance forces courts to deny the existence of gender difference in 
worker interest in order to find sex discrimination in a sex-segregated 
workplace, and enables discrimination law to effectively reach only 
formal barriers that deny women access to non-traditional work oppor-
tunities.291 
Rather than viewing worker preferences as fixed and autonomous, 
Schultz argues that women’s work interests reflect and respond to the 
structures and cultures of the workplace.292 She cites extensive socio-
logical literature demonstrating that, although sex-role socialization 
does influence job aspirations early in life, women can and do change 
their job preferences in response to work experiences and opportuni-
ties.293 In particular, women’s interest in nontraditional work typically 
develops only after opportunities become available.294 Women workers, 
like other persons, tend to respond realistically to their options.295 Thus, 
she argues, Title VII should hold institutions accountable for their role 
in shaping the disparate levels of interest among men and women, rather 
than simply allow institutionally-shaped preferences to justify further 
discrimination against women at work.296 
Schultz’s analysis has great relevance to Title IX’s approach to ensur-
ing equal participation opportunities for men and women in sport. 
Institutional practices that shape men’s and women’s preferences in 
sport should be considered in any assessment of Title IX’s test for dis-
crimination in the allocation of athletic participation opportunities. As 
the court in Brown recognized, allowing institutions to justify the alloca-
tion of fewer opportunities to female athletes on the grounds that girls 
and women are less interested in sport would enable them to justify an 
unequal allocation of opportunities based on their own practices that 
have suppressed female interest.297 
The Brown courts’ recognition of the circularity of such an approach 
and the need to scrutinize closely institutional practices that construct 
interest represents a structuralist analysis. This analysis finds support in 
the work of feminist legal theorists such as Schultz who recognize and 
 
289. Schultz, Telling Stories, supra note 64, at 1790. 
290. Id. at 1787. 
291. Id. at 1792. 
292. Id. at 1840–41. 
293. Id. at 1818. 
294. Id. at 1823. 
295. Id. at 1825. 
296. Id. at 1841–42. 
297. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155, 176 (1st Cir. 1996). 
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explore the dynamic connections between institutional structures and 
individual choice. It also finds support in the Supreme Court’s recogni-
tion in Dothard v. Rawlinson298 that the failure to account for the effect 
of institutional structures in a discrimination challenge makes for an 
incomplete analysis.299 However, the court’s analysis in Brown exhibited 
a deeper understanding of the relationship between institutional struc-
tures and male and female interest levels than that reflected in the 
Supreme Court’s opinion in Dothard. Dothard’s structuralism was lim-
ited to the fairly obvious recognition that the existence of readily 
apparent height and weight requirements would distort the composition 
of the applicant pool, making it an inadequate reference point from 
which to measure the impact of the requirements on men and women.300 
Brown’s more sophisticated approach looked at the disproportionately 
low number of opportunities allocated to female athletes and acknowl-
edge its effect on suppressing women’s interest in sport.301 
One reason that Title IX courts have been better able than many Title 
VII courts to discern the connections between women’s interests and the 
institutional structures that shape them is that athletic opportunities are 
facially sex-segregated in the first instance.302 Because athletic opportu-
nities are offered separately for male and female students, it has been 
easier for Title IX courts to see how the disparate allocation of opportu-
nities between men and women affects their respective levels of 
interest.303 In contrast, when the lack of interest argument has arisen in 
the workplace, there typically has not been a facial classification that 
has provided a ready explanation for how institutional practices may have 
shaped men’s and women’s interest levels.304 However, the existence or 
 
298. 433 U.S. 321, 330 (1977).  
299. See discussion supra Part I.B. 
300. See Dothard, 433 U.S. at 330. 
301. See Brown [insert cite to appropriate Brown opinion].  
302. See Dana Robinson, A League of Their Own: Do Women Want Sex-Segregated Sports? 9 
J. Contemp. Legal Issues 321, 351 (1998) (noting that completely coed sports, such as chess, sail-
ing, and pool, are a rarity in our culture, and that schools and colleges offer few, if any, of such 
sports). 
303. Cf. Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination: The Reality of Supreme Court 
Rhetoric, 86 Geo. L.J. 279, 332–34 (1997) (arguing that it has been easier for the Supreme Court to 
attribute the disadvantaged status of women and minorities to discrimination in contexts where the 
use of a suspect criteria is overt, such as segregation, affirmative action, and redistricting cases). 
304. See discussion of Sears case supra Part I.B; see also City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson 
Co., 488 U.S. 469, 499, 510 (1989) (suggesting that there is no reason to expect that a nondis-
criminatory setting would produce proportional numbers of white and black contractors and 
invalidating Richmond’s affirmative action plan on the ground that no inference of past discrimina-
tion by the City may be drawn from the underrepresentation of minorities in the construction 
industry in Richmond); Johnson v. Transp. Agency of Santa Clara County, 480 U.S. 616, 668 
(1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (suggesting that a lack of interest on the part of women in holding 
construction jobs is the likely cause of women’s underrepresentation in such jobs, and accordingly, 
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nonexistence of a facial classification is not instrumental to the structural-
ist’s understanding of the effect that limited opportunity structures have in 
shaping and suppressing women’s interests. Women’s opportunities can 
be limited in innumerable ways even without a facial classification that 
makes the limitation so readily visible. A structuralist analysis of how 
institutions shape the interests and experiences of those who operate 
within them should not be limited to an examination of those structures 
that facially classify based on sex. 
In fact, as discussed below, disparities in the number of sport oppor-
tunities assigned to male and female athletes are only the most apparent 
evidence of the institutional construction of male and female sport pref-
erences.305 The courts’ analysis in Brown falls far short of capturing the 
full extent to which institutions shape and suppress female interest in 
athletics. The processes that create and reproduce women’s inequality in 
sport are intricate and complex, and they lie deep within the structures 
of interscholastic and intercollegiate athletic programs. Once again, 
Schultz’s work in the employment context is helpful in explaining the 
relationship between athletic interest and institutional practices. Schultz 
identifies two interdynamic structural features of work that discourage 
women from pursuing nontraditional work and construct work and 
workers along gendered lines. First, she notes that limitations on the 
rewards and mobility available for female employees result in lowered 
expectations in response to blocked opportunities.306 Second, she points 
to the male-dominant workplace cultures in traditionally male jobs, in-
cluding harassment, that signal to women that they are unwelcome and 
encourage a “proprietary” interest on the part of men in retaining these 
jobs for themselves.307 
Both of these processes are at work within interscholastic and inter-
collegiate athletic programs. First, through the disproportionate 
allocation of athletic opportunities, as well as the unequal valuation of 
men’s and women’s sporting experiences, educational institutions pro-
vide opportunities to male and female athletes that are very different in 
quantity and quality.308 Second, schools, colleges, and universities en-
gage in a number of practices that perpetuate a male culture in sport, 
signaling to young men and women that sport is masculine and poten-
tially hostile to female athletes.309 Much as employers perpetuate a 
 
disagreeing with the majority ruling upholding a city affirmative action plan to remedy women’s 
underrepresentation in such jobs). 
305. Cite to Section III.C & D, infra pp. 62–113. 
306. Schultz, Telling Stories, supra note 64, at 1827. 
307. Id. at 1832. 
308. See infra Part III.C. 
309. See infra Part III.D. 
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culture of maleness in male-dominated jobs and foster men’s feelings of 
entitlement to certain jobs, school athletic programs instill in male ath-
letes a sense of entitlement to their programs. The connections between 
the structures and cultures of school athletic programs and the relation-
ship of male and female students to sport deserve further exploration in 
order to fully appreciate the theory underlying Title IX. 
C. Opportunity Structures and the Construction of Sex Inequality in 
Sport 
Sociologists who study the workplace have long maintained that 
workers shape their interests and aspirations in response to the opportu-
nity structures available to them.310 Economists who study preference-
formation also have found that individuals shape their preferences in 
accord with the set of opportunities they actually have.311 Not surpris-
ingly, in light of this research, male and female students also appear to 
adapt their athletic interests and preferences in response to existing op-
portunity structures.312 
The courts in Cohen v. Brown implicitly recognized the relationship 
between interest and opportunity when they rejected Brown’s assertion 
that men are more interested in sports participation than women, inde-
pendent of the opportunities provided by Brown.313 The core insight in 
these decisions remains relevant today. Despite steady increases in 
women’s athletic participation, men still retain about sixty percent of 
 
310. See Schultz, Telling Stories, supra note 64, at 1824–32 (citing extensive sociological lit-
erature demonstrating that workplace structures, including the allocation of rewards, affect worker 
aspirations). 
311. Nussbaum, supra note 46, at 151–52 (discussing economic literature of preference-
deformation and its interaction with opportunity structures). 
312. See, e.g., Haffer v. Temple Univ., 678 F. Supp. 517, 526 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (discussing evi-
dence that the number of students who are interested in competing in intercollegiate athletics is not 
independent of the money devoted to scholarships, advertising, promotion, and sports information 
activities); Bloom, supra note 149, at 12 (citing United States Commission on Civil Rights’ state-
ment in 1980 that the “‘relatively less money allocated [to] women’s programs’ may limit the 
number of female athletes and ‘discourage’ participation”); Weistart, Gender Equity, supra note 
173, at 227 (discussing the “sobering” experience of a private school in North Carolina that made a 
commitment to fund and find competition for any group of students interested in forming an inter-
scholastic team and observing that, “For the last several years, 80 percent of the girls, as well as a 
similar percentage of the boys, have chosen to participate in interscholastic sports”); White, supra 
note 22 (quoting the response of Florida’s director of the education department’s equal educational 
opportunity program to administrators who claim that girls are not interested in playing more 
sports: “If you add a team with a good, enthusiastic coach, good facilities, and good publicity, [and] 
if you show that you really mean business, girls will come out. . . . We looked all over the state, and 
we never found a school that did all of that and still had problems with turnout.”). 
313. See discussion supra Part II.B. 
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intercollegiate athletic opportunities nationwide.314 But the numbers of 
opportunities alone do not begin to capture the extent to which opportu-
nity structures and rewards differently situate men and women in 
sports.315 As detailed below, educational institutions continue to provide 
vastly different resources, benefits and treatment to their male and fe-
male athletes. 
Despite progress since Title IX’s enactment, movement toward equal-
ity in the resources, benefits, and opportunities provided to male and 
female athletes has proceeded slowly.316 A study by the Chronicle of 
Higher Education of athletics expenditures for 1995–96 found that 
twenty-five years after Title IX was enacted, NCAA Division I schools 
awarded only thirty-eight percent of athletic scholarship dollars to 
women.317 In 1997, to mark the twenty-fifth anniversary of Title IX, the 
National Women’s Law Center filed complaints with the Office for Civil 
Rights against twenty-five colleges and universities for sex discrimina-
tion in awarding athletic scholarships.318 The complaints were resolved 
two and a half years later: eight institutions were found to be in compli-
ance, while the other seventeen schools agreed to provide more 
scholarship aid to female athletes.319 More recent reports indicate that 
female athletes at some institutions continue to receive a lower share of 
athletic scholarships than their share of athletic participation, indicating 
that some institutions continue to violate Title IX’s scholarship require-
ments.320 Given that Title IX’s test for compliance in the area of athletic 
 
314. See Facts & Figures: Gender Equity: Participation, Chron. Higher Educ., at 
http://chronicle.com/stats/genderequity/participation_search.php3 (last visited June 28, 2000) (on 
file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (reporting 1998–99 NCAA data show-
ing that women’s share of intercollegiate athletic participation as: 42% in Division I; 38.4% in 
Division II; and 40.6% in Division III). 
315. Cf. Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference 26 (1990) [hereinafter 
Young, Justice and Politics]. Young argues that:  
We may mislead ourselves by the fact that in ordinary language we talk about some people 
having ‘fewer’ opportunities than others . . . . Opportunity is a concept of enablement rather 
than possession; it refers to doing more than having. A person has opportunities if he or she 
is not constrained from doing things, and lives under the enabling conditions for doing 
them. 
Id. 
316.  Jim Naughton, Women in Division I Sports Programs: ‘The Glass Is Half-Empty and 
Half-Full,’ Chron. Higher Educ., Apr. 11, 1997, at A39. 
317. Id. 
318. Jim Naughton, Advocacy Group Charges 25 Colleges with Violating Title IX, Chron. 
Higher Educ., June 13, 1997, at A39. 
319. Sidelines: Education Dept. Resolves Last of 25 Bias Complaints Filed by Women’s 
Group, Chron. Higher Educ., Jan. 21, 2000, at A49.  
320. Athletics Scholarships: Proportions for Female Athletes, Chron. Higher Educ., at 
http://chronicle.com/stats/genderequity/scholarship_search.php3 (last visited June 28, 2000) (on 
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scholarships is quite lenient, requiring only that women’s share of 
scholarships match women’s already low participation rates,321 most 
institutions probably comply with Title IX in this area. However, be-
cause women still have substantially fewer opportunities to play sports 
at the college level, female athletes receive only forty-two percent of the 
athletic scholarships awarded to college students.322 A 1997 study by the 
NCAA found that the athletic scholarship gap between men and women 
translates into $142 million less each year for female athletes.323 
Intercollegiate athletic recruitment and operating budget expenditures 
in intercollegiate athletics also greatly favor male athletes. In 1998–
1999, NCAA Division I institutions spent nearly twice as much recruit-
ing male than female athletes.324 Recruiters for women’s sports at 
Divisions II and III fared no better than their Division I counterparts; in 
all three divisions, women’s sports receive only one-third of total funds 
spent to recruit new athletes.325 The same was true for operating ex-
penses in 1998–99: Division I schools spent only 32.8% of their athletic 
operating budgets on women’s sports, spending more than twice as 
much money on operating expenses for men’s sports.326 Divisions II and 
III spent a relatively larger share of their athletic budgets on female ath-
letes, but still only awarded them forty percent of the total funds 
available for operating budgets.327 Moreover, rather than spending all 
newly available funds to narrow this gap, colleges and universities have 
 
file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (reporting serious inequities at some 
institutions where female athletes still receive a lower share of athletic scholarships than their par-
ticipation levels warrant). 
321. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.37(c) (1999) (requiring “reasonable opportunities” for athletic schol-
arships for male and female athletes that are proportionate to the numbers of men and women who 
participate in intercollegiate athletics at that institution). Because the scholarship test is tied to 
athletic participation, which remains disproportionatetly male, it authorizes colleges to award less 
scholarship assistance to female athletes than male athletes if women on campus have a lower share 
of athletic participation. The regulation may, however, permit institutions to spend more resources 
on athletic scholarships for female athletes as a means to increase their disproportionately lower 
rate of athletic participation. See Gonyo v. Drake Univ., 837 F. Supp. 989, 995, 998 (S.D. Iowa 
1993). 
322.  Facts & Figures: Gender Equity: Athletic Scholarships: Proportions for Female Ath-
letes, Chron. Higher Educ., at http://chronicle.com/stats/genderequity/participation (last visited 
June 28, 2000) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform); see also Welch 
Suggs, Uneven Progress for Women’s Sports, Chron. Higher Educ., Apr. 7, 2000, at A52, available 
at http://chronicle.com/free/v46/:31/31a05201.html [hereinafter Suggs, Uneven Progress]. 
323. Heckman, Scoreboard, supra note 148, at 417 n.129 (citing 1997 NCAA Gender Equity 
Study). 
324. Suggs, Uneven Progress, supra note 322.  
325. Welch Suggs, At Smaller Colleges, Women Get Bigger Share of Sports Funds, Chron. 
Higher Educ., Apr. 14, 2000, at A69, available at http://chronicle.com/weekly/v46/ 
i32/32a06901.html [hereinafter Suggs, At Smaller Colleges]. 
326. Suggs, Uneven Progress, supra note 322. 
327. Suggs, At Smaller Colleges, supra note 325. 
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continued to pour vast new sums of money into their men’s athletic pro-
grams. From 1992–1997, overall operating expenditures for women’s 
intercollegiate athletics grew 89%, compared to a 139% increase in 
spending for men’s intercollegiate athletics.328 With less money for 
women’s sports come fewer benefits and lower status.329 
Elementary and secondary schools, like colleges and universities, also 
provide very different opportunity structures to male and female ath-
letes. As institutions accountable under Title IX for providing 
nondiscriminatory participation opportunities, their role in constructing 
male and female interest in sport also deserves scrutiny. 
The extent of discrimination in school sports at the high school level 
and below is more difficult to assess, in part because the disclosure re-
quirements of the Equity in Athletics Disclosure Act and the NCAA only 
apply to post-secondary institutions.330 All indications are, however, that 
these programs exhibit disparities in the opportunities provided to male 
and female athletes similar to those that exist at the post-secondary 
level.331 
Recent years have seen a surge in Title IX litigation at the elementary 
and secondary levels involving sex discrimination against female ath-
letes.332 Such challenges have questioned disparities in the scheduling of 
game and practice times, coaching, equipment, facilities, uniforms, pub-
licity and promotions, and allocation of participation opportunities.333 
328. 25 Years of Progress, supra note 22. 
329. See, e.g., Andrew Zimbalist, Backlash Against Title IX: An End Run Around Female Ath-
letes, Chron. Higher Educ., Mar. 3, 2000, at B9 (“Female athletes still play in inferior facilities, stay 
in lower-caliber hotels on the road, eat in cheaper restaurants, benefit from smaller promotional 
budgets, and have fewer assistant coaches.”). For an interesting case study comparing the treatment 
of men’s and women’s basketball programs at one university, see B. Glenn George, Miles To Go 
and Promises to Keep: A Case Study in Title IX, 64 U. Colo. L. Rev. 555, 562–67 (1993) [hereinaf-
ter George, Miles to Go] (identifying inequalities in resources spent on women’s and men’s 
basketball teams at the University of Colorado in training, equipment, and recruiting budgets, and 
on coaches’ salaries). 
330. Equity in Athletics Disclosure Act, Pub. L. No. 103-382 § 360(B), 108 Stat. 3969, 3969–
71 (1994). 
331. See, e.g., Cahn, supra note 242, at 260 (citing evidence that high school girls receive in-
ferior facilities, uniforms, practice schedules, and promotional support). 
332. See Karen Diegmueller, Inequities in Girls’ Sports Programs in Nebraska Alleged, Educ. 
Week on the Web, Apr. 19. 1995, at http://www.edweek.org/ew/vol-14/30title.h14 (on file with the 
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (reporting on lawsuits filed against four Nebraska 
school districts alleging discrimination against female athletes in participation opportunities, 
equipment, supplies, uniforms, scheduling, travel, coaching, per diems, locker rooms, cheerleading, 
band performances, and publicity); see also White, supra note 22 (discussing OCR compliant 
alleging dangerous conditions on girls’ softball practice field and inequality with boys’ teams). 
333. See, e.g., Daniels v. School Bd., 985 F. Supp. 1458, 1460–62 (M.D. Fla. 1997) (finding 
parents of female high school softball players are entitled to a preliminary  
injunction where school had a state-of-the-art boys’ baseball facility and an inferior girls’ softball 
field), and 995 F. Supp. 1394, 1397–98 (M.D. Fla. 1997) (rejecting school district’s plan for com-
pliance and entering preliminary injunction, pending resolution of additional cases charging district 
 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
97985-TEXT.NATIVE.1192655565 10/17/2007 2:14:06 PM
62 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [Vol. 34:1&2 
Female high school students and their parents also have brought Title IX 
claims against state high school athletic associations for adopting rules 
and procedures that deny equal sport opportunities to female athletes 
statewide.334 
Studies of gender equity in high school sports continue to find sig-
nificant disparities in the benefits and status afforded male and female 
athletes. One particularly thorough investigation of gender equity in 
Georgia high schools was undertaken recently by the  
Atlanta Journal-Constitution.335 This series of articles, published in De-
cember 1999, concluded that, “gender equity still is not the standard in 
most Georgia High Schools. Not even close.”336 The report identified 
major discrepancies in such areas as the opportunity to play interscho-
lastic sports, the provision of coaching for boys’ and girls’ teams, the 
scheduling of games and practices, and the competitive and practice fa-
cilities provided.337 In addition, the investigation found significant 
differences in the level of participation among male and female athletes: 
sixty-four percent of boys play competitive sports, compared to thirty-
 
with similar disparities in other district schools); see also Diane Heckman, Title IX’s 25th Anniver-
sary: Sex Discrimination in the Gym and Classroom, 21 Nova L. Rev. 545, 587 (1997) (discussing 
four Title IX lawsuits brought on behalf of female athletes against school districts in Nebraska); 
Ray Yasser & Samuel J. Schiller, Gender Equity in Interscholastic Sports: A Case Study, 33 Tulsa 
L.J. 273, 286 (1997) (discussing lawsuit and resulting consent decree in Title IX lawsuit on behalf 
of parents of high school and middle school female students in Owasso, Oklahoma). 
334. E.g., Horner v. Ky. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 43 F.3d 265, 272 (6th Cir. 1994) (uphold-
ing, against a motion to dismiss, plaintiffs’ claim that the KHSAA discriminated against girls by 
refusing to sanction fast-pitch softball), appeal after remand, 206 F.3d 685, 696 (6th Cir. 2000) 
(upholding grant of summary judgment against plaintiffs after association changed its rules and 
sanctioned fast-pitch softball for girls); Communities for Equity v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 
80 F. Supp. 2d 729, 731, 733, 743–744 (W.D. Mich. 2000) (holding state association subject to 
Title IX because it exercises controlling authority over federally funded high schools’ athletic pro-
grams, and denying summary judgment in case alleging discrimination in the allocation of 
participation opportunities, scheduling of games and sports seasons, provision of athletic facilities, 
and allocation of resources); Alston v. Va. High Sch. League, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 220, 222–24 (W.D. 
Va. 1997) (denying motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ claim for discrimination in the scheduling of boys’ 
and girls’ sport seasons, motion for class certification denied, 184 F.R.D. 574, 576 (W.D. Va. 
1999); Ridgeway v. Mont. High Sch. Ass’n, 633 F. Supp. 1564 (D. Mont. 1986) (finding that the 
MHSA discriminated in provision of sports opportunities to female athletes, but refusing to require 
alignment of girls’ basketball and volleyball seasons to correspond to normal college recruiting 
seasons). Although the Supreme Court recently ruled that an athletic association is not subject to 
Title IX merely because its member schools receive federal funds, it did not rule out the possibility 
that such an association could be subjected to Title IX if it exercised control over the education 
activities of its federally funded member schools. See NCAA v. Smith, 525 U.S. 459, 469–70 
(1999). 
335. Mike Fish & David A. Milliron, Georgia High School Sports: Girls Still Come in Sec-
ond, Atlanta J.-Const., Dec. 12, 1999 at 1A, available at http://www.accessatlanta.com/ 
partners/ajc/report/gender_equity/day1/index.html. 
336. Id. 
337. Id. 
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six percent of girls.338 The disparity is all the more striking because 
these figures included cheerleading as a girls’ sport, a practice not en-
dorsed by OCR.339 The series prompted the Georgia legislature to pass 
new legislation authorizing a state enforcement agency to take an active 
role in monitoring gender equity in interscholastic sports in Georgia.340 
Studies in other states have found similar inequities. A 1994 study of 
gender equity in athletics in Iowa high schools found that the average 
operating expenditure for girls’ sports was sixty-five percent of what the 
boys received.341 A 1992 study of gender equity in interscholastic sports 
in Minnesota found that “the data does make unequivocally clear that 
athletic programs for boys and girls are not equal. There are more, and 
more varied sports offerings for boys, more money spent on boys athlet-
ics, and more money spent per participant for boys athletics.”342 
One widespread and well-documented disparity in male and female 
athletic programs at all levels of education is the amount of money spent 
on coaching male versus female sports. Data from the intercollegiate 
level show that salaries for coaches of male sports tend to be substan-
tially higher than the salaries for coaches of female sports.343 A report by 
the Chronicle of Higher Education for 1998–1999 showed that in 
NCAA Division I athletic programs, universities spent nearly twice as 
much on salaries for coaches of their men’s teams than they did for their 
women’s teams.344 In 1998–99, the average Division I men’s coach 
 
338. Id. 
339. Mike Fish & David A. Milliron, Hollow Cheers, Atlanta J.-Const., Dec. 18, 1999, at 
D1, available at http://www.accessatlanta.com/partners/ajc/reports/gender_equity/ 
day7/index.html.  
340. See Mike Fish & David A. Millron, Equal Play for Georgia Girls: New Law Puts Teeth 
in Title IX Rules that Schools Provide Equal Opportunity for Female Athletes, Atlanta J.-Const., 
Apr. 29, 2000, at 1A. 
341. Jeff Oliphant, Iowa High Schools Athletic Gender-Equity Study Summary of Results,
University of Iowa, at http://bailiwick.lib.uiowa.edu/ge/iowastudy/iowahs.html (on file with the 
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (June 1995). 
342. Laurie Priest & Liane M. Summerfield, Promoting Gender Equity in Middle and Secon-
dary School Sports Programs, ED367660 ERIC Dig., Apr. 1994, at 1, 3, available at 
http://www.ed.gov/databases/ERIC_Digests/ed367660.html (quoting R.A. Dildine, A Report to the 
Minnesota Legislature Concerning Interscholastic Athletic Equity in Minnesota High Schools 
(1992)). 
343. See Salter, supra note 16, at 91 (noting that, in addition to salary disparities, few 
women’s basketball coaches have written, multi-year contracts, unlike their male counterparts 
coaching men’s basketball); Coaches: Salaries for Division I-A Men’s and Women’s Coaches 
(1996–1997), University of Iowa, at http://bailiwick.lib.uiowa.edu/ge/statistics.htm#Salary Index 
(last visited May 25, 2000) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (stat-
ing that the median personnel expenditure for women’s Division I-A athletics was less than half of 
the amount spent on Division I-A football alone). 
344.  Suggs, Uneven Progress, supra note 324. This amount refers only to base salaries, and 
not the total compensation packages for men’s coaches, which can exceed the base salary many 
times over. See Zimbalist, supra note 329 (“Although the base salaries for men’s coaches—to 
which women’s coaches’ salaries are compared—are normally in the range of $125,000 to 
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earned twice as much as the average Division I women’s coach.345 Simi-
lar disparities were found in the less competitive college athletic 
programs. Women’s coaches received only thirty-two percent of the 
budget for coaching salaries at Division II schools, and forty percent of 
the salary budget in Division III.346 The lower valuation of coaches of 
female teams cuts across a wide range of sports. A 1997 Gender Equity 
study by the NCAA found substantial disparities in men’s and women’s 
coaching salaries in basketball ($99,283 to $60,603), ice hockey 
($64,214 to $25,478), lacrosse ($35,745 to $26,871), rowing ($30,838 to 
$22,623), soccer, ($32,275 to $27,791), and squash ($45,547 to 
$22,200).347 
There are also substantial disparities in coaching salaries for male 
and female teams at the high school level. In Georgia, for example, in 
1998, boys’ teams received $16.4 million of the $22 million spent on 
high school coaches’ salaries, seventy-five percent of the state’s salary 
supplements for coaches, and ninety-five percent of the state’s extended 
pay supplements for coaches, leaving coaches of girls’ teams with only 
$5.6 million of the overall $22 million, twenty-five percent of the state’s 
salary supplements, and five percent of the state’s extended pay supple-
ments for coaches.348 Not surprisingly, boys’ sports in Georgia schools 
have a higher coach-athlete ratio than girls’ sports.349 
All in all, the widespread disparities in the treatment of male and fe-
male athletic programs at all levels of education situate men and women 
(and boys and girls) very differently with respect to the incentives and 
messages surrounding their participation in sports. The different oppor-
tunity structures provided to male and female athletes influence athletic 
interests, while at the same time they shape the culture of sport and its 
relation to gender.350 These opportunity structures construct sport as a 
realm of male privilege where male athletes are more highly valued than 
female athletes. The message conveyed by disparities in the treatment 
and benefits provided to male and female athletes is unmistakable: 
women’s athletics may be gaining increasing attention and support, but 
 
$200,000, total compensation packages for men’s coaches on the leading teams routinely reach 
from $700,000 to $1.4-million.”). 
345. Suggs, Uneven Progress, supra note 322.  
346. Suggs, At Smaller Colleges, supra note 325. 
347. Heckman, Scoreboard, supra note 148, at 417 n.130. 
348. Fish & Milliron, supra note 335.  
349. See id. 
350. Cf. Alice Kessler-Harris, A Woman’s Wage: Historical Meanings and Social Conse-
quences 8 (1990) (“The wage frames gendered messages; it encourages or inhibits certain forms of 
behavior; it can reveal a system of meaning that shapes the expectations of men and women and 
anticipates their struggles over power.”). 
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men’s sports still take center stage.351 As one court explained, in ad-
dressing gender disparities in high school’s boys’ baseball and girls’ 
softball facilities:  
As with all the differences the Court addresses in this Order, the 
fact that the boys have a scoreboard and the girls do not sends a 
clear message to the players, fellow students, teachers and the 
community at large, that girls’ varsity softball is not as worthy as 
boys’ varsity baseball.352 
The persistence of inequality in the sport opportunities available to male 
and female athletes reinforces notions of male entitlement and sex dif-
ference that further marginalize attempts to reallocate these 
opportunities more equitably.353 As a result, disparities in treatment and 
support, much like disparities in the number of athletic opportunities, 
contribute to the construction of interest in sport in a way that is not 
gender-neutral. In addition, these opportunity structures contribute to a 
culture in which sport—at least highly valued sport—is defined as male. 
It is to that broader culture, and the role that institutions play in shaping 
that culture, that I now turn. 
D. Sport Culture and the Masculinization of Sport 
The discussion so far has focused on how institutions allocate oppor-
tunities and resources between male and female athletes—the numbers 
of sport opportunities and the benefits and rewards provided to male and 
female athletes. Although inequities in these areas play an important 
role in shaping male and female interests and experiences in sport, they 
are only part of a broader picture. Equally important is the social mean-
ing of male and female sport participation and the culture of sport 
itself.354 At the present time, the dominant culture of sport is overwhelm-
ingly masculine.355 
351. See, e.g., George, Miles To Go, supra note 329, at 562 (stating that the disparities in the 
University of Colorado’s treatment of its male and female basketball teams “convey a message 
about the importance of the women’s program and the students’ contributions to this institution,” a 
message that is “widely understood as a statement of priorities”). 
352. Daniels v. School Bd., 985 F. Supp. 1458, 1461 (M.D. Fla. 1997). 
353. See Bruce Kidd, The Men’s Cultural Centre: Sports and the Dynamic of Women’s Op-
pression/Men’s Repression, in Sport, Men, and the Gender Order,  supra note 26, at 31, 36–37. 
354. See Schultz, Telling Stories, supra note 64, at 1832–39 (discussing how separate-but-
unequal job structures encourage women to reduce their career aspirations and encourage male 
workers to develop proprietary attitudes toward what they see as “their” jobs); cf. Young, Justice 
and Politics, supra note 315, at 23 (arguing that distributional models alone, which focus on the 
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Educational institutions play a key role in the social processes that 
construct the cultural meaning of sport and its relationship to masculin-
ity and femininity.356 Schools, as well as parents, peers and the media, 
participate in the process of defining the cultural meaning of sport as 
masculine, producing and reinforcing the social norms that encourage 
boys and men to play sports in order to develop a masculine identity.357 
The linkage of sport and masculinity, referred to herein as the mascu-
linization of sport, shapes and defines both men’s and women’s 
relationship to sports. At the same time that males are encouraged to 
participate in sport to bolster their masculinity, the establishment of 
sport as a predominantly male activity calls into question the relation-
ship between female athleticism and femininity.358 
There are at least three ways that educational institutions participate 
in the masculinization of sport: (1) through the structuring of sport lead-
ership; (2) through the cultivation of a masculine culture in their sports 
programs; and (3) by fostering conditions that constrain female athleti-
cism. 
 
distribution of benefits and burdens, are inadequate to explain domination and oppression, and that 
social justice theories must also analyze the institutional context in which unequal distributions 
take place). 
355. See Young, Justice and Politics, supra note 315, at 23 (defining culture as “the symbols, 
images, meanings, habitual comportments, stories, and so on through which people express their 
experience and communicate with one another”). 
356. I use the terms “masculinity” and “femininity” to refer to the social construction of gen-
der identities in a patriarchal society, and do not intend to suggest either that these identities are 
inherent or that they are homogenous. Although there are a wide variety of masculinities and femin-
inities, they are not all socially constructed as equal. In this discussion, “masculinity” is shorthand 
for “dominant masculinity”/“hegemonic masculinity.” See, e.g., Bryson, Challenges to Male He-
gemony, supra note 244, at 173 (“This dominant form of masculinity has been usefully called 
hegemonic masculinity . . . , and the message it conveys renders inferior not only femininity in all 
its forms but also nonhegemonic forms of masculinity.” (citation omitted)). 
I use “femininity” here to refer to the social construction of the qualities and characteristics typi-
cally associated with being female. See Iris Marion Young, Throwing Like a Girl and Other Essays 
in Feminist Philosophy and Social Theory 143–44 (1990) [hereinafter Young, Throwing Like a 
Girl]. As Young explains:  
I take ‘femininity’ to designate not a mysterious quality or essence that all women have by 
virtue of their being biologically female. It is, rather, a set of structures and conditions that 
delimit the typical situation of being a woman in a particular society. . . . This understanding 
of ‘feminine’ existence makes it possible to say that some women escape or transcend the 
typical situation and definition of women in various degrees and respects. 
Id. 
357. See, e.g., David Whitson, Sport in the Social Construction of Masculinity, in Sport, Men 
and the Gender Order, supra note 26, at 19, 22–23 [hereinafter Whitson, Social Construction of 
Masculinity]. 
358. See Michael A. Messner, Masculinities and Athletic Careers: Bonding and Status Differ-
ences, in Sport, Men, and the Gender Order, supra note 26, at 97, 106–07 [hereinafter Messner, 
Masculinities and Athletic Careers]. 
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1. Male Leadership and the Social Construction of Sport—As social 
scientists have recognized, leadership structures within institutions play 
an important role in shaping gender relations within those institutions.359
Sociological literature describes how the absence of a significant pres-
ence of women in institutional leadership roles leads to the phenomenon 
of “tokenism,” in which predominantly male leadership profoundly con-
tributes to the male culture of an institution and creates conditions 
conducive to gender bias.360 This literature also explains how the dearth 
of women in leadership positions affects the expectations and aspira-
tions of women who are involved at other levels in those institutions.361
Although typically focused on the specific context of the workplace, this 
scholarship has important implications for how sport leadership in edu-
cational institutions constructs sport as a male activity and shapes the 
interests and expectations of male and female athletes.  
Ironically, Title IX has had a negative effect on women’s opportuni-
ties in athletics administration. Before Title IX, women held nearly all 
of the positions overseeing women’s intercollegiate athletic programs.362 
After Title IX was enacted, the vast majority of intercollegiate athletic 
 
359. See Martha Chamallas, The New Gender Panic: Reflections on Sex Scandals and the 
Military, 83 Minn. L. Rev. 305, 328–29 (1998) [hereinafter Chamallas, New Gender Panic] (citing 
social science literature demonstrating that the relative absence of women in leadership positions in 
organizations affects gender relations within those institutions); see also Elizabeth Chambliss & 
Christopher Uggen, Men and Women of Elite Law Firms: Reevaluating Kanter’s Legacy, 25 Law & 
Soc. Inquiry 41, 61 (2000) [hereinafter Chambliss & Uggen, Men and Women of Elite Law Firms]
(discussing their own empirical research finding that the composition of women and minorities in 
law firm partnership positions affects the gender and race composition of associates within the 
firm). 
360. See Chamallas, New Gender Panic, supra note 359, at 324–29 (discussing social science 
literature on “tokenism,” where members of the token group are substantially underrepresented and 
considered as “outsiders,” to explain how lack of women in leadership positions increases sex-
stereotyping and gender bias in predominantly male-controlled institutions); see also Annelies 
Knoppers, Gender and the Coaching Profession, in Women, Sport, and Culture, supra note 1, at 
119, 128–30 (discussing the existence of “tokenism” in athletic departments and its implications 
for women in the coaching profession). 
361. Cf. Chamallas, Structuralist and Cultural Domination Theories, supra note 64, at 2380–
81 (discussing ways in which male-dominant leadership structures in the workplace shape and 
distort identities and behaviors of employees); Elizabeth Chambliss, Organizational Determinants 
of Law Firm Integration, 46 Am. U. L. Rev. 669, 678–91 (1997) (discussing extensive body of 
literature demonstrating how organizational determinants of the workplace, including upward mo-
bility and leadership structures, construct worker aspirations and achievement). 
362. See, e.g., Cahn, supra note 242, at 260–61 (discussing post-Title IX merger of men’s and 
women’s athletic programs and resulting decline of women in athletic administration); Suggs, Un-
even Progress, supra note 322 (noting that only six Division I programs [out of 311] have separate 
men’s and women’s athletics departments, and reporting that staff within these women’s depart-
ments claim that the separation gives them a distinct competitive advantage because they have their 
own trainers, strength coaches, and publicists, so that their female athletes “never play second fid-
dle”). For an interesting discussion of the history of the merger of men’s and women’s athletics 
departments and the NCAA’s role in hastening the diminishing control of women over women’s 
athletics, see Festle, supra note 36, at 199–227. 
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departments merged from previously separate men’s and women’s de-
partments into a combined, unitary administrative unit, with the effect of 
displacing women from control over women’s intercollegiate athletics. 
363 
Today athletic leadership and governance is overwhelmingly male.364 
A recently released longitudinal study of women in intercollegiate ath-
letics conducted by Professors Vivian Acosta and Linda Carpenter found 
that from the level of athletic director on down, including coaches and 
other athletics jobs, men increasingly hold the positions that oversee 
competitive sports. As of the year 2000, only 17.4% of women’s pro-
grams were headed by women.365 This represents a decrease from 19.4% 
just since 1998.366 Women hold only 34% of all intercollegiate athletic 
administrative positions in women’s sports.367 Even this snapshot may 
exaggerate the presence of women in athletic leadership, given that most 
administrative positions held by women in intercollegiate athletics are 
support staff positions rather than policy making positions.368 Twenty-
three percent of NCAA women’s athletic programs have no women in-
volved in athletics administration.369 The disproportionate.ly low share 
of women in other intercollegiate athletic jobs is also notable. In 2000, 
only 9.5% of sports information directors in NCAA programs were fe-
male, and only 25.5% of head athletic trainers were female.370 
The problem of women’s displacement from intercollegiate athletics 
administration does not appear to be improving. Although the number of 
athletic administration positions at colleges and universities is increas-
ing, these additional positions have not translated into employment 
 
363. Cahn, supra note 242, at 260–61. According to Vivian Acosta and Linda Carpenter, in 
1972, over ninety percent of women’s intercollegiate athletic programs were directed by a female 
administrator. R. Vivian Acosta & Linda Jean Carpenter, Women in Intercollegiate Sport: A Longi-
tudinal Study—Twenty Three Year Update 1977–2000 9 (2000) (on file with author); see also 
Messner & Sabo, Toward a Critical Feminist Reappraisal, supra note 146, at 5 (explaining 
women’s loss of control over women’s athletic programs in the post-Title IX era as a result of in-
creased budgets and status that enabled women’s athletic programs to pose a “challenge to 
masculine hegemony”). 
364. See, e.g., Hargreaves, supra note 1, at 179 (discussing post-Title IX trend of decreasing 
presence of women in coaching and leadership positions within athletics); Theberge, supra note 
245, at 182 (noting that post-Title IX increase in women’s athletic participation has been accompa-
nied by a decrease in the percentage of women in athletic leadership positions). 
365. Acosta & Carpenter, supra note 363, at 9. Acosta and Carpenter offer the interesting sta-
tistic that there are more female college presidents of Division I-A colleges and universities than 
there are female athletic directors at these institutions. Id.; see also Salter, supra note 16, at 66–69 
(describing accounts of discrimination faced by women who have become athletic directors). 
366. Acosta & Carpenter, supra note 363, at 10. 
367. Id. 
368. Id. 
369. Id. 
370. Id. 
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gains for women. Of the 418 new athletic administrative jobs added at 
NCAA institutions since 1998, women were hired for only forty-five of 
these positions, less than 11% of the total.371
A similar phenomenon has occurred with respect to coaching posi-
tions. Prior to Title IX, women held over 90% of the jobs coaching 
female athletes.372 As of 2000, women held only 45.6% of the head 
coaching positions for women’s intercollegiate athletic teams, the lowest 
percentage on record.373 Like the situation with respect to athletic direc-
tors, women’s share of coaching jobs continues to decline. Of the 524 
new coaching positions created for NCAA women’s teams in the last 
two years, women were hired for only 107 of those positions, approxi-
mately twenty percent of the  
total.374 
The movement of men into positions coaching female athletes has not 
been matched by an expansion of opportunities for women in jobs 
coaching men. Women continue to hold less than two percent of the jobs 
coaching male athletes, as they have for the past three decades.375 
Among the top twenty-five Division I football schools, men hold all of 
the coaching positions for all men’s sports.376 The few jobs women hold 
coaching male athletes typically involve coaching sports in which both 
male and female athletes participate and practice together, such as track 
and field and swimming.377 There remains a virtual bar to women coach-
ing male athletes in sports where males and females do not practice 
together.378 The operative assumption—that women are not qualified to 
coach male athletes—speaks volumes about the role of women in sport 
and the construction of sport itself as a male activity. No similar as-
sumption, that athletes require a coach of the same sex, interferes with 
the opportunities for men to coach women, even in sports where males 
 
371. Id. 
372. Id. 
373. Id. In absolute numbers, of the 7,771 NCAA head coaching jobs for women’s teams, 
women hold approximately 3,544 of those jobs. Id. 
374. Id. 
375. Id. 
376. Top 25 Division I Football Programs, (July 17, 2000) (unpublished chart, on file with 
author). 
377. See Ellen Staurowsky, Women Coaching Male Athletes, in Sport, Men, and the Gender 
Order, supra note 26, at 163; see also id. at 165–67 (discussing the sexism and discrimination 
faced by women who coach male athletes). 
378. See Diane Heckman, The Explosion of Title IX Legal Activity in Intercollegiate Athletics 
During 1992–93: Defining the ‘Equal Opportunity’ Standard, 1994 Detroit C. L. Rev. 953, 1001, 
1002 [hereinafter Heckman, Explosion of Title IX Legal Activity] (noting that no lawsuits have yet 
been brought by women seeking to coach a men’s intercollegiate athletics teams, and stating that 
the virtual absence of women coaching men’s teams “goes beyond evidence of a glass ceiling, it is 
more akin to a bolted and locked door”). 
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have not had extensive intercollegiate opportunities to participate them-
selves, such as softball and volleyball.379 The unwritten rule in athletic 
departments is that the most highly valued sports—those played by 
men—must be coached by men.380 
Although data is less readily available at lower levels of education, 
the picture of athletic leadership at the high school level also appears to 
be overwhelmingly male. A statewide study of Iowa high schools found 
that males were: 98.1% of athletic directors, 81.3% of athletic trainers, 
98% percent of head coaches for boys’ teams, 72.7% of head coaches 
for girls’ teams, 97.4% of assistant coaches for boys’ teams, and 50% of 
assistant coaches for girls’ teams.381 
As exclusionary as sport leadership structures are to women in gen-
eral, they are particularly inaccessible when the disadvantages of sex 
and race are combined. Women of color are in an especially precarious 
situation in relation to leadership positions in sport. The barriers to 
women of color in athletic coaching and administrative positions are not 
well documented.382 However, by piecing together what data there is, 
one finds that women of color are substantially worse off than both 
white women and men of color in sport leadership positions. A survey of 
all NCAA Division I schools conducted by the Orange County Register 
found that, as of September 1999, African American women held only 
1.9% of the head coaching positions for women’s sports, and were only 
1.4% of Division I athletic directors, assistant or associate athletic direc-
tors in college and university programs that included women’s 
athletics.383 The same study found that white women without previous 
college coaching experience were thirty times more likely to get a Divi-
sion I coaching job than African American women with no coaching 
experience.384 In Division I women’s basketball, only 6.4% of the head 
 
379. See Acosta & Carpenter, supra note 363, at 6. Women are 65.4% of women’s softball 
coaches and 59.6% of women’s volleyball coaches, despite the status of these sports as historically 
female sports. Id. 
380. See Heckman, Scoreboard, supra note 148, at 418 & n.132 (citing 1997 NCAA Gender 
Equity Study finding that no women coached men’s football, baseball or basketball in Division I 
schools and an absence of women head coaches in these sports in Divisions II and III). 
381. Oliphant, supra note 341. 
382. See Scott M. Reid, For Black Women, A Coaching Void, Orange County Reg., Dec. 20, 
1999, at D1 (noting that the NCAA does not keep track of the number of African American women 
head coaches and administrators, and that there is a general “inability of African-American women 
and their advocates to obtain the numerical data to support their argument that they are being de-
nied jobs”).  
383. Reid, supra note 382; see also Craig T. Greenlee, NCAA Report Finds Little Diversity in 
Sports Administration, Black Issues in Higher Educ., June 22, 2000, at 16, 16 (reporting data from 
NCAA report that percentage of African American (male and female) athletic directors at Division I 
schools dropped from 10.1% to 7.5% between 1995 to 1999). 
384. Reid, supra note 382. 
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coaches are black women.385 This figure looks especially low when 
compared to the twenty percent of Division I men’s basketball coaches 
who are African American.386 Data on Asian American women, Latinas 
and other women of color in sport leadership positions appear non-
existent. There is also a lack of data on women of color in coaching and 
administrative sport positions at the high school level and below. 
The structure of athletic leadership shapes the context in which ath-
letic interests and identities are molded. The disproportionately low 
presence of women—and women of color in particular—in athletic 
leadership positions renders them tokens in the world of sports.387 As 
tokens, women working in athletics face gender and race bias and 
stereotyping because white males are defined as the norm in sport lead-
ership.388 This has implications for female students as well as 
employees. One implication is that, since the norm of athletic leadership 
is male, female students are more likely to prefer males as coaches.389 
Because tokenism results in occupational stereotyping, in which compe-
tence is linked to maleness, subordinates as well as superiors prefer 
having men in positions of leadership.390 This explains why researchers 
have found that both female and male athletes are more likely to express 
a preference for male coaches, and perceive them to be more competent 
than female coaches, even though men who coach females have lower 
objective qualifications, compared to both women who coach females 
and to men who coach males.391 Thus, to the extent that athlete prefer-
ences shape hiring decisions, tokenism in sport is self-reinforcing.392 
The linkage of athletic leadership with maleness also affects female 
athletes in how they see themselves as athletes and their future role in 
sport. The absence of women in sport leadership positions reinforces 
 
385. Greg Garber, Progress? Not for Black Women Coaches, Hartford Courant, Mar. 16, 2000, 
at C1. 
386. See id. 
387. See Knoppers, supra note 360, at 128–30 (discussing Rosabeth Moss Kanter’s analysis 
of tokenism, and her definition of a ratio of 0.15 or less as “skewed” and one of 0.16 to 0.35 as 
“tilted;” and stating that, “[I]f all coaches and athletic administrators are included in the total count, 
then in most athletic departments the gender ratio is probably titled or close to being skewed.”); cf. 
Chambliss & Uggen, Men and Women of Elite Law Firms, supra note 359, at 62–63 (discussing 
research showing that the presence of women in leadership positions is more important to the gen-
der inclusiveness of institutions than integration at lower levels). 
388. See Knoppers, supra note 360, at 128–30. 
389. Id. at 125. 
390. Id. at 128. 
391. See id. at 123–24, 125, 128. 
392. See id. at 125–26 (“Although evaluations by athletes may not always be part of the for-
mal feedback, if any, received by coaches, such negative attitudes toward female coaches may 
create another gender-related obstacle in their career ladders.”). The occupational stereotyping 
associated with tokenism also perpetuates itself by shaping the gender expectations of the persons 
who make hiring decisions. See id. at 129–30. 
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stereotypes about girls and women in sport and contributes to the ideol-
ogy that athletic excellence is male.393 The conflation of maleness and 
athletic competence profoundly influences how girls and women per-
ceive their place in sport. As sociologist Ellen Staurowsky explains: 
The underrepresentation of women in coaching and leadership po-
sitions speaks to the strength of the connection between sport and 
gender. There is an underlying assumption that links sport exper-
tise with masculinity and leadership with male superiority. . . . For 
those participants who are gendered female, there is an automatic 
devaluation of experience, of achievement, and of self.394 
In this way, sport leadership structures preserve sport as a male domain 
for athletes as well as for athletic coaches and administrators.395 
The constricted role for women in sport leadership positions also 
shapes the aspirations of female athletes in their future careers. The 
lower share of female coaches and athletic administrators means that 
female athletes have fewer role models in sport.396 The absence of fe-
male role models as coaches or administrators places a ceiling on the 
female athletic experience that limits the female athlete’s potential for 
future involvement in sport.397 African American athletes in particular 
have very few, if any, African American women as role models in coach-
ing and administration positions, and receive an especially bleak picture 
 
393. See id. at 120 (“The absence of women from such [sport leadership] positions may rein-
force the gender stereotyping traditionally associated with the sports world and women in 
general.”). 
394. Staurowsky, supra note 377, at 163. 
395. Cf. Weistart, Gender Equity, supra note 173, at 200–04 (discussing how sport leadership 
structures have built-in headwinds that resist efforts to attain gender equity in sport and instead 
preserve existing male-dominant hierarchies). 
396. See Hargreaves, supra note 1, at 201–02 (“Because male coaches greatly outnumber fe-
male coaches (particularly in senior positions), and men are increasingly involved in coaching 
women’s sports, there are very few role models to encourage young women to take up coaching.”); 
Knoppers, supra note 360, at 120 (citing research suggesting that the decline of women coaches 
“could have a detrimental effect on female athletes . . . beyond the technical aspects of coaching,” 
due to the “fewer visible role models for women in sport”). 
397. Knoppers, supra note 360, at 120. Knoppers observes 
This absence may mean not only that fewer women than men will consider coaching as a ca-
reer, but also that fewer women will be able to continue their sport involvement once their 
own college athletic participation is over. In addition, since coaching is the entry-level job 
for careers in athletics, fewer women will have careers in sport and possibly will miss oppor-
tunities for mobility through such involvement. 
Id. 
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of their future athletic opportunities.398 Overall, current leadership struc-
tures convey to female athletes a message that males in sport do not 
receive: your chance for a future in sports will be limited by your sex 
and, if you are a woman of color, also by your race.  
The increasing male control over female athletes has another dimen-
sion as well: athletics becomes another arena where men exert control 
over women.399 Female athletes may be more vulnerable to abuse of the 
disparate power inherent in the coach-athlete relationship when they are 
coached by men.400 The sexual abuse of female athletes by male 
coaches is gaining increasing recognition as a widespread problem in 
girls’ and women’s sports.401 Some such cases make their way to the 
courts, although most go unreported and unaddressed.402 When male 
 
398. See Reid, supra note 382 (discussing the impact of the absence of African American 
women coaches and athletic administrators on female athletes and the importance of role models). 
399. See Elaine Blinde, Unequal Exchange and Exploitation in College Sport: The Case of 
the Female Athlete, in Women, Sport, and Culture, supra note 1, at 135, 144 (“Patterns of interac-
tion between male coaches and female athletes may sometimes parallel the dominant-subordinate 
roles usually accorded males and females respectively in a patriarchal society.”). 
400. See id. at 142–44 (discussing emotional and psychological exploitation of female athletes 
by male coaches, and concluding, “it appears that female athletes may be subject to some unique 
forms of psychological exploitation given the fact that they are frequently (and increasingly) placed 
under the direction of male coaches.”). 
401. See Pat Griffin, Strong Women, Deep Closets: Lesbians and Homophobia in Sport 200 
(Becky Lane et al. eds., 1998) (citing recent articles “indicat[ing] that male coaches’ sexual in-
volvement with female athletes is a problem that has only recently come to light”); Julie Cart & 
Theresa Muñoz, A Touch Too Much—Harassment and More are Possible When Men Coach 
Women Athletes, L.A. Times, Apr. 2, 1992, at C1 (discussing specific instances of male coaches 
accused of sexually harassing their female athletes at the undergraduate level); Robin Finn, Out of 
Bounds—A Special Report: Growth in Women’s Sports Stirs Harassment Issue, N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 
1999 at A1 (reporting recent instances of female athletes accusing male coaches of sexual harass-
ment, and discussing the conditions in sports that are conducive to sexual abuse and harassment of 
female athletes by male coaches);  Marina Pisano, Insight, San Antonio Express-News, Aug. 4, 
1996, at L-1 (“Some of the ‘best’ coaches in the country have seduced a succession of their female 
athletes. We’ve sexualized little girls. We’ve eroticized domination.”). 
402. See, e.g., Klemencic v. Ohio St. Univ., No. 96-3851 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 8117, at *6 
(6th Cir. Apr. 17, 1997) (rejecting qualified immunity defense in suit for sexual abuse by assistant 
coach); Canty v. Old Rochester Reg’l Sch. Dist., 54 F. Supp. 2d 66, 71 (D. Mass. 1999) (rejecting 
sexual assault claim against public high school coach because assault was not within the scope of 
employment); Ericson v. Syracuse Univ., 35 F. Supp. 2d 326, 328–29 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (upholding 
Title IX claim for sexual harassment of two students by their coach); R.L.R. v. Prague Sch. Dist., 
838 F. Supp. 1526, 1530, 1534 (W.D. Okla. 1993) (granting defendant summary judgment in Title 
IX claim for sexual harassment of female athlete by her male coach); Alexander v. Yale Univ., 459 
F. Supp. 1, 3–4 (D. Conn. 1977) (one of female plaintiffs alleged that she stopped serving as team 
manager for her field hockey team because of sexual harassment by their male coach); King v. 
U.S.D. No. 446, No. 59,346, 1987 Kan. App. LEXIS 857, at *13–17 (Kan. Ct. App. Mar. 5, 1987) 
(rejecting due process claim for sexual assault of a nine-year-old girl by coach); Durham City Bd. 
of Educ. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 109 N.C. App. 152, 157 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993) 
(refusing to find a coach accused of raping a student-athlete to be covered under school district’s 
insurance policy because the assault was not within the scope of employment); Scadden v. Wyo-
ming, 732 P.2d 1036, 1054 (Wyo. 1987) (upholding conviction of high school volleyball coach for 
sexual assault of athlete); see also Leslie Heywood, Despite the Positive Rhetoric About Women’s 
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coaches and administrators abuse their power over female athletes, it 
has the potential to transform athletics from a physically and psycho-
logically liberating activity to one that exacerbates women’s relative 
powerlessness in relation to men.403 While it is important to acknowl-
edge that most men who hold positions of leadership in female sports do 
not abuse their power over female athletes, and that some women who 
hold sport leadership positions do, the existing gender dynamics of sport 
create conditions more favorable to the abuse of male power over fe-
male athletes.404 The lack of a strong institutional response to the 
problem exacerbates and perpetuates the conditions in sport that con-
tribute to such abuse.405 
In summary, the male-dominant leadership structures in place in ath-
letic departments shape men’s and women’s relationship to sport. They 
do this at the level of athletic culture, by linking sport leadership (and, 
by extension, competence in sport) with masculinity, and at the level of 
experience, by placing female but not male athletes in a situation where 
their gender is an added vulnerability in a relationship that is already 
defined by a marked imbalance of power. However, the leadership struc-
tures in sport are just the beginning of the analysis of the 
masculinization of sport. A broader account of sex inequality in sport 
 
Sports, Female Athletes Face a Culture of Sexual Harassment, Chron. Higher Educ., Jan. 8, 1999, 
at B4 (“[M]any women rightly believe that doing so [reporting abuse by a coach] would bring 
about reprisals, such as being ostracized by their teammates and coaches, and being given less 
playing time.”). 
403. See Birrell & Richter, supra note 1, at 227–29 (describing feminist-identified softball 
players’ negative experiences with abusive male coaches whom they perceived as replicating un-
equal societal power structures). 
404. See Alan Tomlinson & Ilkay Yorganci, Male Coach/Female Athlete Relations: Gender 
and Power Relations in Competitive Sport, 21 J. Sport & Soc. Issues 134, 134 (1997) (reporting 
results of a study of harassment of female athletes by male coaches, and concluding that, when men 
coach female athletes, “the power dynamics [of the relationship between coach and athlete] are 
accentuated, and a perfect climate for exploitation has been created”); Robin Finn, Harassment a 
Concern as Women’s Sports Grow, N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1999, at A1 (discussing increasing reports 
of sexual harassment of female athletes by male coaches and quoting sociology professor Don Sabo 
as stating that reports of harassment by female coaches are much less prevalent); Pisano, supra note 
401, at L-1 (quoting author Mariah Burton Nelson as stating that although “some sexual molesta-
tion in sports involves female coaches and male athletes or gay/lesbian cases, . . . about 95 percent 
of the cases occur between older male coaches and young female athletes”); cf. Griffin, supra note 
401, at 58, 191, 201–04 (asserting that, despite images of “lesbian predators” in sports, female 
athletes statistically are much more likely to be sexually harassed, assaulted, and coerced into sex-
ual relationships with hetereosexual male coaches and athletes, and noting the “double standard” in 
how institutions respond to male coach-female athlete sexual relationships versus female coach-
female athlete sexual relationships). 
405. See Heywood, supra note 402 (discussing problem of sexual harassment and abuse of 
female athletes by male coaches and lack of adequate response to the problem by educational insti-
tutions). 
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must look at how institutions shape sexism and male dominance within 
the culture of sport itself.406
2. Linking Sport, Masculinity and Male Dominance in Male Athletic 
Culture—Sport and masculinity have been conflated in American cul-
ture.407 Athletic programs in schools originated out of a desire to 
inculcate masculinity in males.408 Schools created athletic programs in 
response to concerns that boys were becoming “femininized” by the in-
creasing absence of fathers from the home during the industrial 
revolution.409 Not surprisingly in light of this history, school athletic 
programs were originally conceived as activities for males only.410 
Likewise, the Olympics were originally premised on an explicit linkage 
between athleticism and masculinity. The founder of the modern Olym-
pics, Pierre de Coubertin, described the justification for the Olympics in 
explicitly gendered terms: “The Olympic Games must be reserved for 
men . . . [W]e must continue to try to achieve the following definition: 
the solemn and periodic exaltation of male athleticism, with internation-
alism as a base, loyalty as a means, art for its setting, and female 
applause as its reward.”411 
Sport continues to serve the social function of teaching masculinity to 
males. For boys and men, sports participation constructs masculinity by 
placing a high value on male physical power and by contributing to and 
celebrating an ideology of masculinity as distinct from, and in opposi-
tion, to femininity.412 
406. Cf. Chambliss & Uggen, Men and Women of Elite Law Firms, supra note 359, at 45 (dis-
cussing research suggesting that tokenism in leadership structures alone does not explain gender 
inequality within institutions and highlighting the need for attention to the broader social and cul-
tural forces that influence the positions of women in organizations). 
407. E.g., Jim McKay, Managing Gender: Affirmative Action and Organizational Power in 
Australian, Canadian, and New Zealand Sport 20 (1997) (“Perhaps no single institution in Ameri-
can culture has influenced our sense of masculinity more than sport.”) (internal quotations 
omitted); Willis, supra note 244, at 35–36 (“It is also clear that sport is strongly associated with the 
male identity, with being popular and having friends. . . . Achievement particularly strengthens 
male identity; it is assumed that sports success is success at being masculine.”). 
408. See Bryson, Challenges to Male Hegemony, supra note 244, at 176 (“There is clear his-
torical evidence that sport was often promoted with an explicit goal of enhancing masculinity.”). 
409. See Brian Pronger, The Arena of Masculinity: Sports, Homosexuality, and the Meaning of 
Sex 16–17 (1990). 
410. See Kidd, supra note 353, at 35 (“The men who developed and promoted sports were 
careful to ensure that only males were masculinized in this way. These developers maintained sports 
as male preserves by actively discouraging females from participation.”). 
411. Women in Sport, supra note 241, at 169. 
412. See Whitson, Social Construction of Masculinity, supra note 357, at 21–22. Whitson ar-
gues that the social construction of masculinity is so important because it does not exist naturally: 
“If boys simply grew into men and that was that, the efforts described to teach boys how to be men 
would be redundant. We can suggest, then, that ‘becoming a man’ is something that boys (and 
especially adolescent boys) work at.” Id. at 22. Likewise, the cultural norms that define what it 
means to be a man are not natural, but “are themselves historical constructs.” Id. 
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Masculinity is linked with male sport in general, but with certain 
sports in particular. The more rugged, powerful contact sports are the 
preferred vehicles through which males prove their masculinity,413 and 
not coincidentally, the sports that are often the most valued in school 
athletic programs in terms of the resources, benefits and prestige that 
accompany those programs.414 Sports that require less physical aggres-
sion and that combine aestheticism with athletic skill, such as figure 
skating, diving and gymnastics, are regarded as less masculine, and may 
even subject their male participants to accusations of femininity or ho-
mosexuality.415
The social practices surrounding sport often develop a particular type 
of masculinity that celebrates traditional manhood and emphasizes male 
dominance and the devaluation of women.416 For many males, sports 
participation provides an avenue for learning and practicing a dominant 
masculinity and gaining status as a male by distancing from, and estab-
lishing superiority over, females. Much of male sports culture consists 
of everyday interactions among male athletes and coaches that confirm 
and reinforce male superiority and privilege, both on the playing field 
 
413. See Pronger, supra note 409, at 19–20 (describing hierarchy of masculinity among male 
sports, and listing boxing, football, and hockey as the “most masculine” because they are the most 
violent); Donald F. Sabo & Joe Panepinto, Football Ritual and the Social Reproduction of Mascu-
linity, in Sport, Men, and the Gender Order, supra note 26, at 115, 125 [hereinafter Sabo & 
Panepinto, Football Ritual] (discussing their research into the relationship between football players 
and their coaches, and concluding that this relationship serves as “a training ground for hegemonic 
masculinity”); Whitson, Embodiment of Gender, supra note 245, at 367. Whitson observes that: 
Body contact games, in particular, have historically naturalized an aggressive way of ‘doing 
masculinity’ in which physical domination is legitimated; over time, these confrontative 
sports have become important masculinizing practices that initiate young males into a hier-
archy of gendered identities in which the capacity to dominate is honored and physical 
power confers social power. 
Id.
414. See Weistart, Equal Opportunity?, supra note 32, at 37 (“[O]ne does not become an ath-
letic director in a substantial program without understanding that the revenue sports, which means 
one or both of the dominant men’s sports, come first.”). 
415. Pronger, supra note 409, at 20, 37–38; see also Lorraine Kee Montre, Gay or Nay? It’s 
Really None of Our Business What Stars’ Sexual Preference Is, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Apr. 4, 
1992, at 1C (citing Olympic figure skater Christopher Bowman’s comments about the perception 
that male figure skaters are gay and discussing personal harassment he experienced for “performing 
in a predominantly girls’ sport”). 
416. See Whitson, Social Construction of Masculinity, supra note 357, at 21–22; see also 
Brian Pronger, Gay Jocks: A Phenomenology of Gay Men in Athletics, in Sport, Men, and the Gen-
der Order, supra note 26, at 144 (“Masculinity, then, is a strategy for the power relations between 
men and women; it is a strategy that serves the interests of patriarchal heterosexuality. Athletics, as 
a sign of masculinity in men, can be an instrument of those power relations.”). 
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and in social relations.417 The emphasis on sport as a means of develop-
ing a privileged masculinity through physical dominance and aggression 
creates a culture in which a high value is placed on exercising sexual 
and physical dominance over women.418 As the authors of one study ex-
ploring the relationship between male athletics and sexual dominance 
explained, subcultures and societies that “regard qualities such as 
power, toughness, dominance, aggressiveness, and competitiveness as 
‘masculine’ may breed individuals hostile to women and to qualities 
associated with ‘femininity.’”419 The male athletic privilege that devel-
ops through sports participation often includes an expectation of access 
to women’s bodies as a side benefit of highly developed athletic 
skills.420 
Too often the culture of masculinity learned through sport is ex-
pressed through the sexual abuse and exploitation of women by male 
athletes. Male sport culture and its dominant style of masculinity create 
social conditions that are ripe for the practice of male dominance over 
women.421 The connection between male athletic participation and the 
physical and sexual abuse of women is just beginning to receive atten-
tion commensurate with the scope of the problem. Numerous studies 
 
417. Cf. Chamallas, New Gender Panic, supra note 359, at 364 (describing “military culture” 
as “the complex of attitudes, daily interactions and institutional structures that can give us a clue as 
to why the military might be so resistant to women and so fearful of feminization.”). 
418. See Michael A. Messner & Donald F. Sabo, Sex, Violence & Power in Sports: Rethinking 
Masculinity 87 (1994) [hereinafter Messner & Sabo, Sex, Violence & Power] The coaching of male 
athletes teaches them “to take orders, to take pain, to ‘take out’ opponents, to take the game seri-
ously, to take women, and to take their place on the team.”  Id. Moreover, “[d]ating becomes a 
sport in itself, and ‘scoring,’ or having sex with little or no emotional involvement, is a mark of 
masculine achievement.”  Id. at 38. 
419. Neil M. Malamuth et al., Characteristics of Aggressors Against Women: Testing a Model 
Using a National Sample of College Students, 59 J. Consulting & Clinical Psychol. 670, 671 
(1991). 
420. See Messner & Sabo, Sex, Violence & Power, supra note 418, at 122, 124 (discussing 
implications of Magic Johnson’s statements upon announcing his HIV-positive status that “scores 
of beautiful women hang around famous male jocks” and stating that “[m]ale athletes, in contrast 
[to heterosexual female athletes], are expected to be heterosexually promiscuous”); Robert Lipsyte, 
The Emasculation of Sports, N.Y. Times, Apr. 2, 1995, § 6, at 51 (“Potential sports stars—who 
might bring fame and money to everyone around them—are excused from taking out the trash, 
from learning to read, from having to ask, ‘May I touch you there?’”). 
421. See Messner & Sabo, Sex, Violence & Power, supra note 418, at 50 (explaining that a 
“rape culture” is created in male sports programs where “verbal sparring and bragging about sexual 
conquests [leads] to actual behavior,” with group dynamics encouraging male athletes to treat 
women “as objects of conquest”); Todd W. Crosset et al., Male Student-Athletes Reported for Sex-
ual Assault: A Survey of Campus Police Departments and Judicial Affairs Offices, 19 J. Sport & 
Soc. Issues 126, 127 (1995) (discussing elements of “rape culture” in athletics as displaying a high 
level of tolerance for violence, male dominance, and sex segregation).  
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have begun to document the relatively higher propensity for male stu-
dent-athletes to sexually assault women.422
In its most extreme form, male athletes’ expression of sexual domi-
nance over women occurs through gang rape.423 Other than fraternities, 
male athletes are more likely than any other social group in college to 
participate in gang rape.424 One study of campus gang rapes showed that 
of the twenty-four gang rapes analyzed, athletes committed approxi-
mately thirty-eight percent (or nine).425 Through gang rape, male athletes 
solidify bonds with one another by using the woman’s body as the ob-
ject of sexual dominance, while seemingly distancing themselves from 
the homoerotic implications of a group sexual experience.426 The culture 
of masculinity and team insularity plays an important role in establish-
ing the group dynamic that gives rise to such conduct, and in the  
reluctance of team members to accept responsibility for the rape or to 
implicate others.427 
422. Messner & Sabo, Sex, Violence & Power, supra note 418, at 33 (reporting one study 
finding that athletes were involved in approximately one-third of the sexual assaults on campuses in 
the United States between 1988 and 1991); Nelson, Are We Winning Yet?, supra note 245, at 130 
(citing 1986 Philadelphia Daily News survey of 350 colleges, finding that male football and bas-
ketball players were thirty-eight percent more likely to be implicated in sexual assaults than the 
average male college student); see Crosset et al., supra note 421, at 132–33 (finding that male 
athletes were alleged to be responsible for a disproportionate share of on-campus sexual assaults at 
Division I schools, and that male football and basketball players accounted for thirty percent of the 
male athletic population, but sixty-seven percent of the reported assaults by male athletes); id. at 51 
(citing another study finding that between 1983 and 1986, a college athlete in the United States was 
reported for sexual assault an average of once every eighteen days); see also Howard L. Nixon II, 
Gender, Sport and Aggressive Behavior Outside Sport, 21 J. Sport & Soc. Issues 379, 384, 386, 
388 (1997) (reporting results of study on male athletes and violence and concluding that male ath-
letes are more likely than female athletes to engage in physically aggressive acts outside of sports). 
423. For an in-depth account of the events and circumstances surrounding a highly publicized 
gang rape of a mentally retarded adolescent girl by members of a high school football team, and an 
analysis of the school and community culture which supported the players, see Bernard Lefkowitz, 
Our Guys: The Glen Ridge Rape and the Secret Life of the Perfect Suburb (1997). 
424. McKay, supra note 407, at 8. 
425. Crosset et al., supra note 421, at 128, 137 n.1. 
426. See Messner & Sabo, Sex, Violence & Power, supra note 418, at 67 (describing the dy-
namics of gang rape by male athletes, and explaining, “[t]hough she is physically present, the girl 
or woman, as a thinking, choosing partner, is obliterated. She serves as the conquered object 
through which the guys have ‘sex’ with each other.”). See generally Peggy Reeves Sanday, Frater-
nity Gang Rape (1990) (analyzing the gender dynamics of gang rape). 
427. Jeff Benedict, Public Heroes, Private Felons 10–11 (1997) (quoting one player involved 
in a gang rape as stating, “The peer pressure to perform in front of the guys . . . was the overlapping 
problem that occurred . . . you get caught up in it. . . . It was hard to say, ‘Nah, no,’ because . . . 
you’re gonna be teased about it.”); McKay, supra note 407, at 8 (“Like other tightly-knit competi-
tive male peer groups . . . sport often produces ‘group-think’—a mind-set that makes men incapable 
of believing that there is anything wrong with their harassing, abusive, and violent behavior toward 
women.”); see also Merrill Melnick, Male Athletes and Sexual Assault, 63 J. Phys Educ., Recrea-
tion & Dance 32, 33 (1992) (“The pressure to be one of the boys can turn rape into a team 
activity.”). 
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To the extent that male athletic culture encourages a certain type of 
masculinity that teaches male superiority and values heterosexual male 
dominance, it is not a culture that is predetermined by male athletic activ-
ity in and of itself.428 Rather, it is a specific type of athletic culture that is 
shaped, controlled and fostered by the institutions in which sport takes 
place. Educational institutions, through their actions and inaction, par-
ticipate in creating a culture of sport that links athletic participation with 
hegemonic masculinity.429 The ways in which educational institutions 
contribute to this culture take subtle and not so subtle forms. 
One of the more direct ways in which schools shape male athletic cul-
ture is through the actions of their coaches. Many coaches blatantly 
convey the message to their male athletes that athletic failure will jeop-
ardize their masculinity.430 Rebukes from coaches and teammates such 
as, “You throw like a girl,” and more graphic variations on similar 
themes instill in male athletes the fear that athletic failure risks a loss of 
manhood itself.431 The unmistakable message is, that to protect their 
masculinity, male athletes must differentiate themselves from girls and 
women.432 At the same time, such interactions teach male athletes that 
femininity is tantamount to failure, with the implication that a female 
athlete is a contradiction in terms.433 In this way, masculinity is con-
 
428. See Messner & Sabo, Sex, Violence & Power, supra note 418, at 34 (“[N]othing inherent 
in sports makes athletes especially likely to rape women. Rather, it is the way sports are organized 
to influence developing masculine identities and male peer groups that leads many male athletes to 
rape.”); cf. Mary P. Koss et al., The Scope of Rape: Incidence and Prevalence of Sexual Aggression 
and Victimization in a National Sample of Higher Education Students, 55 J. Consulting & Clinical 
Psychol. 162, 169 (1987) (“It is difficult to believe that such widespread violence is the responsibil-
ity of a small lunatic fringe of psychopathic men. That sexual violence is so pervasive supports the 
view that the locus of violence against women rests squarely in the middle of what our culture 
defines as ‘normal’ interaction between men and women.”). 
429. See Hargreaves, supra note 1, at 151 (acknowledging that girls and boys come to school 
“with definite ideas about what is appropriate for their respective gender,” but that schools “have 
the potential to modify children’s perceptions of gender roles and to challenge sexist behaviour”). 
430. See Pronger, supra note 409, at 26 (“[F]ootball coaches are well known for berating their 
players with insults: ‘ladies,’ ‘faggots,’ ‘pansies.’”); Sabo & Panepinto, Football Ritual, supra note 
413, at 120 (describing use of misogyny and homophobia to induce conformity and athletic 
achievement by male athletes: “One coach hung a bra in a player’s locker to signify that player 
wasn’t tough enough. In order to inflame aggression or compliance, coaches called players ‘pussies’ 
or ‘limp wrists’ and told them ‘go home and play with your sisters’ or ‘start wearing silk panties.’”).  
431. Griffin, supra note 401, at 22 (“Male coaches send strong messages about women and 
about the need for men to avoid being like women when they compare a poor performance by a 
male athlete to that of a girl (for example, throwing like a girl).”). For an insightful essay on what it 
means to “throw like a girl,” and an explanation of how female athleticism is culturally constructed, 
see Young, Throwing Like a Girl, supra note 356, at 141–59. 
432. See Pronger, supra note 409, at 26 (“Coaches demand that their athletes play like men 
even if they are just boys; it’s boys’ concern about masculinity that is played upon to motivate more 
aggressive performances.”). 
433. See Bryson, Challenges to Male Hegemony, supra note 244, at 173 (“The inferiorising of 
the ‘other’ is most frequently implicit, though it is also explicitly and graphically conveyed when, 
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structed as oppositional to femininity, and femininity is portrayed as 
something that must be controlled and suppressed. Sport as a process for 
masculinizing boys and men relegates the feminine role in sport to one 
that is subordinate and subject to domination. 
In addition to the messages conveyed by coaches, the peer culture 
within male locker rooms contributes to a culture of male dominance. 
Male locker rooms, while providing space for male bonding about ath-
letic experiences, often double as a location where values are learned 
linking masculinity to the sexual exploitation of women.434 One study 
analyzing the conversational patterns of male athletes in locker rooms 
found that “hostile talk about women is blended with jokes and put-
downs about classes and each other.”435 The study concluded that locker 
room conversation among male athletes objectified women through lan-
guage and jokes, and valued the ability to conquer and control them.436 
Finally, educational institutions shape the culture of male sports in 
the privileges they extend to male athletes and the ways they respond to 
the exploitation and abuse of women by male athletes. Male athletic 
privilege is constructed to include an expectation of increased sexual 
access to women.437 At some institutions, this message is conveyed ex-
plicitly by the use of attractive women on campus to assist recruiters in 
 
for example, coaches, supporters, and commentators chastise their team for playing like girls or 
poofters.”). 
434. See Kidd, supra note 353, at 42 (describing “the gross sexism and homophobia of that 
inner sanctum of patriarchy, the locker room”, and explaining how the celebration of physical 
dominance and control on the playing field, when combined with the celebration of the sexual 
conquest of women in the locker room, can serve as a “training ground for rape”); see also 
Whitson, Social Construction of Masculinity, supra note 357, at 26 (showing prevalence of mi-
sogynist remarks and discussions of sexual exploitation of women in male athletic culture, and 
concluding that “the effect is to establish a norm that equates masculinity with domination in male-
female relationships.”). 
435. Timothy Jon Curry, Fraternal Bonding in the Locker Room: A Profeminist Analysis of 
Talk About Competition and Women, 8 Soc. Sport J. 119, 126 (1991); see also Mary Jo Kane & 
Lisa J. Disch, Sexual Violence and the Reproduction of Male Power in the Locker Room: The 
“Lisa Olson Incident”, 10 Soc. Sport J. 331, 333 (1993) (discussing the group dynamics of a  
professional football locker room that led to sexual harassment when a female sportswriter was 
attempting to conduct an interview). 
436. See Curry, supra note 435, at 129. 
437. See Messner & Sabo, Sex, Violence & Power, supra note 418, at 15 (describing the 
“stars’ world” that institutions cultivate for their highly valued male athletes as “a ‘promised 
land’—full of notoriety, women, sex, and status.”); Deborah Reed, Where’s the Penalty Flag? A 
Call for the NCAA to Promulgate an Eligibility Rule Revoking a Male Student-Athlete’s Eligibility 
to Participate in Intercollegiate Athletics for Committing Violent Acts Against Women, 21 
Women’s Rts. L. Rep. 41, 50 (1999) (quoting one sociologist as stating that “the kid going to (a top 
football school) has been recruited by eighty other schools and has a sense of entitlement . . . and 
included in that is the view of women as always at one’s beck and call”). 
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attracting elite male athletes.438 School officials confirm this expectation 
when they overlook the sexual and physical abuse of women by male 
athletes.439 The vast majority of institutions do not have any policy for 
dealing with misconduct by athletes, leaving athletic directors and men’s 
coaches with a large degree of influence over institutional responses to 
male athletes’ abuse of women.440 As a result, the institution’s response 
often values the athlete’s contributions in sport more highly than the 
protection of women from abuse.441 A number of court cases in recent 
years have illustrated the phenomenon of educational institutions con-
ferring a privilege to exercise sexual dominance as part of the male 
athletic experience. 
In one of the most widely publicized of such cases, Brzonkala v. Vir-
ginia Polytechnic Institute and State University,442 Christy Brzonkala 
sued the University under Title IX for hostile environment sexual har-
assment based on its response to her allegation that she was gang-raped 
in a student dormitory by two of the school’s football players when she 
was a freshman at the school.443 In response to the charges, the Univer-
sity held a disciplinary hearing at which it found one of the accused 
students guilty of sexual misconduct and insufficient evidence to take 
 
438. See Jeffrey R. Benedict, Athletes and Acquaintance Rape 14 (1998) (“Highly recruited 
athletes are exposed to women who are used to entice players to their school. This initial experience 
with women as a benefit is expanded over the course of a college career. . . .”). 
439. See id. at 13; Messner & Sabo, Sex, Violence & Power, supra note 418, at 14; see also 
Jeffrey Benedict & Alan Klein, Arrest and Conviction Rates for Athletes Accused of Sexual Assault,
14 Soc. Sport J. 86, 91 (1997) (finding that although male college athletes are more likely to be 
arrested for sexual assault charge than nonathletes, they are much less likely to be convicted be-
cause of the public perception of the victim as a “groupie,” and the “larger institutional safety net 
that is available to athletes accused of criminal behavior . . . [such as] exceptional financial re-
sources and powerful advocates in the form of coaches, agents, lawyers, and pillars of the 
community”). 
440. See Colleges Confront Athlete’s Crimes, USA Today, Sept. 18, 1998, at 20C (finding 
that, of the nation’s twenty-five top football schools, only eight have a written policy on how to deal 
with athlete misconduct, and that of these eight, seven permit the coach and the athletic director to 
have some role in determining punishment and reinstatement of the athlete); id. (finding that, at 
schools where there is no written policy on athlete misconduct, most coaches and athletic directors 
have a great deal of discretion in determining the athlete’s fate at the institution). The NCAA has no 
official policy for dealing with sexual abuse by athletes. Reed, supra note 437, at 43. 
441. See Reed, supra note 437, at 47–48 (stating that the tendency of coaches and athletic di-
rectors is to protect male student athletes who are accused of sexual assault). 
442. 935 F. Supp. 779 (W.D. Va. 1996), rev’d, 132 F.3d 949 (4th Cir. 1997), vacated and aff’d 
en banc, 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999) (vacating the panel decision and affirming the district court 
decision with respect to the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) claim only), aff’d, 120 S. Ct. 
1740 (2000). The following discussion of the facts of the case are based on the allegations of the 
complaint. Because the case was not fully litigated (it was settled after the Fourth Circuit reversed 
the district court’s dismissal of the complaint), the facts were never adjudicated and remain in dis-
pute. 
443. Brzonkala, [insert cite to whichever opinion supports]  
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disciplinary action against the other accused student.444 The University 
disciplinary committee recommended a one-year suspension for the stu-
dent who was found guilty, a recommendation that was adopted by the 
Provost.445 At that point, the University abruptly changed course and 
decided (on specious grounds) to require a second evidentiary proceed-
ing giving the student who had been found guilty a second chance to 
prove his innocence.446 The second proceeding was wrought with proce-
dural irregularities that made it more difficult for Christy Brzonkala to 
prove her allegations.447 Nevertheless, at the conclusion of the second 
hearing, the disciplinary committee again found the student guilty and 
again recommended a one-year suspension.448 However, the University 
inexplicably (and in violation of its own procedures) deferred the one-
year suspension until after the accused student graduated, thereby ren-
dering the suspension moot.449 The only “sanction” imposed was to 
require the offender to participate in a one-hour sensitivity training ses-
sion conducted by school officials.450 Both football players returned to 
the school after the summer break.451 Christy Brzonkala never returned; 
she dropped out of the university, unwilling to face the humiliation of 
the perceived vindication of her rapists.452 The case against the univer-
sity eventually settled for $75,000.453 
Other cases also have involved the conferral of institutional privilege 
on male athletes who sexually exploit and abuse women. In Tanja H. v. 
Regents of the University of California,454 a female student sued the 
University of California at Berkeley after she was gang-raped by four 
football players in her dormitory after a party.455 Unlike Christy Brzon-
kala, the plaintiff in this case grounded her case on state law, arguing 
 
444. Brzonkala, 132 F.3d at 954. 
445. Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 782. 
446. Brzonkala, 132 F.3d at 954. 
447. Id. 
448. Id. at 955. 
449. Id. 
450. Id. 
451. Id. 
452. Id. 
453. Settlement in Virginia Tech Rape Case, Wash. Post, Feb. 26, 2000, at B2. The case also 
included VAWA claims against the individual attackers. Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic and St. Univ., 
935 F. Supp. 779, 781 (W.D. Va. 1996) (dismissing Title IX and VAWA claims), rev’d, 132 F.3d 
949, ___ (4th Cir. 1997) (reinstating Title IX and VAWA claims), rev’d en banc, 169 F.3d 820, ___ 
(4th Cir. 1999) (holding VAWA unconstitutional but not addressing the Title IX claims), aff’d, 120 
S. Ct. 1740, ___ (2000) (striking down VAWA as an unconstitutional exercise of Congressional 
power). The claims against the individual attackers proceeded separately after the case against the 
University was settled, and were finally dismissed when the Supreme Court held the Act unconsti-
tutional.  
454. 278 Cal. Rptr. 918 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991). 
455. Id. at ___.  
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that the University acted negligently in failing to enforce its alcohol pol-
icy or otherwise protecting her from the rape—a theory that was 
rejected by the California Court of Appeals.456 The case was ultimately 
settled with an agreement requiring the football players to undergo 
counseling and perform 40 hours of community service; neither the 
players’ academic nor their athletic status was affected.457 
In a similar case of male athletic privilege, this time involving an al-
leged gang-rape by two football players, Sheronne Thorpe sued her 
University for its response to her report of the rapes.458 The accused rap-
ists did not deny that the sexual incident had occurred, but claimed that 
it was consensual.459 Thorpe alleged that the University never provided 
her with the student handbook, the code of student conduct, or the 
school’s sexual harassment complaint procedure, and never informed 
her of her rights in connection with the charges.460 The only disciplinary 
action imposed by the school was to ban the two accused students from 
the women’s dorm.461 Thorpe sued the University under Title IX for hos-
tile environment sexual harassment.462 The University unsuccessfully 
sought to have the case dismissed on the grounds that it had sovereign 
immunity from Title IX damages claims under the Eleventh Amend-
ment.463 The case is still pending as of this writing. 
A final example of a case involving institutional acquiescence in a 
male athlete’s sexual abuse of women is Redmond v. University of Ne-
braska.464 Kathy Redmond, a student at the University of Nebraska, 
sued her university for sex discrimination under Title IX and state negli-
gence law based on the school’s actions in response to her charge that 
she was raped by a university football player on two separate occasions. 
Redmond filed charges with university police two weeks before the Or-
 
456. Id. at 919. 
457. See UC Women Object to Settlement of Group Rape Case, L.A. Times, Nov. 28, 1986, at 
38. 
458. Thorpe v. Va. St. Univ., 6 F. Supp. 2d 507, ___ (E.D. Va. 1998); see also Suit is Filed in 
Rape Case Involving VSU, Richmond Times Dispatch, Dec. 4, 1996, at B3. 
459. Thorpe, 6 F. Supp. 2d at 509; see also Benedict, supra note 427, at 80 (reporting that the 
consensual sex defense results in the acquittal of athletes who are tried for gang rape more than 
seventy-five percent of the time). 
460. Thorpe, 6 F. Supp. 2d at 509; see also John Ritter, When Schools Act as Courts, USA 
Today, Feb. 26, 1997, at 3A (reporting that Thorpe stated that VSU officials at first were sympa-
thetic and promised to take action, but that “they got evasive [and] . . . after a while they wouldn’t 
take my parents’ calls. They just wanted it to go away.”).  
461. Thorpe, 6 F. Supp. 2d at 509.  Thorpe reportedly stated, “I feel so betrayed by that 
school. . . . No one helped me. No one advised me of anything.” Ritter, supra note 460, at 3A. 
462. Thorpe, 6 F. Supp. 2d at 508–09. 
463. See id. at 509, 517. 
464. Redmond v. Univ. of Neb., No.4:CV95-3223, 1995 WL 928211 (D. Neb.  Dec. 5, 1995); 
see also Rick Ruggles, Women Stage Protest Outside Husker Game, Omaha World Herald, Oct. 1, 
1995, at 12A. 
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ange Bowl in 1993.465 The county prosecutor did not receive notice of 
the charges until much later, when it was too late to obtain any physical 
or medical evidence.466 Redmond’s suit alleged that the University de-
layed forwarding the charges to the prosecutor, or otherwise responding 
to them, in order to protect the football player and the image of the 
team.467 Reaching a different result than in the Thorpe case, a federal 
district court in Nebraska dismissed Redmond’s claims on the ground 
that the University, as a state actor, was immune from suit in federal 
court under the Eleventh Amendment.468 Redmond eventually settled her 
case against the University for $50,000 after she agreed to drop her law-
suit and not to discuss the case.469 No university  
disciplinary action was ever taken against the accused football player.470 
These cases are not isolated incidents; they reflect a widespread ten-
dency among educational institutions to legitimate and minimize the 
sexual exploitation of women by highly valued male athletes. Many 
more such instances never make it to the courts.471 
The teaching of male dominance through male athletic culture is not 
limited to the privileging of male athletes’ exercise of dominance over 
women. As in other social contexts, the culture of male dominance in 
sport is complex and multi-dimensional;472 it may be constructed and 
 
465. See Benedict, supra note 427, at 121. 
466. See id. at 122. 
467. Redmond, 1995 WL 928211, at * ____; see also Lynn Zinser, Crimes That Draw Few 
Penalty Flags; Players Escape Punishment for Abusing Women, Chi. Trib., Oct. 18, 1998, at C8. 
468. See Redmond 1995 WL 928211, at * PC; see also Zinser, supra note 467. 
469. See Zinser, supra note 467. 
470. See Benedict, supra note 427, at 121. 
471. See, e.g., id. at 130–34, 142 (discussing many incidents of institutions ignoring or mini-
mizing reports of abuse of women by male athletes, including an incident where a male basketball 
player was suspended from six games for assaulting his ex-girlfriend, a women’s basketball player; 
the woman lost her athletic scholarship after she reported him); Julie Cart, Sports Heroes, Social 
Villains; Aberrant Sexual Conduct By Star Athletes Is Called Result of Lifelong Coddling, L.A. 
Times, Feb. 2, 1992, at C3 (discussing similar occurrences, including an incident at the University 
of South Florida where school officials took no action against a male basketball player for more 
than one year after six different women filed sexual harassment or assault charges against him; the 
player was finally kicked off the team for a curfew violation); id. (discussing University of Mary-
land incident where men’s basketball coach repeatedly called a woman urging her to drop sexual 
misconduct charges against one of his players); Chris Ison & Paul McEnroe, ‘U’ Officials Inter-
vened for Athletes; Records Show a Pattern of Alleged Sex Crimes and Assaults by Players That 
Weren’t Referred to Prosecutors, Minn. Star Trib., May 21, 1999, at 1A (discussing reports that 
athletic officials at the University of Minnesota pressured women to drop charges alleging sexual 
abuse by male athletes or otherwise intervened in sexual misconduct cases involving their male 
athletes); Jack McCallum & Kostya Kennedy, Nebraska’s Double Standard, Sports Illustrated, Apr. 
29, 1996, at 17 (discussing incident where male basketball player received a brief suspension from 
playing for assaulting his ex-girlfriend while she lost her athletic scholarship after reporting him).  
472. See Messner & Sabo, Toward a Feminist Reappraisal, supra note 146, at 12 (discussing 
R. W. Connell’s analysis of gender, and his theory that “at any given historical moment, there are 
competing masculinities—some hegemonic, some marginalized, and some stigmatized,” and his 
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reinforced through sexual abuse and dominance by males over other 
males as well as over females.473 The linkage of sport and masculinity 
privileges a particular type of heterosexist masculinity that can be fur-
thered by exercising dominance over men whose masculinity is 
perceived as vulnerable to challenge.474 Kenneth Karst’s discussion of 
how the ideology of masculinity perpetuates male dominance is instruc-
tive: 
The heart of the ideology of masculinity is the belief that power 
rightfully belongs to the masculine—that is, to those who display 
the traits traditionally called masculine. This belief has two corol-
laries. The first is that the gender line must be clearly drawn, and 
the second is that power is rightfully distributed among the mascu-
line in proportion to their masculinity, as determined not merely by 
their physical stature or aggressiveness, but more generally by 
their ability to dominate and to avoid being dominated.475 
Thus, the exercise of male dominance over other males legitimates a 
system of power in which the most “masculine” persons have the most 
power over others.476 Subordinating others who are perceived as less 
masculine confers power on those who practice subordination. The re-
sult is a hypermasculine culture which is not only hostile to women, but 
also hostile to those men who do not fit into, or who dare to challenge, 
the dominant mode of masculinity.477 
conception of “hegemonic masculinity” as “constructed in relation to various subordinated mascu-
linities as well as in relation to femininities”). 
473. See Messner, Masculinities and Athletic Careers, supra note 358, at 107 (discussing the 
“gender order” of sport in which “[h]egemonic masculinity (that definition of masculinity that is 
culturally ascendant) is constructed in relation to various subordinated masculinities as well as in 
relation to femininities,” and how such hierarchies among men “help to construct and legitimize 
men’s overall power and privilege over women”). For a discussion of how sexual dominance by 
males over males constructs and reinforces male dominance in the workplace, see Katherine M. 
Franke, What’s Wrong with Sexual Harassment?, 49 Stan. L. Rev. 691, 757–58, 770–71 (1997). 
474. See Hargreaves, supra note 1, at 145 (discussing sport as ground for celebrating physical 
differences between males, as well as between males and females, and arguing that the exalting of 
“hegemonic masculinity over other groups of males is essential to the domination of women”) 
(internal quotations omitted); see also Whitson, Social Construction of Masculinity, supra note 
357, at 19, 26–27 (discussing the “darker side” of all-male sport culture that “demeans and objecti-
fies women, and . . . enforces and reinforces a certain standard of masculinity (i.e., aggressive, 
dominating, or ‘macho’) among men,” and citing research “suggest[ing] that sport as a male pre-
serve remains a bastion of reaction, in which traditional masculinity is celebrated and other kinds of 
masculinity are disparaged and deterred”).  
475. Kenneth L. Karst, The Pursuit of Manhood and the Desegregation of the Armed Forces,
38 UCLA L. Rev. 499, 505 (1991). 
476. See id. at 506. 
477. See Catharine MacKinnon, Brief of Amici Curiae National Organization on Male Sexual 
Victimization, Inc. et al., 8 UCLA Women’s L.J. 9, 17–22 (1997) (analyzing male dominance over 
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The case of Seamons v. Snow478 illustrates how male sport culture can 
teach male dominance through the exercise of dominance over other 
males. The Seamons case stemmed from an incident in which a high 
school football player, Brian Seamons, was assaulted by five of his 
teammates in the locker room after he came out of the shower.479 They 
forced him, naked, onto a horizontal towel rack, bound him onto the 
rack with adhesive tape, taped his genitals, and brought a girl whom he 
dated into the locker room to view him, while other teammates 
watched.480
Brian reported the incident to the football coach and other school 
administrators.481 These officials not only absolved the football players 
of any wrongdoing, but blamed Brian for complaining.482 The football 
coach brought Brian before the entire team and forced him to apologize 
for reporting the incident and betraying his teammates.483 When Brian 
refused, the coach dismissed Brian from the team, but allowed the five 
assailants to play in the next game.484 School officials told Brian that he 
“should have taken it like a man,” and the coach trivialized the incident, 
saying “boys will be boys.”485 When the incident drew public criticism, 
the school district announced that it would have to cancel the final game 
of the season, a playoff game for the state championship, because of 
Brian’s complaint.486 After the game was cancelled, Brian was harassed 
and ostracized by his peers so severely that even the principal suggested 
that Brian transfer to a different school.487 Brian ultimately took the 
principal’s advice and transferred out of the school district.488 
Brian sued the school district under Title IX, arguing that its failure to 
investigate and take disciplinary action in response to the locker room 
incident created a hostile educational environment on the basis of his 
sex.489 Both the district and appellate courts in the case failed to appre-
ciate how the incident discriminated against Brian on the basis of sex.490 
other males and arguing that such dominance is integral to the ideology of male dominance over 
women). 
478. 84 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 1996). 
479. Id. at 1230. 
480. Id. 
481. Id. 
482. See id. 
483. Id. 
484. Id. 
485. Id. 
486. Id. 
487. Id. 
488. Id. 
489. See id. 
490. See Seamons v. Snow, 864 F. Supp. 1111, 1119–23 (D. Utah 1994) (dismissing Title IX 
claim, but allowing plaintiff to proceed on First Amendment claims against the coach and school 
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The Tenth Circuit, affirming the district court’s dismissal of the Title IX 
claim, described the school district’s actions in gender-neutral terms, 
insisting that: 
[t]he qualities Defendants were promoting, team loyalty and 
toughness, are not uniquely male. The fact that the coach, and per-
haps others, described these qualities as they pertain to his 
situation in terms of the masculine gender does not convert this 
into sexual harassment.491
The court did not see that the school’s reaction was influenced by 
Brian’s gender as a male who objected to the exercise of male domi-
nance in the locker room. Brian lost his male privilege when he broke 
ranks with his teammates and reported the abuse. The coach’s rebuke to 
Brian, “boys will be boys,” reveals the gendered meaning of the inci-
dent: by reporting his teammates, who were acting in a gender-
appropriate fashion, Brian was the one who was not acting like a “boy.” 
Under the rules of the locker room, Brian became a “social female,” re-
sulting in the loss of his athletic privilege and his dismissal from the 
team.492 The explanation that “boys will be boys” expresses explicitly 
what the incident expresses implicitly: sexual dominance is what boys 
do, and sport is sacred ground for doing it. 
The courts are just beginning to struggle with the legal issues raised 
by institutional complicity in sexual abuse by male student-athletes. 
Where students are abused or harassed by a male student-athlete on the 
basis of sex, and the school responds with deliberate indifference de-
spite actual notice of the incident, Title IX provides a remedy for sex 
discrimination to the individual victim.493 However, in addition to dis-
 
district), aff’d, 84 F.3d 1226, 1232 (affirming dismissal of Title IX claim); see also Seamons v. 
Snow, 15 F. Supp. 2d 1150 (D. Utah 1998) (dismissing remaining claims), rev’d, 206 F.3d 1021, 
___ (10th Cir. 2000) (reinstating First Amendment claims against both the coach and school dis-
trict). 
491. Seamons, 84 F.3d at 1233. 
492. Id. at 1230; see also Kathryn Abrams, Complex Claimants and Reductive Moral Judg-
ments: New Patterns in the Search for Equality, 57 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 337, 347 (1996) (discussing 
male-male sexual harassment case as an example where a male was singled out because he “re-
sponded to harassment in a socially female manner: he blushed, he stammered, he tried to avoid 
sexual conversations”); Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orienta-
tion: The Effeminate Man in the Law and Femininst Jurisprudence, 105 Yale L.J. 1, 60–61 (1995) 
(arguing that sex discrimination law should protect men who are treated adversely because their 
behavior or identity is associated with femininity). 
493. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999) (holding that 
schools are liable under Title IX for deliberate indifference to known sexual harassment by students 
but “only for harassment that is ‘so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it effectively 
bars the victim’s access to an educational opportunity or benefit.’”). Despite the court’s ruling in 
Redmond that state institutions have Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit under Title IX, see 
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crimination against the immediate target of the abuse, such cases in-
volve gender bias at another level as well: the institution’s actions 
convey the message that male athletic privilege includes physical and 
sexual dominance over others. The privilege that is conferred is a privi-
lege that is distinctly male and premised on a dominant masculinity. 
Christy Brzonkala, an athlete herself, received no protection from the 
school on the basis of her athletic status. Likewise, Brian Seamons, also 
an athlete, did not receive any protection from his athletic status be-
cause, although biologically male, he did not act consistently with the 
gendered expectations of being a male athlete. The result in both types 
of cases is the reaffirmation of a male sport culture that binds together 
sport, masculinity, and male dominance.  
The masculine culture of sport described here is not something that 
needs to be expected or accepted. Sport is socially constructed as mas-
culine; it is not masculine by nature.494 A primary purpose of this Article 
is to demonstrate that educational institutions have enormous control 
over the culture of sport that occurs within them, and thus have the 
power to reconstruct the masculine culture that they have participated in 
creating.495 Research into the problem of sexism and sexual violence in 
the culture of male sport has produced a number of concrete recommen-
dations that institutions can implement to change the culture of sport.496 
One way educational institutions can influence sport culture is 
through their coaches, who have tremendous power and influence over 
the athletes they coach.497 Coaches have the ability to change male ath-
letic culture by eliminating their own sexist comments and punishing 
 
Redmond v. Univ. of Neb., No. 4:CV95-3223, 1995 WL 928211, at *1 (D.Neb. Dec. 5, 1995), the 
majority of courts have rejected this argument. See, e.g., Pederson v. La. St. Univ., 213 F. 3d 858, 
___ (5th Cir. 2000); Franks v. Ky. Sch. for the Deaf, 142 F.3d 360, 362–63 (6th Cir. 1998); Doe v. 
Univ. of Ill., 138 F.3d 653, 659–60 (7th Cir. 1998); Crawford v. Davis, 109 F.3d 1281, 1282–83 
(8th Cir. 1997). 
494. Cf. Carol Oglesby, Women and Sport, in Sports, Games and Play: Social and Psychologi-
cal Viewpoints 143, ___ (1989) (noting that sports involve traditionally feminine characteristics as 
much as male-associated qualities of achievement, independence, and activity). 
495. See Timothy Davis & Tonya Parker, Student-Athlete Sexual Violence Against Women: 
Defining the Limits of Institutional Responsibility, 55 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 55, 113 (1998) 
(“[C]olleges regulate [the] academic performance, course selection, training, practice sessions, diet, 
attendance at study halls, curfews, and substance abuse [of their athletes].”). 
496. See McKay, supra note 407, at 148–53 (stating that “[m]en—particularly sports adminis-
trators and coaches—have the capacity to eradicate sexism and sexual violence in sport,” and 
listing recommendations identified by researchers for how to go about doing so). 
497. See Pronger, supra note 409, at 10 (“Many coaches seem like gods to their athletes, al-
most arbitrarily presiding over their athletic futures. What the coach says goes, even if it has little to 
do with the athletic enterprise.”); Timothy Davis, Student-Athlete Prospective Economic Interests: 
Contractual Dimensions, 19 T. Marshall L. Rev. 585, 622 (1994) (“The student-athlete’s relation-
ship with his or her institution is marked by dominance by institutions over most aspects of his or 
her college life.”). 
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athletes who make such comments.498 The tone set by the coach may 
even affect the practice of sexual dominance by male athletes. One study 
of male athlete sexual abuse found that the prevalence of reported sex-
ual assaults by athletes changed dramatically in some instances 
following changes in coaching staffs.499 The authors of the study con-
cluded that coaches “may have a significant impact on the team’s social 
milieu and thus on athletes’ behavior outside of sport.”500 
The reconstruction of sport culture is crucial to transform both men’s 
and women’s relationship to sport.501 The cultivation of sport as a way 
for males to attain a privileged masculinity plays an important role in 
shaping male athletic participation.502 The strength of the masculine ide-
ology of sport—and the use of sport as an avenue for proving one’s 
masculinity—greatly influences the decision of boys and men to play 
sports.503 At the same time, it puts girls and women on notice that their 
place in sport is precarious, influencing their participation as well.504 
The identification of sport with a dominant masculinity has important 
implications for women in sports. As long as sport is defined as a male 
 
498. See Nelson, Are We Winning Yet?, supra note 245, at 174 (describing experience of one 
female university coach who had a policy forbidding sexist remarks and who once enforced that 
policy by kicking a male athlete out of practice; she concluded, “They learn. Now the guys are 
respectful of the women’s team.”); Kidd, supra note 353, at 41 (“We can start [liberating sports 
from patriarchal structures of domination] by actively questioning the pervasive masculinist bias in 
the sports world. The language is rife with words and phrases that unconsciously reinforce the male 
preserve.”). 
499. See Benedict & Klein, supra note 439, at 86, 91. 
500. Id. at ___. 
501. Cf. Young, Justice and Politics, supra note 315, at 23 (“Culture is ubiquitous, but never-
theless deserves distinct consideration in discussions of social justice. The symbolic meanings that 
people attach to other kinds of people and to actions, gestures, or institutions often significantly 
affect the social standing of persons and their opportunities.”). 
502. See Messner, Masculinities and Athletic Careers, supra note 358, at 107 (citing and dis-
cussing feminist literature “demonstrat[ing] that organized sports give men from all backgrounds a 
means of status enhancement that is not available to young women”). 
503. See id. at 106 (summarizing research suggesting that “within a social context that is 
stratified by social class and by race, the choice to pursue or not to pursue an athletic career is 
explicable as an individual’s rational assessment of the available means to achieve a respected 
masculine identity”). 
504. See Lois Bryson, Sport and the Maintenance of Masculine Hegemony, in Women, Sport, 
and Culture, supra note 1, at 47, 50 [hereinafter Bryson, Maintenance of Masculine Hegemony]
(discussing “vast store of evidence which provides illustration that sport is traditionally defined in 
such a way as to engage men rather than women,” and concluding that “[s]chool children learn very 
early the message about the masculinity of sport”); Kerry A. White, 25 Years After Title IX, Sexual 
Bias In K-12 Sports Still Sidelines Girls, Educ. Week on the Web, [DATE?] at 
http://www.edweek.org/ew/vol-16/38titlei.h16 (last visited June 28, 2000) (on file with the Univer-
sity of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (discussing research finding that girls and boys younger 
than the age of nine show an equal interest in playing sports, and that this begins to change around 
puberty, when girls respond to messages pervading schools and the media that sports are largely a 
male domain). 
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domain, and the culture of sport emphasizes the development of a domi-
nant masculinity, sport will continue to be unequal terrain for women.505
3. Constraints on Female Athleticism—The conflation of sport and 
masculinity in the culture of sport leaves women in a compromised posi-
tion in relation to sport. Historically, athletic participation has conflicted 
with the dominant cultural meaning of femininity.506 Female athletes 
have had some difficulty defining their relationship to sport as a result 
of the social forces that have constructed sport as a proving ground for 
masculinity.507 The perceived conflict between athleticism and feminin-
ity is illustrated most graphically in the sex-testing of successful female 
athletes to make sure that the athlete is biologically female.508 Although 
this is not a practice that is used within educational institutions, its con-
tinuing existence in other sport arenas, including the Olympics, serves 
as a graphic reminder of the dominant perception that elite female ath-
letes are culturally suspect. 
In recent years, as girls’ and women’s sports have become more popu-
lar, the cultural conflict between athleticism and femininity has become 
more selective, but it is still present.509 Its intensity varies in response to 
 
505. See Griffin, supra note 401, at 16–17 (“The importance of sport in socializing men into 
traditional masculine gender roles also defines the sport experience for women. Because sport is 
identified with men and masculinity, women in sport become trespassers in male territory, and their 
access is limited or blocked entirely.”) (citations omitted); Hargreaves, supra note 1, at 171 
(“Changes in women’s sports cannot happen unilaterally when boys continue to be schooled 
through sports to accept an aggressive model of masculinity that embodies compulsory heterosexu-
ality, the subordination of women, and the marginalization of gay men.”); cf. Chamallas, New 
Gender Panic, supra note 359, at 366 (citing to scholarship “detailing how informal customs and 
traditions in the service academies and during basic training construct a hypermasculine environ-
ment in which women are regarded as alien and inferior,” and concluding that “[u]nless the job of 
the soldier is degendered, in the sense that the image of a ‘good soldier’ is no longer seen as exclu-
sively male, we can expect continued resistance to women in the military, particularly in leadership 
roles”). 
506. See Willis, supra note 244, at 35 (“There is a very important thread in popular con-
sciousness which sees the very presence of women in sport as bizarre.”). 
507. See Cole, supra note 243, at 20 (“The female athletic body was and remains suspicious 
because of both its apparent masculinization and its position as a border case that challenges the 
normalized feminine and masculine body.”). 
508. See, e.g., Cahn, supra note 242, at 263–64 (discussing International Olympic Committee 
practice of mandatory chromosome-testing of female Olympic athletes); id. at 2 (describing inci-
dent where two fathers of athletes on the losing girl’s soccer team demanded that the three best 
players on the winning team undress in the bathroom so that a designated parent could verify that 
they were girls). 
509. See Michael A. Messner, Sports and Male Domination: The Female Athlete as Contested 
Ideological Terrain, in Women, Sport, and Culture, supra note 1, at 65, 71 [hereinafter Messner, 
Sports and Male Domination] (citing a 1985 poll showing that ninety-four percent of the female 
athletes surveyed did not regard athletic participation as threatening to their femininity, but that 
fifty-seven percent of these same athletes agreed that “society still forces a choice between being an 
athlete and being feminine, suggesting that there is still a dynamic tension between traditional 
prescriptions for femininity and the image presented by active, strong, even muscular women”). 
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what sports female athletes play, how they compete, and how they pre-
sent their femininity.510 The pressure to maintain a culturally approved 
mode of femininity while participating in a masculine institution places 
female athletes in the classic “double bind.”511 Participation in sports 
requires strength, competitiveness, aggression, and drive—qualities cul-
turally defined as masculine—and maintaining traditional femininity 
requires passivity, vulnerability, softness, and physical weakness—
qualities defined by sport culture as unathletic.  
Navigating this tension can be tricky. Some female athletes react to 
this cultural conflict by engaging in efforts to “prove” their cultural 
femininity (and, by extension, their heterosexuality).512 Mary Jo Festle 
has called this reaction “apologetic behavior” designed to mediate role 
conflict by downplaying the contradiction between a woman’s role as an 
athlete and as a woman.513 Examples of apologetic behavior include 
promoting a sexualized or traditionally feminine image, overtly disasso-
ciating from lesbianism, preferring male over female coaches, 
disclaiming any affinity for feminism, and not challenging the prioritiza-
tion of male over female athletics.514 The very need for, and existence 
of, apologetic behavior in turn reinforces the perception of the conflict. 
Educational institutions may contribute to and exacerbate the cultural 
tensions between sport and femininity through the structuring of their 
athletic programs and the sport cultures they maintain. For many institu-
tions, at the same time that they construct sport as a masculine domain, 
they actively reinforce women’s compromised relationship to sport. This 
process often involves several overlapping practices, described here as 
marginalization, containment, and objectification. One or more of these 
strategies plays a role in shaping women’s relationship to sport at many 
institutions. 
 
510. See Willis, supra note 244, at 36 (“As the athlete becomes even more outstanding, she 
marks herself out as even more deviant. Instead of confirming her identity, success can threaten her 
with a foreign male identity.”). 
511. See Chamallas, Feminist Legal Theory, supra note 43, at 17 (discussing the “double 
bind” facing women who strive to achieve in predominantly male fields). 
512. See Kidd, supra note 353, at 36 (“Female athletes have also faced inordinate pressures to 
conform to the heterosexual expectations of most males.”) (internal citation omitted). 
513. Festle, supra note 36, at 45. 
514. See, e.g., Griffin, supra note 401, at 66 (defining “apologetic” response to the “lesbian 
bogeywoman” in women’s sports); Nelson, Who We Might Become, supra note 7, at xi (“Some 
female athletes deliberately disassociate themselves from femininism. They assert that their in-
volvement [in sports] changes nothing, that they can compete ‘and still be feminine.’ These athletes 
take great pains—and it can hurt—to send reassuring signals to those who would oppose their 
play. . . . It has been a survival strategy.”); Julie Cart, Lesbian Issue Stirs Discussion; Women’s 
Sports: Fear and Discrimination Are Common As Players Deal With a Perception of Homosexual-
ity, L.A. Times, Apr. 6, 1992, at C1 (“To counter the perception of lesbianism, some female athletes 
adopt compensatory behavior; they wear makeup while competing, they dress in ultra-feminine 
clothes when not competing, they talk about their boyfriends whether they have them or not.”).  
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The marginalization of women’s sports occurs at many levels, includ-
ing the unequal treatment of and benefits provided to female athletes, 
and the devaluation of female athletes by paying coaches more money to 
coach male athletes than female athletes. The existence and impact of 
these practices has been discussed previously.515 However, marginaliza-
tion also occurs at the level of sport culture, conveying the message that 
athletics is, by nature, male, and that women’s place in sport is periph-
eral.  
One example of how institutions perpetuate a sport culture that mar-
ginalizes female athletes is in the naming of athletic teams. It is common 
practice for educational institutions to specifically identify the gender of 
their women’s teams through the team name, while employing sex-
neutral language to describe their men’s teams.516 The gendered names 
affixed to girls’ and women’s teams reflect a cultural fixation with the 
need to reinforce the femininity and the specialness of what is presented 
as a distinctly female, modified version of sport.517 For example, the 
“Tennessee Lady Volunteers” (women’s basketball), juxtaposed with the 
“Tennessee Volunteers” (men’s basketball) reflects the value judgment 
that the normal baseline for sports is male.518 The women’s team is 
shown to be an add-on or an after-thought to the school athletics pro-
gram, as women’s teams in fact were historically.519 As historian Susan 
Cahn explains: 
The primary status of male sport found expression in common lan-
guage, too. Women’s presence was signaled with references to 
“women’s basketball” or the “ladies golf tour,” while the unmodi-
fied “basketball” or “golf” presumed the presence of men. 
Similarly, by itself the supposedly neutral noun “athlete” was in 
 
515. See discussion supra Part III.D.1–2.  
516. See Lady Nanooks? What’s a Women’s Team to Do?; Equality of Sexes Vexes When 
Schools Try Names that Are Gender Benders, Balt. Sun, Jan. 10, 1999, at 4C (“By the time women 
were permitted to play intercollegiately, most schools already had team nicknames, and they had 
been chosen to reflect the characteristics of the men’s teams.”); Lois Kerschen, Schoolgirls: Classi-
fications, Roles and Sports, Women’s Sports Foundation, at 
http://208.178.42.127/templates/re. . ._topics2.html?article=61&record=36 (last visited Jan. 21, 
2000) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (“[M]ost of the time, the 
Cardinals are the men, and the Lady Cardinals are the women.”). 
517. The practice of gender-differential naming can lead to strangely gendered team names. 
See Rhode, Speaking of Sex, supra note 25, at 62 (“Female sporting events often feature zoologi-
cally bizarre competitions between beaverettes, lady panthers, and teddy bears.”). Of the oddly 
gendered women’s athletic names I have heard, my personal favorite is “The Lady Warriors.” See 
Suggs, At Smaller Colleges, supra note 325, at A69. 
518. See Festle, supra note 36, at 52 (“[I]t was not ‘basketball’—it was ‘girls’ basketball.’ The 
word basketball connoted boys’ basketball, just as athlete referred to a male unless otherwise quali-
fied. This was not merely an issue of language but of norms.”). 
519. See, e.g., Cahn, supra note 242, at 222; Festle, supra note 36, at 52. 
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common usage a male term. Female athleticism found acknowl-
edgment only through the modified term “woman athlete.” In 
language as well as practice, women’s sport required modifica-
tion.520 
The cultural significance of the sex-differentiated naming of athletic 
teams is not always agreed upon among advocates for women in 
sport.521 Female athletes themselves do not always object to the naming 
of “ladies” or “women’s” teams, despite the absence of comparable 
qualifiers for the men’s teams.522 In part, this may be because female 
athletes do not want to draw attention to disparities that they view as 
trivial in the scheme of things, or to be viewed as radical or trouble-
makers.523 Some female athletes may even welcome the special desig-
nation as reinforcement that they are feminine in a sport culture that 
requires female athletes to prove their femininity.524 Nevertheless, the 
 
520. Cahn, supra note 242, at 222. 
521. See, e.g., Amy Moritz, Sticking Up for the ‘Lady’; Gail Maloney’s Fight for Women’s 
Sports Has Paralleled the Timeline of Title IX, Buff. News, Mar. 27, 2000, at 8S (discussing oppo-
sition of coach to changing team name from the “Lady Bengals”); Libby Sander, Title IX Report 
Card: Goals, Assists and Fouls for Girls’ and Women’s Sports: What’s In a Name, Anyway?, The 
Women’s Sports Experience, Oct./Nov. 1999, at 14, 14 (discussing belief of the opponents of a 
move to strike the prefix “Lady” from female athletic teams that doing so “would actually send the 
message to female athletes that men’s athletic programs are superior, and that women’s programs 
need to fit the mold of men’s programs in order to be worthy of recognition”). But see Christine 
Brennan, Words to the Wise About Unwise Words, USA Today, Mar. 4, 1999, at 3C (urging the 
NCAA to change the name of the “Final Four” to the “Men’s Final Four,” and for women’s teams to 
remove the word “Lady” from their school names, and stating that “as the women’s game has 
grown, respect for its presence also should expand. To continue to call the men’s tournament the 
Final Four, implying that it is the be-all and end-all of college hoops as if it’s the only game in 
town, is to reach the heights of institutional arrogance”). 
522. See, e.g., Kim Ode, Hey, Lady. . .You’ll Have to Leave Now; It’s Long Past the Time to 
Dump the Term as a Nickname for Female Athletic Teams, Minn. Star Trib., June 6, 1999, at 4E 
(discussing experience with gendered team names at a Wisconsin high school whose athletic direc-
tor states that female athletes at the school like their team nickname, the “Lady Popes,” and do not 
want to change it). 
523. See, e.g., Kerschen, supra note 516 (relaying author’s conversation with a high-ranking 
professor in women’s athletics at Texas Tech about why their women’s teams were called the “Lady 
Raiders”: 
She said that they hated the name and wanted to be called just Raiders or the Raider 
women’s team, but that they were just starting to get some attention from the media because 
of their national ranking, and they were too afraid of alienating the press by trying to make 
any demands. 
Id. 
524. See, e.g., Ben Tschann & Mikki Chullino, The Creightonian, Sept. 28, 1998, at ___ (dis-
cussing reaction of female athletes to change in teams name from “Lady Jays” to the “Bluejays,” 
and noting that, although some women athletes were very supportive of the change, others thought 
that the change was not “a big deal,” and even liked the “Lady Jays” because it made them “ ‘a little 
different’ ”); see also Festle, supra note 36, at 26 (defining “‘hegemonic’ norms” as “notions so 
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message is clear: athletes and sports are presumptively male unless 
otherwise specified.525 
A related constraint on girls and women in sport is the containment 
of women’s sports to modes of athleticism that are considered cultur-
ally appropriate and nonthreatening. The practice of containment 
occurs when female athletes who push the boundaries of their ac-
cepted place in sport too far are met with resistance and hostility.526 For 
example, the culture of sport, while it is increasingly tolerant of the 
presence of women in sport, becomes very hostile to demands for equal 
resources.527 Female athletes who provoke the guardians of male sport 
privilege by vocalizing inequality risk retaliation and retribution.528 
Many female athletes respond by accepting inferior treatment because 
they recognize the dangers associated with challenging sex inequality in 
sport in a culture that has not fully reconciled female athleticism with 
dominant notions of traditional femininity.529 
A primary mechanism for containment is the lesbian-baiting of 
women in sport. The “lesbian label” has historically been used to control 
and regulate women’s participation in sport.530 With recent improve-
ments in the cultural acceptance of women playing sports, the lesbian 
stigma has become more selective: it targets female athletes whose sport 
experiences defy the expectations for girls and women in sport. Female 
athletes who play sports perceived as “feminine” are less at risk for anti-
lesbian reactions. Mariah Burton Nelson reports, “Only contact sports, 
 
pervasive and taken for granted that even people oppressed by them do not challenge them,” and 
discussing the importance of retaining one’s femininity as such a norm affecting women in athlet-
ics). 
525. See Kerschen, supra note 516 (stating that the message of referring to women’s teams as 
“Lady Bulls” or “Rebelettes” is that “sports are for men; women who participate are ‘coeds’ where 
‘co’ means ‘in addition to or as an afterthought to’ the real participants who are, of course, men”). 
526.  Griffin, Strong Women, Deep Closets, supra note 401, at 17 (describing a 1997 incident 
in which a twelve-year-old female catcher playing in a Babe Ruth baseball league was forced to 
wear a protective cup to comply with league rules, despite the absence of any medical reason for a 
girl to wear a protective cup; “[t]his example shows the absurd lengths to which some men will go 
to try to humiliate a young girl to make sure she knows that she is trespassing on male turf”). 
527. See Festle, supra note 36, at 185, 359 n.11, 12; see also Andrea M. Giampetro-Meyer, 
Recognizing and Remedying Individual and Institutional Gender-Based Wage Discrimination in 
Sport, 37 Am. Bus. L.J. 343, ___ (2000) (discussing men’s historic control over sport, and stating, 
“Men generally believe they deserve more and better of everything. After all, they’re the better 
athletes who provide exciting entertainment. . . . When women “score” by gaining financial sup-
port, men perceive they have lost something that was rightfully theirs.”) 
528. See Lillian Howard Potter, ‘Man-Woman’: Anti-Gay Peer Harassment of Straight High 
School Activists, 1 Geo. J. Gender & L. 173, ___ (1999) (discussing author’s experiences as a stu-
dent who encountered severe harassment by other students when she raised gender equity concerns 
about the athletic programs in high schools in Montgomery County, Maryland.). 
529. See Festle, supra note 36, at 285, 349 n.119. 
530. See, e.g., Pat Griffin, Homophobia in Women’s Sports: The Fear that Divides Us, in 
Women in Sport, supra note 241, at ___, 194–95. 
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team sports, and traditionally male-dominated sports are rumored to be 
lesbian havens. . . . Female athletes in traditionally masculine sports 
challenge social dictates about proper behavior for females; therefore, 
the reasoning goes, there must be something wrong with them.”531 
The specter of anti-lesbian harassment looms large in the lives of fe-
male athletes. As Pat Griffin writes: 
As women’s participation in sport has become more acceptable and 
widespread, norms of femininity have expanded to include athleti-
cism. Lesbians in sport are now more openly targeted within sport 
and continue to represent the boundary line between acceptable 
and unacceptable behavior for women. As a result, fear of the les-
bian label continues to control women’s sport. Fear of the lesbian 
label ensures that women do not gain control over their sporting 
experience or develop their physical competence beyond what is 
acceptable in a sexist culture.532 
Anti-lesbian policing is not limited to female athletes whose athletic 
participation itself becomes too “masculine.” The power of the lesbian 
stigma is widely used to enforce the subordinate position of girls and 
women in sport by punishing resistance to the status quo.533 Female ath-
letes who advocate for gender equity in sport face the risk of being 
labeled as lesbians and punished accordingly. One former high school 
athlete who led a charge for Title IX compliance in the Montgomery 
County Public Schools offers a poignant account of the harassment she 
experienced from other students: 
During my senior year of high school, it was impossible for me to 
walk down the halls of my high school without being called a 
“dyke,” or, my personal favorite, “man-woman.” The harassment 
followed me everywhere—to class, in the parking lot, at the 
 
531. Nelson, Are We Winning Yet?, supra note 245, at 144. Nelson attributes negative charges 
of lesbianism in women’s professional golf and tennis to their professional status, under the reason-
ing that “[a]ny woman who takes sports seriously, who devotes her life to sports, must be gay,” even 
though these sports have traditionally been considered appropriate activities for women. Id. She 
also notes that male athletes who participate in sports viewed as feminine also face accusations of 
homosexuality, so that “sports requiring grace and judged on beauty—such as diving, skating, and 
gymnastics—are rumored to be populated by gay men.” Id. 
532. Griffin, supra note 401, at 48–49. 
533. E.g., id. at 20 (“As long as women’s sports are associated with lesbians and lesbians are 
stigmatized as sexual and social deviants, the lesbian label serves an important social-control func-
tion in sport, ensuring that only men have access to the benefits of sport participation and the 
physical and psychological empowerment available in sport.”); Cart, supra note 514, at C1 (dis-
cussing “profound impact” of widespread homophobia on women athletes and coaches and how it 
affects their participation in sports). 
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McDonald’s at lunch, at the mall, and at parties on the weekend. 
During every class period, at least one student would interrupt 
class with some epithet or insult directed toward me. Sadly, teach-
ers did nothing to discourage the conduct.534 
Educational institutions participate in the practice of containment by 
permitting lesbian-baiting and anti-lesbian harassment within their ath-
letic programs.535 When school administrators and employees tolerate 
such conduct by not intervening to stop the harassment, they contribute 
to the precarious place of all female athletes in sport, regardless of their 
sexual orientation.536 
At some institutions, coaches reinforce an anti-lesbian bias against 
women in sport. Coaches of female athletes have been known to dis-
close anti-lesbian views or policies to potential female recruits and their 
parents in an effort to bolster recruiting.537 Some schools even engage in 
“negative recruiting,” whereby coaches suggest to potential recruits 
and/or their parents that a rival program includes a lesbian coach or 
players.538 
Many educational institutions allow anti-lesbian bias and bias against 
women in sport to limit women in coaching and athletic administration 
positions as well.539 The lesbian-baiting of female coaches and adminis-
 
534. Potter, supra note 528, at 175. 
535. See Griffin, supra note 401, at 83 (noting that female athletes, regardless of their sexual 
orientation, have been subjected to anti-lesbian harassment from coaches, teammates, opposing 
teams, other students or fans).  
536. See Brake, supra note 144, at 100–01 (illustrating the adverse effects of anti-gay harass-
ment on students regardless of their sexual orientation); see also Women’s Sports Foundation, 
Homophobia in Women’s Sports, at 
http://208.178.42.127/templates/re. . ._topics2.html?article=54&record=39 (last visited Jan. 21, 
2000) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (“Those who feel threat-
ened by Title IX . . . are using fear of exposing women coaches as lesbians to deter them from 
talking about unequal treatment of female athletes.”). 
537. See Festle, supra note 36, at xxvii (discussing homophobic recruiting practices of some 
women’s coaches); Griffin, supra note 401, at 79. Griffin notes that:  
Penn State coach Renee Portland is not the only coach to prohibit lesbians from her team. 
Other college coaches also tell athletes and their parents that they will not allow lesbians on 
their teams. . . . Some coaches follow through by dropping women they discover are lesbi-
ans from the roster, limiting their playing time, or ostracizing them. 
Griffin, supra note 401, at 79.  
538. See Griffin, supra note 401, at 82–83; Homophobia, supra note 536 (stating it is “not 
uncommon” for a coach to suggest “to a recruit that the coach of the team at another school she is 
considering is a lesbian”). 
539. Griffin, supra note 401, at 79 (stating that “[s]ome athletic directors fire women coaches 
if they suspect that they are lesbians”); Nelson, Are We Winning Yet?, supra note 245, at 152 (quot-
ing Betty Jaynes, the executive director of the Women’s Basketball Coaches’ Association, as stating, 
“[W]e’re losing women in coaching because they’re afraid of being labeled lesbians.”).  
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trators contributes to the precarious position of women in sport leader-
ship positions. Athletic directors sometimes avoid hiring women, 
preferring men to coach women’s teams in order to “rehabilitate” a 
women’s team that has been “tarnished” with a lesbian reputation.540 In 
this way, cultural anxiety about women in sport combines with anti-
lesbian bias to displace women from leadership positions in sport.541 
The final strategy discussed here in connection with the cultural con-
straints on female athletes is the objectification of women in sport. The 
tendency to emphasize the sexuality of women in sport reinforces the 
message that female athletes have something to prove with regard to 
their femininity. The sexualization of female athletes responds to the 
cultural tension between athleticism and femininity by highlighting the 
heterosexual sexuality of girls and women in sport.542 At the same time, 
it downplays their athleticism, reducing them to a less significant pres-
ence in sport.543 The message is that female athletes must be 
“feminized” to be made acceptable, and objectified to be rendered 
nonthreatening. The significance of the female athlete becomes her 
sexuality, not her strength, stamina, skill, or speed.  
Educational institutions, like other seats of culture, can contribute to 
the objectification of women in sport. One way in which some institu-
tions emphasize the sexuality of their female athletes is through their 
publicity and promotional materials. At some institutions, female ath-
letes are photographed in feminine, sexualized poses, or dressed up in 
nonathletic clothes, while male athletes are pictured in action shots in 
the heat of the game.544 Such differences in the way schools portray their 
 
540. Griffin, supra note 401, at 84. 
541. Id. at 205 (noting that women head coaches may also prefer to hire male assistant 
coaches to “counteract any lesbian aura that might be associated with an all-women coaching 
staff”). 
542. Cf. Women’s Sports Foundation, Women’s Sports and Sexuality: The Myth and the Real-
ity, at http://208.178.42.127/templates/re. . .topics2.html?article=368&record=39 website (last 
visited Jan. 21, 2000) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).  The Foun-
dation observes that: 
Girls, fearful of being labeled lesbians, choose not to participate in sports and miss out on 
the physical and mental benefits. Those women who do engage in sports often feel the need 
to prove their heterosexuality by having unwanted sex or allowing themselves to be por-
trayed in sexually provocative poses. 
Id. 
543. For an insightful discussion of the effect of objectification on female athleticism and bod-
ily movement, see Young, Throwing Like a Girl, supra note 356, at 141–56. See Willis, supra note 
244, at 35 (describing sexualization of female athletes as a “useful technique, for if a woman seems 
to be encroaching too far, and too threateningly, into male sanctuaries, she can be symbolically 
vapourised and reconstituted as an object, a butt for smutty jokes and complacent elbow nudging”).  
544. Griffin, supra note 401, at 75 (discussing 1987 media guide for Northwestern State Uni-
versity of Louisiana women’s basketball team in which the players were posed in sexually 
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male and female athletes effectively convey the institution’s view of the 
essential identities of men and women in sport.  
One widespread example of institutional reinforcement of the objecti-
fication of women in sport is found in the structuring of cheerleading 
programs. Cheerleaders occupy the quintessentially “feminine” role of 
standing at the periphery, offering unconditional support for the athletes 
who play the traditionally masculine role of competing in the primary 
athletic event.545 The cultural function of cheerleading is to exhibit 
feminine, sexualized women providing a support and entertainment role 
in sport. As sociologist Laurel Davis explains: 
[C]heerleading sends messages about what are appropriate activi-
ties for females or for females in sport. The female cheerleader 
represents support for males, especially the male athletes. . . . The 
place for women in sport is seen as on the sidelines engaged in ac-
tivities that should not be taken too seriously by the sport 
community.546
The athletes cheered on in the role of competitor tend to be male as 
well.547 However, even when the athletes are female, the cultural mean-
ing of cheerleading remains gendered, with cheerleaders serving as a 
 
suggestive positions wearing their uniforms with Playboy bunny ears, with a caption saying “These 
girls can play, boy” and inviting fans and reporters to watch them play in the “pleasure palace”); 
Susan Vinella, What’s Wrong with This Picture?; It Spotlights the Woman and Not the Athlete, 
Critics Say, Dayton Daily News, July 16, 1995, at 1D (discussing media portrayal of female ath-
letes as “vulnerable, sexy and passive women and not as accomplished competitors” and reporting 
that “[a] look at about two dozen men’s and women’s basketball media guides on file at the Dayton 
Daily News shows that indeed women were much more likely to be posed in street clothes while 
men were most often pictured shooting baskets on the court”).  
545. See Laurel R. Davis, Male Cheerleaders and the Naturalization of Gender, in Sport, 
Men, and the Gender Order, supra note 26, at 153, 154 [hereinafter Davis, Male Cheerleaders]
(describing cultural image of cheerleading as a “naturally feminine” activity and describing stereo-
types of female cheerleaders as “good looking, sexy, supportive, bouncy, and bubbly”); Jay, supra 
note 146, at 31–32 (discussing cheerleading as a practice that contributes to women’s subordination 
in sport by feminizing the supporting role in sport and naturalizing the view that males are the 
“real” athletes). In addition to cheering at the games, some cheerleaders perform the female nurturer 
and support role for male athletes off the field. See, e.g., Potter, supra note 528, at 174 (describing 
role of cheerleaders in Montgomery County Public Schools as “‘guardian angels’ of the football and 
boys’ basketball teams, baking cookies and buying small gifts for the players,” without offering 
such support to the girls’ teams). 
546. Davis, Male Cheerleaders, supra note 545, at 155; see also Lenskyj, supra note 242, at 
101 (discussing significance of female cheerleading in sport, and stating that “[w]hatever the ra-
tionale, the presence of attractive, admiring women validates the display of masculinity and 
machismo on the playing field.”). 
547. See, e.g., Kerschen, supra note 516, ___ (stating that cheerleading squads “cheer for the 
male teams, but seldom does anyone cheer for the girl’s, or women’s teams, or give them a pep 
rally”); Potter, supra note 528, at 174 (describing inequities in Montgomery County Public 
Schools, including that “[c]heerleaders cheered only at boys’ games, never girls’”). 
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reminder of the seemingly natural, feminine place for females in sport. 
The presence of cheerleaders at female athletic events has not changed 
the public perception of cheerleading and sport as differently gendered 
activities.548 
The relatively recent integration of males onto cheerleading squads 
also has not altered the gendered dynamic of cheerleading, nor its con-
tribution to the masculinization of sport and the femininization of the 
female support-role.549 Male cheerleaders play a distinct role in cheer-
leading, engaging in very different physical activities than female 
cheerleaders, such as tumbling and lifting female cheerleaders, while 
female cheerleaders peform dancing routines and other activities viewed 
as more feminine.550 The male cheerleading role is perceived as helping 
to show off the female cheerleaders.551 With the gender specialization of 
cheerleading tasks, the presence of male cheerleaders further “fem-
inizes” female cheerleaders and contributes to the differentiation of 
masculine and feminine identities in sport.552 
The emphasis on female cheerleaders’ physical attractiveness and the 
culturally feminine display of their athletic skills contains important 
assumptions not only about the sex of the players and the role of women 
in sport, but also about the gender of the spectators—and by implica-
tion, the gender of sport itself. The primary audience for female 
cheerleaders is presumed to be male heterosexuals. As Davis explains: 
Not only are cheerleaders seen as female, but spectators are seen 
as naturally male. The assumption that the male audience is voyeu-
ristically fixated on the female cheerleaders helps to structure the 
performance, and presentation of cheerleaders . . . . [T]he male 
 
548. See Laurel R. Davis, A Postmodern Paradox? Cheerleaders at Women’s Sporting Events,
in Women, Sport, and Culture, supra note 1, at ___, 149–57 [hereinafter Davis, A Postmodern 
Paradox?]. 
549. See id. 
550. Id. at 154. Despite their different cheerleading activities, male cheerleaders also face 
challenges to their masculinity—which also reinforces gender dichotomies in sport. See id. at 155–
56 (describing common perceptions of male cheerleaders as “feminine” or gay, based on the view 
that cheerleading is a “feminine” activity). 
551. Id. at 157–58 (describing the sexual division of labor on cheerleading teams as reflecting 
traditional norms of gender). 
552. See Davis, Male Cheerleaders, supra note 545, at 153. Davis points out that cheerlead-
ing was not always considered “feminine.” Id. In the 1800s, cheerleading was an all-male activity, 
and the entry of females in cheerleading during World War I was viewed by many as an intrusion 
into the male domain of sport. Id. However, men dropped out of cheerleading in the 1940s and 50s, 
as more women became cheerleaders, and by the 1970s cheerleading was considered to be “natu-
rally feminine.” Id. Males did not reenter cheerleading in significant numbers until the late 1970s. 
Id.; see also Lenskyj, supra note 242, at 84 (discussing the transformation of cheerleading from a 
mostly male event that valued gymnastic performances and deep male voices to an event emphasiz-
ing the decorative function of female cheerleaders). 
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view of a cameraman often helps to frame female cheerleaders as 
erotic objects. This type of camera work objectifies and sexualizes 
females, and it is based on and reinforces the notion of male vo-
yeurism as natural and heterosexuality as universal for all men.553 
The existence of cheerleading programs that are structured on the basis 
of an objectified role for women in sport, at the periphery of the men’s 
game, symbolically conveys important messages about the gender of 
sport and the respective roles of men and women within it.  
This message is all the more profoundly communicated by those 
schools that try to count cheerleaders as athletes in an attempt to bolster 
their measurement of female sports participants under the Title IX three-
part test. High schools and colleges are increasingly attempting to count 
cheerleading as a sport for the purposes of Title IX compliance.554 So 
far, OCR has resisted this move, holding fast to its policy determination 
that cheerleading is not a sport unless its primary activity is interscho-
lastic or intercollegiate competition.555 Nevertheless, some schools do 
count cheerleaders as athletes.556 The decision to provide cheerleading 
opportunities for girls instead of additional competitive sport opportuni-
ties in which female athletes themselves are the central event, 
compounds the message that the preferred place for girls and women in 
sport is on the sidelines. 
There is a danger that in describing the constraints facing women in 
sport, the constraints will appear more monolithic and stable than they 
 
553. Davis, Male Cheerleaders, supra note 545, at 159 (citations omitted). An example of this 
type of “camera work” can be found in the movie American Beauty where a middle-aged father, 
played by Kevin Spacey, becomes obsessed with his high school daughter’s cheerleading friend 
(played by Mena Suvari) after watching her perform a cheerleading routine during a male basket-
ball game. American Beauty (DreamworksSKG 1999). The portrayal of Kevin Spacey’s character 
as a middle-aged father falling for a high school cheerleader was comic, yet sympathetic, as the 
cheerleader represented the embodiment of idealized, irresistible, and devious sexuality combined 
with, in the end, a hidden innocence and vulnerability. The storyline played out the cultural image 
of the female cheerleader as seductress of the male sports spectator. 
554. See Women’s Sports Foundation, Foundation Position Papers, Addressing the Issue of 
Drill Team, Cheerleading, Danceline and Band as Varsity Sports, at 
http://208.178.42.127/templates/action/take/results.html?record=95 (last visited Jan. 28, 2000) (on 
file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (“It has come to our attention that 
there are athletic governance associations, schools and colleges who are attempting to recognize 
drill team, cheerleading, danceline, marching bands, twirling and similar extracurricular activities 
as bona fide sports and varsity athletic program offerings in order to comply with Title IX.”). 
555. Adrienne D. Coles, School Cheerleading Evolving into a Competitive Activity, Educ. 
Week on the Web, Apr. 26, 2000, at http://www.edweek.org/ew/ewstory.cfm? 
slug=33cheer.h19 (on file with author) (citing to 1995 statement of the Office for Civil Rights that 
cheerleading is not considered a sport for purposes of Title IX athletics compliance). 
556. See id.; see also Amy Argetsinger, This is Cheerleading? ‘All Star’ Squads Are Doing It 
For Themselves, Charleston Daily Mail, July 17, 1999, at 1C (noting that Anne Arundel County, 
Md., like many other school systems, have designated cheerleading as a sport). 
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actually are.557 In fact, the constraints that shape girls’ and women’s re-
lationship to sport are not monolithic. Many women of color, in 
particular, have not had their sport experiences defined by the same cul-
tural conflict that presents traditional femininity as oppositional to 
athleticism. African American women, for example, have a distinct his-
tory in relation to sports; they have not experienced the same 
“protective” rationale as white girls and women for limiting their ath-
letic participation.558 Black women, having been excluded from 
standards of femininity shaped by white middle class norms, have been 
less constrained by a conflict between athleticism and femininity.559
Perhaps as a consequence of the different cultural meanings of sport 
for white women and African American women, different sports histori-
cally have been emphasized for white women and African American 
women. This has presented its own barrier to African American female 
athletes. While white women were channeled into purportedly “femi-
nine” sports such as field hockey and swimming, African American 
women were playing basketball and competing in track.560 African 
American girls and women continue to be channeled into the “black” 
sports of basketball and track, and are sorely underrepresented in other 
sports.561 In addition to the sport-specific cultural constraints faced by 
African American girls and women, economic barriers also have dis-
 
557. Cf. Nussbaum, supra note 46, at 14 (“[P]eople are not stamped out like coins by the 
power machine of social convention. They are constrained by social norms, but norms are plural 
and people are devious.”). 
558. See Cindy Himes Gissendanner, African-American Women and Competitive Sport, 1920–
1960, in Women, Sport, and Culture, supra note 1, at [starting page PC] 88 (discussing history of 
African American women in sport, and noting that “[t]he African-American woman’s experience 
flew in the face of medical arguments linking physical exertion during menstruation with reproduc-
tive malfunction, one of the basic components of the . . . argument against scheduled competitive 
events for girls and women.”); see also Cahn, supra note 242, at 36–41, 69–70, 110–39 (discussing 
distinct societal constraints that have shaped African American women’s participation in sport). 
559. See Gissendanner, supra note 558, at 88 (arguing that African American women generally 
adhered to a more active ideal of femininity than their white counterparts); Messner, Sports and 
Male Domination, supra note 509, at 71 (citing to literature arguing that “there has never been an 
apologetic for black women athletes, suggesting that there are cultural differences in the construc-
tion of femininities”). 
560. See Cahn, supra note 242, at 89, 96–97, 111–12, 129. 
561. See Alfred Dennis Mathewson, Black Women, Gender Equity and the Function at the 
Junction, 6 Marq. Sports L.J. 239, 257 (1996) (discussing the steering of black female athletes into 
basketball and track, and away from other sports); see also Debra E. Blum, The Battle for Gender 
Equity: Some Fear that Steps to Help Female Athletes May Curtail Opportunities for Blacks,
Chron. Higher Educ., May 26, 1995, at http://chronicle.com/che-data/arti. . .s-41.dir/issue-
37.dir/37a00101.html (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (last visited 
June 28, 2000) (citing data showing that eighty-one percent of black female athletes at Division I 
colleges competed in basketball or track); Kelly Whiteside, Race in Sports/Wednesday Special/A 
Ways to Go/Minority Women Have Been Left Out in Title IX Gains, Newsday (New York), July 1, 
1998, at A74 (reporting NCAA data showing that, outside of basketball and track, only five percent 
of female college athletes receiving aid in 1996 were African American). 
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torted the athletic participation of African American girls and women, 
who have been less able to afford the private training and experience 
necessary to compete in sports where access is expensive.562 The issue 
of economic access has been compounded by discrimination against 
women of color in arenas where they could develop their athletic skills, 
such as country clubs and community recreational programs.563 When 
schools, colleges, and universities add women’s sports without address-
ing the barriers to full participation by women of color, they contribute 
to the inequality of women of color in sport.564
The constraints facing girls and women of color in sport have just be-
gun to be the subject of critical scholarly analysis.565 Marilyn 
Yarbrough, among other scholars provides a much-needed voice analyz-
ing the barriers facing African American women in sport, who stand in a 
precarious place at the intersection of race and gender.566 There is a 
great need for further research and attention to the distinct constraints 
facing girls and women of color in sport.567 The national conversation 
about sex inequality in sport must include an examination of the athletic 
experiences of all girls and women, not just those who are at the pinna-
cle of racial, sexual and class privilege.568 
562. Marilyn V. Yarbrough, If You Let Me Play Sports, 6 Marq. Sports L.J. 229, 235–36 
(1996) [hereinafter Yarbrough, If You Let Me Play Sports]; see also Olson, supra note 146, at 129–
30 (suggesting that African American women are typecast into only a handful of sports for which it 
is inexpensive to acquire skills and where there is public access to facilities where the sports can be 
played); Elliott Almond, Title IX 25 Years Later—Minority Women Worry About Which Sports Get 
Support, Seattle Times, June 22, 1997, at A11 (noting that sports commonly added in the name of 
gender equity—such as golf, gymnastics, rowing, soccer, tennis and water polo—favor participants 
of some means, translating into more opportunities for college women from suburban white 
neighborhoods). 
563. See Yarbrough, If You Let Me Play Sports, supra note 562, at 235–36. 
564. Cf. Almond, supra note 562 (quoting one African American women’s track coach as stat-
ing, “[w]hite coaches are less inclined to go to the inner-city areas” to recruit athletes in the 
emerging sports); Whiteside, supra note 561 (noting that the “emerging sports” for women desig-
nated by the NCAA “are primarily played by whites”).  
565. See, e.g., Tonya M. Evans, In the Title IX Race Toward Gender Equity, the Black Female 
Athlete Is Left to Finish Last: The Lack of Access for the “Invisible Woman”, 42 How. L.J. 105 
(1998); Mathewson, supra note 561; Yarbrough, If You Let Me Play Sports, supra note 562.  
566. See Yarbrough, If You Let Me Play Sports, supra note 562, at ___; Marilyn V. Yarbrough, 
Sports Law as a Reflection of Society’s Laws and Values: A Sporting Chance: The Intersection of 
Race and Gender, 38 S. Tex. L. Rev. 1029 (1997) [hereinafter Yarbrough, A Sporting Chance]; see 
also Evans, supra note 565, at ___; Mathewson, supra note 565, at ___. 
567. See, e.g., Don Sabo, Mexican-American Girls and High School Sports, at 
http://208.178.42.127/templates/re. . ._topics2.html?article=46&record=19 (last visited Jan. 21, 
2000) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (stating that Latina and 
Asian American female athletes have not been the focus of scholarly investigation). 
568. Cf. Elise Pettus, From the Suburbs to the Sports Arenas, in Nike is a Goddess, supra note 
7, at [starting page PC], 265 (noting that girls’ soccer “is still primarily a white, middle-class, sub-
urban sport, and efforts are just beginning to bring soccer to kids in inner cities”). 
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A related danger in discussing the social constraints facing girls and 
women in sport is that the extent to which many female athletes have 
transcended these constraints will be obscured.569 Although the con-
straints discussed above continue to shape and limit women’s 
relationship to sport, many women have found a place in sport, and in-
creasing numbers of women continue to do so. Female athletes are 
gaining in popularity and recognition even as they are constrained in 
their choices and operate within the confines of social structures. As 
Mariah Burton Nelson wrote in the late 1990s, “At the end of the mil-
lennium, it’s definitely cool to be athletic. Female athletes know it, and 
the mainstream culture is catching on.”570 
Sport’s role in perpetuating a dominant masculinity is increasingly 
contested as gender relations within sport are challenged.571 As more 
women participate in sport, and their participation becomes more highly 
valued, sport itself becomes less associated with masculinity, and the 
culture of sport is subject to change.572 At the same time, female partici-
pants in sport have the potential to experience concrete gains in their 
own satisfaction and sense of empowerment.573
569. See, e.g., Bryson, Challenges to Male Hegemony, supra note 244, at 182 (“[I]t is clear 
that despite its strongly masculine flavour, sport is not a monolithic institution. As with other sites 
of social life, the hegemonic position has been continually contested.”); Messner, Sports and Male 
Domination, supra note 509, at 76 (“[G]ender relations, along with their concomitant images of 
masculinity and femininity, change and develop historically as a result of interactions between men 
and women within socially structured limits and constraints.”). 
570. Nelson, Who We Might Become, supra note 7, at xvii. And yet, she notes, many women 
athletes “still buy in” to the notion that they need “to prove that they’re not unfeminine, meaning 
not lesbian and not threatening to men.” Id. at xviii. 
571. See Hargreaves, supra note 1, at 3 (arguing that the role of sport in producing male 
domination over women is not straightforward, and that gender relations are reproduced in sport 
and contested at the same time). 
572. See Griffin, supra note 401, at 17. Griffin argues that: 
Women’s presence in sport as serious participants dilutes the importance and exclusivity of 
sport as a training ground for learning about and accepting traditional male gender roles and 
the privileges that their adoption confers on (white, heterosexual) men . . . . If women in 
sport can be tough minded, competitive, and muscular too, then sport loses its special place 
in the development of masculinity for men. If women can so easily develop these so-called 
masculine qualities, then what are the meanings of masculinity and femininity? 
Id.; Hargreaves, supra note 1, at 12 (arguing that culture is “a ‘lived experience,’ constructed and 
changed through the interaction of men and women who make, resist and transform meanings, 
values and rules of behaviour”).  
573. See Hargreaves, supra note 1, at 109, 289; see also Bryson, Challenges to Male Hegem-
ony, supra note 244, at 184 (“Although structural change is important, ultimately there is a 
dimension of oppressive social relationships that must be tackled directly at the personal level.”) 
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IV. Implications for Title IX Doctrine: Enhancing 
Institutional Accountability for Sex Inequality 
in Athletic Opportunity and Culture 
The above discussion provides a more complete but by no means ex-
haustive account of the ways in which educational institutions construct 
men’s and women’s unequal relationship to sport, beyond that acknowl-
edged by the courts in the Brown litigation. Through the level of 
resources and benefits provided to male and female athletes, the struc-
turing of athletic programs, and the maintenance of a distinctly 
masculine sport culture, educational institutions play a critical role in 
the linkage of sport and masculinity. The masculinization of sport, in 
turn, marginalizes and constrains women’s role in sport and, by exten-
sion, in society.574 While Title IX has made notable progress in holding 
institutions accountable under the three-part test for creating asymmetri-
cal positions for men and women in relation to athletic participation 
levels, it has not succeeded in making sport an activity that is equally 
accessible and valuable for male and female students. This section dis-
cusses how Title IX doctrine might be reformed to better address the 
unequal valuation of women’s sport experiences and challenge the con-
struction of masculinity and femininity in sport. 
A. Securing the Equal Valuation of Women’s Sports Under the  
Treatment and Benefits Standard 
The three-part test for equality in athletic participation opportunities, 
discussed above, has resulted in large numbers of new sport participa-
tion opportunities for girls and women. However, Title IX has not 
succeeded in forcing schools to equally value the male and female sports 
programs that they offer. As the law has developed, certain disparities in 
the treatment and valuation of male and female athletics are permissible 
under Title IX. 
Title IX’s standards for measuring equality in the treatment of male 
and female athletes fall short of requiring schools to equally value 
women’s sports. Under the Title IX regulations, disparities in funding 
for men’s and women’s sports alone do not violate Title IX.575 Rather, 
 
574. See Kidd, supra note 353, at 36–37 (linking the effects of disparate sport opportunities 
for males and females to the perpetuation of sex inequality in society and the reinforcement of the 
sexual division of labor at home and in the workplace). 
575. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c) 1999. The regulations hold that: 
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determining compliance in this area requires comparing the factors listed 
in the regulations and Policy Interpretation to determine whether the pro-
grams provide for overall parity.576 The relevant comparison is program-
wide, rather than sport-by-sport, so that disparities in the treatment of 
individuals sports are permissible if the men’s and women’s programs 
overall provide for equal treatment to male and female students.577 In 
other words, the key issue is not the amount of money spent on men’s 
and women’s sports, but whether that money buys the same quality of 
treatment for men and women in the sports that they play. This standard 
has enabled institutions to spend several times the amount of money on 
more expensive men’s athletic programs than they do on women’s pro-
grams, as indicated by the figures cited previously.578 These differences 
in spending alone illustrate the higher value that institutions place on 
men’s sports than women’s sports. 
In addition to disparities in funding, the law permits disparities in the 
treatment and benefits provided to men’s and women’s athletic programs 
if the disparities result from so-called nondiscriminatory factors.579 “Non-
discriminatory factors” may include the cost of more expensive 
equipment, facilities, uniforms, and crowd control for stadiums, among 
other items.580 The “nondiscriminatory factors” justification is most often 
 
Unequal aggregate expenditures for members of each sex or unequal expenditures for male 
and female teams if a recipient operates or sponsors separate teams will not constitute non-
compliance with this section, but the Assistant Secretary may consider the failure to provide 
necessary funds for teams for one sex in assessing equality of opportunity for members of 
each sex. 
Id. 
576. The factors listed in the regulation are: equipment and supplies; scheduling of games and 
practice times; travel and per diems; opportunity to receive coaching and tutoring; assignment and 
compensation of coaches and tutors; locker rooms and practice and competitive facilities; medical 
and training facilities and services; housing and dining facilities and services; and publicity. Id. 
These factors are not exhaustive. Id. The Policy Interpretation adds recruitment to the list of factors 
to consider in an equal treatment claim. Policy Interpretation, supra note 6, at 71,417(B.4.a). 
577. Policy Interpretation, supra note 6, at 71,415(B.2). The Policy Interpretation states that 
the relevant standard is to evaluate the “availability, quality and kinds of benefits, opportunities, 
and treatment afforded members of both sexes.” Id. This standard requires that the programs overall 
be “equivalent”; “identical benefits, opportunities, or treatment are not required, provided the over-
all effect of any differences is negligible.” Id. 
578. See discussion of resource allocation supra Part III.C; see also Weistart, Gender Equity,
supra note 173, at 206–07 (estimating that when all actual costs are accounted for, a “Big Time” 
athletic university spends roughly $13 million on men’s football and basketball alone; out of a $20 
million budget, all women’s sports together receive approximately $2.2 million). 
579. Policy Interpretation, supra note 6, at 71,415–16 (B.2.a-c). 
580. Id. Case law is clear, however, that lack of funds or a desire to save money is not a de-
fense to a Title IX athletics claim. See, e.g., Favia v. Indiana Univ. of Pa., 812 F. Supp. 578, 583 
(W.D. Pa. 1993), aff’d, 7 F.3d 332 (3d Cir. 1993); Cook v. Colgate Univ., 802 F. Supp. 737, 750 
(N.D.N.Y. 1992), vacated as moot, 992 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1993); Haffer v. Temple Univ., 678 F. 
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invoked to support the higher level of treatment and benefits typically 
allocated to football programs.581 
The argument that football is different and warrants special privileges 
reflects deep-seated resistance to relinquishing male privilege in 
sport.582 It persists despite the reality that the vast majority of football 
programs spend much more money than they generate in revenue.583 
Even for those big-time programs that do bring in revenue, many of the 
game’s excess expenditures are not necessary to produce revenue.584 To 
the extent that football programs do produce net revenue, they do so 
because educational institutions have chosen to invest substantial re-
sources in them to make them popular. For example, large expenditures 
for athletic facilities, including expensive stadiums and other infrasturc-
ture that accommodate significant numbers of spectators, reflect long-
term institutional investments that have enabled such programs to be-
come popular.585 Rather than finding support from any intrinsic financial 
 
Supp. 517, 530 (E.D. Pa. 1987). The source of funds spent on the teams is also irrelevant to the 
analysis, so it is no defense that the teams with the most benefits receive funding from booster clubs 
or outside donors. See, e.g., Cohen v. Brown Univ., 809 F. Supp. 978, 996 (D.R.I. 1992), aff’d, 991 
F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1993). 
581. See Policy Interpretation, supra note 6, at 71,415–16 (including several references to the 
“unique demands” of football in discussing possible nondiscriminatory factors that might justify 
different treatment of men’s and women’s athletics). 
582. See Festle, supra note 36, at xxvi (quoting one athletic administrator’s fear of Title IX 
“emasculating” football); Griffin, supra note 401, at 24 (describing incident where female member 
of high school football team was physically assaulted by her teammates to keep her from playing); 
see generally Mariah Burton Nelson, The Stronger Women Get, The More Men Love Football 
(1994).  
583. Weistart, Gender Equity, supra note 173, at 207–09, 221 & n.101 (stating that when all 
costs are considered, very few football programs make more money than they spend); id. at 219 
(acknowledging that football does earn more revenues than any other sport, but stating that “the 
football deficit is greater than the total cost of all women’s sports excluding basketball”); Zimbalist, 
supra note 329, at B9 (stating that “[i]n any given year, only about a dozen of the 973 colleges and 
universities in the N.C.A.A. have athletics programs that run a true surplus,” and referencing the 
“tangled” accounting practices of college sports). 
584. See David F. Slater, Crashing the Old Boys’ Network 54 (1996) (citing excess expendi-
tures in Division I-A football programs, including widespread practices of paying for the team to 
stay in hotels on nights before home games and flying in recruits for a campus visit when coaches 
are not interested in them, just to deprive rival schools of the visit); Weistart, Equal Opportunity?,
supra note 32, at 39, 42 (discussing the “athletics arms race” of increasing men’s football and bas-
ketball expenditures, and proposing NCAA-enforced expenditure caps as a way to curb excess 
expenditures while increasing the number of teams that are competitive, thus spurring consumer 
interest); Weistart, Gender Equity, supra note 173, at 211–14, 250–53 (arguing that even otherwise 
unbiased athletic directors will fund men’s so-called revenue sports over men’s and women’s non-
revenue sports, and that spending caps on the revenue sports would help fund women’s sports with-
out reducing either the revenue potential or quality of men’s revenue sports); Zimbalist, supra note 
329, at B9 (discussing “extravagant amounts of money” received by men’s football and basketball 
programs, and noting that such expenditures “soar well beyond what a competitive market would 
offer”).  
585. Slater, supra note 584, at 53, 57 (discussing institutional investments in men’s sports, 
and noting that Norman May pointed out “sporting events are not intrinsically interesting but are 
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consequences of the game, the sentiment that football should be spe-
cially regarded derives much of its power from the premise that it is not 
a game for women.586 In this view, it is unthinkable that sports played by 
women could be compared to football or deserve such prominence. 
Title IX has resisted this argument in its most extreme form, as Con-
gress has repeatedly refused to exempt football and other revenue-
producing sports from Title IX coverage.587 Yet, the equal treatment and 
benefits standard enables football and other major men’s sports to retain 
some special privilege under the guise of nondiscriminatory factors that 
render the sport “unique.”588 However, nothing about football or any 
other men’s sport necessarily means that women must be relegated to a 
lesser share of resources for their sports.589 Women have not had the 
opportunity to design their own sport opportunities, much less the insti-
tutional support to do so in any way that begins to compare to what 
institutions have invested in football and other men’s sports. Title IX’s 
equal treatment standard fails to acknowledge the reality that these so-
called nondiscriminatory factors actually mask discriminatory choices in 
institutional priorities.  
 
made so”); Weistart, Gender Equity, supra note 173, at 221 n.101 (stating that revenue sports de-
pend on large taxpayer and institutional investments and the general good will of the university to 
generate revenue); see also id. at 226–27 (discussing reasons to be skeptical of “inherent truths” 
about the presumed inability of women’s sports to become money-makers); Zimbalist, supra note 
329, at B9 (noting that “[a]ttendance at women’s sporting contests is growing every year, as are 
television ratings” and that “[u]ntil we support women’s college sports at similar levels to those of 
the men—and for as long as a generation—we won’t be able to assess their long-run potential”).  
586. Messner, Sports and Male Domination, supra note 509, at 70–71 (arguing that “foot-
ball’s primary ideological salience lies in its ability, in the face of women’s challenges to male 
dominance, to symbolically link men of diverse ages and socioeconomic backgrounds,” and to 
identify as “a superior and separate caste”). 
587. Congress has repeatedly rejected resolutions to exempt revenue-producing sports from Ti-
tle IX’s coverage. See discussion of Javits Amendment supra note 153. 
588. One sports scholar has described the argument that football is unique as an example of 
“institutionalized sexism,” which refers to “the depth of sexism in the daily practice of sport to the 
extent that it is no longer recognized as such but is instead justified on the basis of factors such as 
economic or spectator interests.” Knoppers, supra note 360, at 133. As she explains: “[T]he amount 
of energy, publicity, and money spent on men’s football programs is justified because these pro-
grams bring in revenue that purportedly support all the other sports programs. The fact that these 
football programs involve only men is overlooked or ignored.” Id. 
589. The argument that football is larger than any one women’s sport, and therefore should be 
treated specially, is not compelling. Because Title IX looks at the men’s and women’s overall ath-
letic programs, rather than engaging in a sport-by-sport comparison, there is no reason why women 
must play a sport as large as football in order to obtain equal athletic resources. See Policy Interpre-
tation, supra note 6, at 71,422 (rejecting sport-specific approach to Title IX compliance in favor of 
approach that requires overall equality for the men’s and women’s programs, and noting that a 
sport-specific standard could create unequal opportunity by limiting women to equal opportunities 
only in sports that both men and women play). Moreover, the larger squad size of football reflects 
institutional decisions about how to structure the game at least as much as the nature of the game 
itself. See Weistart, Gender Equity, supra note 173, at 214 n.78 (suggesting that football squad 
sizes are artificially inflated); Zimbalist, supra note 329 (same). 
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The decision to provide more expensive sports for men than for women 
is itself discriminatory.590 There are many expensive sports that women 
may desire to participate in, such as equestrian competitions, rock climb-
ing, water polo, and sailing, among others.591 
Yet institutions generally do not choose to offer such sports, and instead 
offer less expensive sports for women.592 
The equal treatment standard should be informed by the theory under-
lying the three-part test and hold educational institutions accountable for 
the different situations of male and female athletic programs. To the ex-
tent that football and other major men’s sports are unique, and therefore 
in need of greater resources, institutional decisions about how to struc-
ture and prioritize their athletics programs have created that very 
uniqueness. Title IX should not permit educational institutions to re-
spond to the different situations they have created with further 
discrimination in the treatment and benefits provided to men’s and 
women’s athletics. 
Another example of how Title IX permits educational institutions to 
evade accountability for sex inequality in their athletics programs is the 
law’s response to disparities in the salaries for coaching male and fe-
male athletes. The Title IX regulations include the “opportunity to 
receive coaching” among the factors listed for consideration in deter-
mining equality in the area of the treatment and benefits provided to 
male and female athletes.593 The unequal salaries provided to the 
coaches of male and female teams could certainly fall within this factor. 
However, the current interpretation of equal treatment with respect to 
coaching is much more limited. Under this interpretation, in order for 
the payment of lower salaries to the coaches of female athletes to consti-
tute discrimination against female athletes, the lower salary must “deny 
 
590. See Weistart, Gender Equity, supra note 173, at 207 (explaining that while a “Big Time” 
university spends about $10 million on football, at a rough cost of $100,000 per player, entire 
women’s teams can be funded at a very competitive level for about $200,000–$250,000, and less 
competitively at $50,000–$100,000). 
591. See, e.g., Hargreaves, supra note 1, at 239–40 (arguing that women’s sports interests de-
pend on what activities are offered, which tend to be relatively inexpensive; and that when women 
are offered more costly “subsidized ‘tasters’ of a less predictable kind,” such as rock-climbing and 
hand-gliding, “the evidence shows that a surprising number tend to take part”); id. at 286–87 (dis-
cussing lower profile water sports, such as water-polo, canoeing, water-ski racing, and air sports, 
such as hot air ballooning, handgliding, and parachuting, as activities with substantial female inter-
est that receive little emphasis or funding); Jackie C. Burke, The Highest Risks for the Boldest of 
Athletes, in Nike is a Goddess, supra note 7, at 199, 217 (“Today the vast majority of participants 
in most horse sports are women. Girls outnumber boys in the Pony Club by at least ten to one and 
in the American Horse Shows Association by better than eight to one. . . . Twenty colleges from 
Stanford to University of Virginia to Cornell to Texas A&M boast of women’s polo teams.”). 
592. See Bryson, Maintenance of Masculine Hegemony, supra note 504, at 53 (noting that 
“the more costly sports are almost invariably those where males predominate”). 
593. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c)(4). 
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male and female athletes coaching of equivalent quality, nature, or 
availability.”594 Thus, female athletes asserting a discrimination claim 
based on the lower coaching salaries for female athletes must allege that 
they are receiving a level of coaching that is inferior to that received by 
male athletes.595 This interpretation forces female athletes into the awk-
ward position of having to criticize their coach’s ability or effort in 
order to obtain equal resources for their coaches, when the actual per-
formance of the coach often is not the real issue.596 The standard’s 
limited focus on concrete indicia of the quality of coaching does not 
capture the nature of the discrimination against the women’s sports pro-
gram that the disparities in coaches’ salaries represents. 
In theory, the discrimination against female athletes that results from 
the allocation of lower salaries for coaches in female athletic programs 
could be redressed in an employment discrimination claim by the coach 
herself (or himself).597 However, such an approach runs into a quagmire 
of doctrinal problems. Title IX and its regulations cover employment 
discrimination, although several courts have refused to allow employees 
to proceed with discrimination claims directly under Title IX, ruling that 
Title VII preempts an individual cause of action under Title IX.598 How-
ever, even if coaches may bring pay discrimination claims directly under 
Title IX, courts will apply the substantive standards that govern such 
claims under Title VII, which raises additional problems.599 Title VII 
 
594. Policy Interpretation, supra note 6, at 71,416 (B.3.e). One court has applied this analysis 
to reject a female coach’s claim for pay discrimination under Title IX. See Deli v. U. of Minn., 863 
F. Supp. 958, 963 (D. Minn. 1994) (“Because Plaintiff does not claim or provide any evidence to 
suggest that due to her receipt of a lower salary than that received by coaches of some men’s ath-
letic teams, Plaintiff’s coaching services were inferior in ‘quality, nature or availability’ to those 
provided to the men’s teams, she has failed to make out a prima facie claim for violation of Title 
IX.”). 
595. See Heckman, Explosion of Title IX Legal Activity, supra note 378, at 1013 (discussing 
and criticizing OCR’s treatment of coaches compensation in its Investigator’s Manual, which states 
that, “if availability and assignment of coaches are equivalent, it is difficult for OCR to assert that 
the lower compensation for coaches in, for example, the women’s program, negatively affects fe-
male athletes”). 
596. See, e.g., Deli, 863 F.Supp. at 963 (finding against plaintiff, a women’s gymnastics 
coach, who alleged under Title IX that she provided superior coaching services for less money than 
the university’s men’s coaches). 
597. See North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 521 (1982) (upholding Title IX 
regulations governing discrimination against employees of federally-funded education programs). 
598. See, e.g., Lakoski v. James, 66 F.3d 751 (5th Cir. 1995); Cooper v. Gustavus Adolphus 
Coll., 957 F. Supp. 191 (D. Minn. 1997); Diane Heckman, Lowrey v. Texas A & M Univ. Systems: 
Title IX Vis-À-Vis Title VII Sex Discrimination and Retaliation in Educational Employment, 124 
Educ. L. Rep. 753, 755–66 (1998) (discussing case law surrounding Title VII preemption of Title 
IX employment discrimination claims). 
599. See Enforcement Guidance on Sex Discrimination in the Compensation of Sports 
Coaches in Educational Institutions, EEOC Notice No. 915.002, n.6 (Oct. 29, 1997), at 
http://www.eeoc.gov/docs/coaches.html (stating that courts apply Title VII standards in analyzing 
employee Title IX claims for coaches’ pay discrimination) [hereinafter EEOC Coaches’ Pay Guid-
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challenges brought by coaches of women’s teams have been unsuccess-
ful on the grounds that the pay disparity is because of the sex of the 
students coached, not the sex of coach herself.600
The Equal Pay Act holds somewhat more promise for coaches’ pay 
discrimination claims, in that a violation of the Act is established by 
proof that a man and a woman perform substantially equal work for un-
equal pay.601 Thus, a female coach of women’s basketball could claim 
that the higher salary paid to the male coach of men’s basketball vio-
lated the Act, even though the salary for coaching women’s basketball 
would be the same if a male held the job.602 However, one difficulty 
with such a claim in this context is that courts have allowed institutional 
decisions about how to structure and invest in their men’s and women’s 
programs to provide a legitimate basis for paying different salaries to 
their men’s and women’s coaches.603 Institutions have escaped liability 
 
ance]; see also Heckman, Explosion of Title IX Legal Activity, supra note 378, at 1003 (discussing 
OCR’s 1983 Policy Clarification interpreting Title IX employment discrimination coverage to fol-
low Title VII standard that coaches must establish discrimination based on their own sex, not the 
sex of the students coached). Title IX discrimination claims by employees provide advantages over 
Title VII in the procedures and remedies available, not the substantive standards for determining 
liability. See id. at 998–99 (discussing differences between Title VII and Title IX in exhaustion of 
administrative avenues, statutes of limitations, and caps on damages). 
600. See, e.g., EEOC v. Madison Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 12, 818 F.2d 577, 581–84 (7th 
Cir. 1987) (rejecting coach’s pay discrimination claim because pay differential was based on the sex 
of the team, not the sex of the coach); Bartges v. Univ. of N.C at Charlotte, 908 F. Supp. 1312, 
1328 (W.D.N.C. 1995) (rejecting female coach’s Title VII pay discrimination claim on the ground 
that university’s decision to invest differently in its men’s and women’s athletics programs did not 
discriminate against the coach on the basis of her sex); Kenneweg v. Hampton Township Sch. Dist., 
438 F. Supp. 575, 577 (W.D. Pa. 1977) (rejecting coaches’ pay discrimination claim on the ground 
that the coaches were paid less because of the sex of their teams, not their own sex; see also 
Coaches: Salaries for Division I-A Men’s and Women’s Coaches (1996–1997), at 
http://bailiwick.lib.uiowa.edu/ge/statistics.html (last visited May 25, 2000) (on file with the Uni-
versity of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (citing statistics showing that, with the exception of 
volleyball, the median coaches’ compensation for men’s teams is consistently higher than for 
women’s teams, regardless of the sex of the coach). 
601. See, e.g., Lisa A. Bireline Sarver, Coaching Contracts Take on the Equal Pay Act: Can 
(and Should) Female Coaches Tie the Score? 28 Creighton L. Rev. 885, 890–92 (1995) (describing 
basic framework of Equal Pay Act claims); Giampetro-Meyer, supra note 527, at 372–75 (discuss-
ing recent successful Equal Pay Act claims for discrimination in coaching salaries). 
602. See Sarver, supra note 601, at 892–901 (discussing cases involving claims by coaches 
where courts found that that the Equal Pay Act was violated). 
603. See, e.g., Stanley v. Univ. of S. Cal., 13 F.3d 1313, 1321 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding that dif-
ferences in the responsibilities of the coaching jobs for men’s and women’s basketball, particularly 
with respect to public relations and promotional activities, rendered the jobs dissimilar under the 
Equal Pay Act); Madison Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 12, 818 F.2d at 581 (rejecting Equal Pay Act 
claim for coaches’ pay discrimination); Bartges, 908 F. Supp. at 1334 (same); see also Stanley v. 
Univ. of S. Cal., 178 F.3d 1069, 1077 (9th Cir. 1999) (affirming trial court’s decision that pay dif-
ferential in men’s and women’s basketball coaching jobs did not violate the Equal Pay Act); Deli v. 
Univ. of Minn., 863 F. Supp. 958, 961 (D. Minn. 1994) (holding that greater spectator attendance, 
revenue generation, and responsibility for public and media relations are sufficient to show that 
coaching jobs are not “substantially equal” in Equal Pay Act claim); Sarver, supra note 601, at 916 
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under the Equal Pay Act for paying their men’s coaches more by show-
ing that men’s coaches have more responsibility to bring in fans and 
produce revenue—reflecting, to some extent, institutional investments 
in these programs.604 
A recent EEOC guidance in this area may improve the potential for 
legal redress for discrimination in men’s and women’s coaching salaries 
under the Equal Pay Act.605 Unlike previous court decisions interpreting 
the Act, the Guidance acknowledges that in most athletic programs, the 
sex of the coach is connected to the sex of the team in that women are 
virtually excluded from the higher paid jobs of coaching male ath-
letes.606 For this reason, the Guidance takes the position that an 
institution’s decision to invest more in its men’s athletics program than 
its women’s program should not be viewed as a justification for a dis-
parity in men’s and women’s coaching salaries.607 Nevertheless, the 
Guidance still allows institutions to justify paying coaches of men’s 
teams more where the pay differential is based on different levels of re-
sponsibility or status associated with the men’s teams, even if the 
institution itself has created such differences.608 Such a result is contrary 
to the rationale underlying the three-part test, which is appropriately 
skeptical of the use of differences in men’s and women’s situations in 
sport to justify the allocation of greater opportunities to male sports. 
One irony of even a successful analysis under the Equal Pay Act is 
that it would provide no recourse for pay inequity if the coach of the 
women’s teams was a man who was paid less than male coaches of 
men’s teams.609 Consequently, it creates an incentive for schools to hire 
 
(comparing salaries of University of Nebraska men’s and women’s basketball coaches, and stating 
that the greater pressure placed on the men’s team to bring in revenue and generate publicity may 
be a valid basis for denying an Equal Pay Act challenges to the coaches’ different salaries). 
604. See, e.g., Sarver, supra note 601, at 902–13 (discussing cases where coaches’ pay dis-
crimination claims have failed under the Equal Pay Act). 
605. See EEOC Coaches’ Pay Guidance, supra note 599, at 7. But see Weaver v. Ohio St. 
Univ., 71 F. Supp. 2d 789, 802 (S.D. Ohio 1999) (declining to follow the EEOC Guidance and 
stating that “such guidelines do not have the effect of agency regulations and are not entitled to 
deference”). 
606. See EEOC Coaches’ Pay Guidance, supra note 599, at 7. 
607. See id. at 21 n.40 (criticizing the Deli court for failing to analyze whether women were 
hired predominantly to coach only female athletes). 
608. For example, the EEOC Guidance suggests that no women’s coaching job would be com-
parable to the job of football coach, given the unique size of team, the high number of assistant 
coaches, and the pressure to raise revenue and maintain a high profile, thereby, exempting football 
coaching salaries from the requirements of the Equal Pay Act. Id. at 5–6. Thus, the Guidance per-
mits decisions about how to structure men’s and women’s teams to justify paying lower salaries to 
coaches of the women’s teams. 
609. See EEOC v. Madison Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 12, 818 F.2d 577, 581 (7th Cir. 1987) 
(“Suppose that the school district happened to have just male, or just female, coaches and paid 
coaches more for coaching boys’ teams than girls’ teams. Men paid less than other men for coach-
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men to coach female athletes because they could pay male coaches less 
than they would have to pay women in the same jobs.610 Although en-
gaging in hiring discrimination against women for coaching positions 
would violate Title VII, proving such discrimination is a difficult mat-
ter.611 As a result, under current legal interpretation, increases in the 
number of successful Equal Pay Act claims may exacerbate the relative 
absence of women from leadership positions in athletics and further pre-
serve the male domain of sport leadership.  
This doctrinal morass leaves coaches of girls’ and women’s sports 
with little effective recourse for their lower salaries. Although such pay 
disparities clearly reflect a devaluation of women’s sports, discrimina-
tion law has not been very receptive to such claims.612 Paying women 
less to coach women athletes should be recognized as a form of clear-cut 
disparate treatment because women are effectively barred from the 
higher paying jobs coaching males.613 
However, the clearest instance of disparate treatment against female 
coaches of women’s teams discrimination in this context targets the ath-
letes, who are female, rather than the employees who coach women’s 
teams, who are not necessarily female. Wholly apart from the discrimi-
nation against coaches themselves, Title IX should recognize disparities 
in coaches’ pay for male and female teams as a form of discrimination 
against female athletes. The allocation of higher coaching salaries to 
male teams places a higher valuation on male sports than female sports. 
The determination that sports programs for girls and women deserve 
fewer resources than those for men, or that the job of a coach is less 
 
ing, or women paid less than other women, could not complain of a violation of the Equal Pay 
Act.”). 
610. For example, one school district responded to an EEOC investigation of coaches’ pay 
disparities by appointing more men to coach girls’ teams and paying them the same amount as the 
female coaches had received. See id. at 586. 
611. See id. (holding school district’s hiring of more males to coach girls teams after EEOC 
Equal Pay Act investigation began was not hiring discrimination; “efforts to bring one’s conduct 
into conformity with one’s litigating posture are not evidence of willful noncompliance with the 
law”). 
612. Martha Chamallas identifies this type of discrimination, which has not been adequately 
addressed under discrimination law, as devaluation. Chamallas, Deepening the Legal Understand-
ing of Bias, supra note 53, at 13. She defines devaluation as the systematic assignment of lower 
worth to “activities, institutions, injuries, and other ‘things,’ which are associated with individuals 
from a disfavored group,” in those situations that do not involve clear-cut disparate treatment 
against a member of a protected class. Id. at 13, 33. 
613. In this respect, claims for coaches’ pay discrimination are on firmer legal ground under 
current discrimination law than comparable worth claims, in which courts have refused to find the 
lower valuation of women’s work (performed predominantly by women and fewer numbers of men) 
as a form of unlawful discrimination. See id. at 29–32 (discussing the fate of comparable worth in 
the courts); see also EEOC Coaches’ Pay Guidance, supra note 599, at 11 (recognizing that where 
women are effectively barred from jobs coaching men, paying coaches of male athletes more than 
coaches of female athletes discriminates against women coaches). 
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demanding when the persons coached are females instead of males, de-
values and marginalizes girls and women in sport. The unmistakable 
message is that coaches of women’s teams are valued less than coaches 
of men’s teams because female athletes themselves are valued less than 
male athletes. This message, combined with other institutional practices 
that contribute to it, solidifies the male character of sport. For women to 
equally participate in sport, Title IX must challenge such institutional 
messages and priorities. 
Title IX’s failure to stop schools from valuing male sports more 
highly than female sports is inconsistent with the value judgments un-
derlying Title IX’s three-part test. This test does not permit 
institutionally created differences in men’s and women’s sport experi-
ences to justify continued unequal allocation of men’s and women’s 
sport opportunities. In contrast, the law’s treatment of disparities in 
coaching salaries and other resources enables institutions to structure 
their sport programs in such a manner as to justify paying the coaches of 
their women’s sports less than the coaches of their men’s sports, and to 
allocate greater resources to men’s athletic programs generally.  
B. De-Linking Sport and Masculinity in the Culture of Sport 
The project of fashioning legal doctrine to challenge the gendered 
construction of sport is one that is daunting at best. Sport and masculin-
ity have become so intertwined in American culture that it is hard to 
imagine how legal reform could make significant inroads in separating 
the two. Yet, to the extent that the law reaffirms this connection by rein-
forcing the exclusivity of sport as a male domain, changing the law is a 
necessary starting point for the social reconstruction of sport and its re-
lationship to gender. 
1. Sex as a Classifier: The Explicit Use of Sex to Organize and 
Structure Sport—One way that Title IX has operated to solidify the con-
nection between sport and masculinity is to codify gendered divisions in 
the sports that males and females play. Title IX organizes athletic par-
ticipation along gendered lines in two respects: first, it approves of 
separate athletic offerings for males and females, and second, it rein-
forces gendered notions about which sports males and females should 
play.  
These two aspects of Title IX have very different implications for the 
construction of masculinity and femininity in relation to sport. The first 
of these, the allowance for sex-separate athletic programs, is highly con-
tested in terms of its relationship to the masculinization of sport. The 
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second, the gendering of particular sports as male or female, more 
clearly contributes to the subordination of girls and women in sport.  
a. Sex-Separation in Competitive Sport Programs—The decision to 
allow sex-separate teams was and remains a controversial one. The de-
velopment of sex-separate athletic teams was initially advocated by 
women physical education leaders to defend the creation of a limited 
sphere of physical education opportunities for girls and women against 
charges that sport would “masculinize” women.614 However protection-
ist and apologetic in its origins, sex segregation in sport came to be 
embraced by many women’s sports advocates as a way to seek a meas-
ure of equality for girls and women in sport while preserving significant 
opportunities for female athletes to compete.615 
Around the time Title IX was being considered, women physical edu-
cation teachers supported a view of equality that would provide 
comparable teams to a significant number of female athletes, rather than 
emphasizing competitive sport opportunities for a few token elite female 
athletes.616 This approach was ultimately embraced in the Title IX regu-
lations.617 Title IX’s regulations expressly permit schools to offer 
athletic teams separately by sex where team selection is based on com-
petitive skill or the sport is categorized as a contact sport. Much of Title 
IX law, including the three-part test for participation opportunities dis-
cussed earlier, proceeds from the presumed validity of sex-segregation 
as an organizing principle for competitive athletic programs. 
The relationship between the sex-segregation of competitive sport 
and the linkage of sport and male dominance is complex and context-
dependent.618 Critics of sex-separation in sport, like proponents of for-
mal equality, argue that Title IX’s allowance for sex-segregated teams 
only solidifies the connection between sport and male dominance.619 
614. See Cahn, supra note 242, at 24 (discussing history of women in sports and development 
of “female separatism” as a way to provide moderate sport opportunities “without fear of sexual 
harm or the taint of masculinity”). 
615. During early debates over sex equality in sports, feminist groups such as the National Or-
ganization for Women (NOW) split from women physical education leaders, with NOW arguing for 
co-ed teams, and women physical education (PE) teachers and educators pushing for a separate-
but-equal approach. Festle, supra note 36, at 325 n.155. 
616. Id. 
617. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(b) (1999). 
618. See Hargreaves, supra note 1, at 29–34, 207–08 (discussing the complexity of the assimi-
lation/segregation debate in sports, in that separatism can increase women’s control over their 
sports, mobilize women to fight for equal resources in sport, and enable women to participate in 
sport free of male interference and domination, but that it can also recreate social gender divisions 
and [can] exaggerate sexism by conveying the message that biological sex rather than culture de-
fines athleticism). 
619. See, e.g., Nelson, Are We Winning Yet?, supra note 245, at 87 (citing a 1985 Women’s 
Sports Foundation survey showing that women who as children had played sports with boys had a 
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They argue that, similar to segregation in the race context, separate-but-
equal is never truly equal because of the social significance of gender.620
In this view, sex segregation in sport relegates female athletes to second-
class status and affirms the superiority of males in sport.621 A related 
argument is that sex-separation bolsters the culture of male dominance 
in sport by protecting the culture of masculinity on all-male teams.622 
On the other hand, allowing schools to provide separate athletic 
teams for female athletes may challenge the linkage between sport and 
masculinity by enabling female athletes to participate in sport in large 
numbers and to experience their own athletic power  
without male interference.623 The perceived sex neutrality of open 
teams, where athletes are selected based on “merit,” could serve to le-
gitimate male dominance in sports as natural, while reinforcing the 
notion that few women belong in sport, and even then, only when they 
 
more positive body image as adolescents than women who played sports only with girls, and that 
women who are most athletic as adults tend to have played mostly with boys or in mixed groups 
rather than just with girls); Tokarz, supra note 269, at 232–33, 239–40 (arguing that sex segrega-
tion in sport reinforces the social inferiority of females and stigmatizes female athletics, while 
reinforcing the exclusive role for males as aggressive, violent, combative). 
620. Cf. Finley, supra note 57, at 1103 (noting the cultural willingness to segregate people by 
their sex in contexts that would not be viewed as appropriate for racial segregation, including pris-
ons and athletics, and arguing that “[j]ust as with separation along racial lines, separate never really 
means equal”). 
621. See Jay, supra note 146, at 21 (arguing that separating athletic teams by sex sends female 
athletes messages of inferiority and lowered expectations); Tokarz, supra note 269, at 232–33, 239 
(arguing that sex-separate teams are premised on stereotypes of female inferiority and harm women 
psychologically, socially, and occupationally). 
622. See Cahn, supra note 242, at 52–54 (discussing male anxiety over losing to female ath-
letes in mixed-sex competition and the implications for male privilege); id. at 26–27 (citing 
research suggesting that “homophobia is actively fanned in the single-sex subcultures that have 
surrounded sport and physical education,” and suggesting that this “operates as a constraint that 
keeps heterosexual people of both sexes within the boundaries of traditional masculinity and femi-
ninity”); cf. Nancy Levit, Separating Equals: Educational Research and the Long-Term 
Consequences of Sex Segregation, 67 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 451, 511, 521 (1999) (arguing that the 
impact on the cultural construction of gender has been ignored in debates over sex-segregation in 
education, and that separate sex environments may exalt and exaggerate perceived gender differ-
ences). 
623. See Williams v. Sch. Dist., 998 F.2d 168, 175–76 (3d Cir. 1993) (reversing summary 
judgment for parents of male athlete seeking to play on girls’ field hockey team, and noting that if 
real physical differences exist between the sexes, permitting boys to play on girls’ teams could 
displace girls from the team); Petrie v. Ill. High Sch. Ass’n., 394 N.E.2d 855, 857–63 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1979) (upholding classification of athletic competition on the basis of sex on the grounds that it 
prevented male dominance in games and served state interest in preserving athletic opportunities 
for girls); B.C. v. Bd. of Educ., 531 A.2d 1059, 1066 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987) (upholding 
athletic association’s regulation prohibiting male participation on female teams as substantially 
related to the state interest in preventing males from displacing female athletes); see also Virginia P. 
Croudace & Steven A Desmarais, Note, Where the Boys Are: Can Separate Be Equal in School 
Sports?, 58 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1425, 1427 (1985). 
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can compete on men’s terms.624 A standard requiring sex-integrated 
teams could contribute to an ideology of male athletic superiority and to 
the perception that men have “earned” their privileged status on the 
playing field.625 It also could reinforce the idea that in order for women 
to have a legitimate place in sport, they must compete with men; that 
sport participation involving only women lacks value.626 Indeed, one 
could even argue that sex-separate teams are required by Title IX to en-
sure that women have meaningful, rather than token, opportunities to 
participate in athletics.627
624. It is unclear and hotly disputed whether the competitive abilities of male and female ath-
letes would even out over time, given equal training, encouragement and sport opportunities, or 
whether a switch to sex-integrated teams would perpetually disadvantage female athletes. Compare 
Hargreaves, supra note 1, at 284–88 (arguing that sex differences in sport are more social than 
biological, citing the fact that women’s performances are improving at a faster rate than men’s, and 
noting that some physical sex differences give women a competitive advantage in endurance 
sports), and Kidd, supra note 353, at 38 (citing research showing that women’s athletic records are 
improving at a faster rate than men’s records, suggesting that if women’s sport opportunities were 
equalized, the best females would be competitive with the best male athletes in most sports), with 
Messner, Sports and Male Domination, supra note 509, at 75 (arguing that average physical differ-
ences between the sexes would disadvantage women in cross-sex competition, particularly because 
the major sports “are organized around the most extreme potentialities of the male body”). Histo-
rian Jennifer Hargreaves argues that, rather than asking whether women will ever parallel men’s 
sporting abilities, a question that she contends has become an “obsession” in sport, we should ask 
why sport is culturally defined in ways that let men display their physical advantages. See Har-
greaves, supra note 1, at 285–86 (“[I]f endurance, flexibility, skill, artistry, creativity and timing 
were accorded higher value, sports would have a very different meaning.”).  
625. See, e.g., Lemaire, supra note 262, at 131–33 (discussing the danger that unisex teams 
would legitimate male dominance in sport); Messner, Sports and Male Domination, supra note 
509, at 75 (arguing that mixed-sex competition under the guise of “equal opportunity” and liberal 
feminism “is likely to become a new means of solidifying the ideological hegemony of male superi-
ority” by “provid[ing] support for the ideology of meritocracy while at the same time offering 
incontrovertible evidence of the ‘natural’ differences between males and females”).  
626. Cf. Willis, supra note 244, at 44. Willis notes that: 
Heroic sports success amongst a few women—without a massive, corresponding ideological 
battle to change the field of force of meaning—will not lead to greater participation regu-
larly in schools and sports centres by girls and women, nor to a liberation in their sense of 
gender. A particular notion of masculine standards may, paradoxically, be reproduced and 
further ‘negative’ examples of femininity made regularly available. 
Id. 
627. This issue could have practical significance if Title IX’s critics attempt to avoid the obli-
gations of the three-part test by sponsoring open teams, instead of separate men’s and women’s 
teams, in which men would retain the lion’s share of sport opportunities. See, e.g., Haffer v. Temple 
Univ., 678 F. Supp. 517, 524 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (acknowledging but rejecting Temple’s argument that 
it offered “open” teams and “women’s teams,” and that women were free to try out for the “open” 
teams). The regulations do not require institutions to offer any of their athletic opportunities sepa-
rately by sex; however, equality in this context may require such an approach if the alternative 
would allow the de facto exclusion of women from athletic participation opportunities. Cf. Cohen v. 
Brown Univ., 879 F. Supp. 185, 204 (D.R.I. 1995) (stating that, in the context of counting the ath-
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The allowance for sex-separated teams may also broaden the defini-
tion of sport by enabling female athletes to participate in their own 
preferred sports, rather than forcing male and female athletes to compete 
together in the same sports that have largely been designed and selected 
by and for males.628 In addition to having greater control over what 
sports they play, separate women’s sports enable women to experience 
the power of their bodies without constant comparison with male play-
ers or an atmosphere of male dominance.629 
Whether sex-separation in athletics promotes or counters the con-
struction of sport as quintessentially male terrain may well depend on 
the context in which all-female sport occurs.630 As women’s sports gain 
increasing attention and appreciation, all-female sports take on a differ-
ent social meaning. The recent focus on and support for women’s 
Olympic, professional and collegiate sports puts a more positive spin on 
the social meaning of female sports than has been the case in years past. 
By providing women space to develop their own sporting preferences 
and abilities, while publicly demonstrating female competence in sports, 
the sex-separation of athletics may in the end do more damage to the 
masculine construction of sport than it does to support it.631 
letic opportunities available to male and female athletes, “‘[a]thletic opportunities’ means real op-
portunities, not illusory ones”). 
628. Some commentators have criticized Title IX’s allowance for sex-separate teams on the 
grounds that, while it allows males and females to compete in separate programs, the law neverthe-
less measures equal athletic opportunity for women by a male standard. See, e.g., Olson, supra 
note 146, at 116–17; Note, Cheering on Women and Girls, supra note 146, at 1634–35.  Although 
it is certainly true as an empirical matter that women’s sports programs have largely followed the 
male competitive model, Title IX itself does not dictate how men’s and women’s sports programs 
should be organized or structured, except to require that the same quality of treatment and support 
be provided to both programs. Title IX thus permits a women’s program to offer different sports 
than a men’s program and to prioritize different aspects of each program, so long as the men’s and 
women’s programs overall provide equal opportunity. While in practice, many women’s athletic 
programs emulate men’s programs by creating similar hierarchies within their programs and em-
phasizing similar aspects of their programs, the law does not require this result. 
629. See Hargreaves, supra note 1, at 243 (discussing reasons why women choose to partici-
pate in sports in all-female environments, including to escape sexism and male dominance, and to 
benefit from a collective sports experience with other women in an atmosphere where they do not 
feel threatened or inadequate); Nelson, Are We Winning Yet?, supra note 245, at 89–90 (quoting 
sport sociologist Susan Birrell, an advocate of sex-segregated sports, as stating that mixed-sex 
sports would shortchange women because of the “‘subtle losses of power the accommodated class 
suffers when integrated within a structure already defined and run by others’”). 
630. See Hargreaves, supra note 1, at 150 (explaining that the process of assimilation or sepa-
ration is complex because femininity is not a static condition, but responds to changes in social 
structures); cf. LeMaire, supra note 262, at 131–33 (acknowledging that sex-segregation of sports 
teams is problematic because it reinforces traditional conceptions of women and stigmatizes 
women’s teams, but arguing that separate women’s teams may become equal if allowed to develop 
their own models of competition). 
631. See Whitson, Embodiment of Gender, supra note 245, at 363 (“If [Iris Marion] Young is 
correct [about the empowering potential of women learning to use their bodies actively], the physi-
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b.Title IX’s Role in Assigning a Gender to Particular Sports—
However one views Title IX’s general authorization of sex separation in 
athletics in connection with the social construction of sport and gender, 
Title IX’s regulation of which sports males and females may play raises 
a different set of issues. Title IX has permitted schools to channel girls 
and women into less physically aggressive sports, while emphasizing 
these sports for boys and men.632 This gender division constructs par-
ticular sporting activities themselves as masculine or feminine.  
More specifically, the Title IX regulation governing the right to try 
out for teams that are otherwise only available to members of one sex 
contributes to the construction of gendered sport activities.633 Title IX 
effectively limits the sports in which male and female athletes compete 
in a way that conforms to traditional gender expectations. Under the Ti-
tle IX regulations, if athletic opportunities for one sex have been 
previously limited (which is true for female students at virtually every 
educational institution in the United States), members of that sex have a 
qualified right to try out for a team in a sport that is offered only to the 
other sex.634 The qualification is that the right to try out in a sport of-
fered only to one sex does not exist if that sport is a contact sport.635 
cal empowerment of more women and the entry into sport of greater numbers of women will stead-
ily contribute toward breaking down the masculine connotations of sport itself.”). 
632. See id. at 356 (“Despite the recent expansion of organized sports for girls, their sports are 
often kept less ‘physical’ than boys’, and girls are not encouraged as readily as boys are to push 
themselves and to really develop their physical skills.”). 
633. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(b). 
634. The Regulation states: 
[W]here a recipient operates or sponsors a team in a particular sport for members of one sex 
but operates or sponsors no such team for members of the other sex, and athletic opportuni-
ties for members of that sex have previously been limited, members of the excluded sex 
must be allowed to try-out for the team offered unless the sport involved is a contact sport. 
Id. The regulation does not allow female athletes to compete on male teams in sports that are of-
fered to female athletes on the theory that the potential “talent drain” from the female teams could 
reduce the potential for women’s sports as a whole to gain credibility and recognition. See, e.g.,
O’Connor v. Bd. of Educ., 449 U.S. 1301, 1307–08 (1980) (refusing to lift court of appeal’s stay of 
a preliminary injunction requiring school district to allow girl to tryout for boys’ basketball team 
where the school offered a girls’ basketball team, and noting that the district court’s order could 
have the effect of hurting girls’ sports overall by draining the best players from the girls’ program); 
O’Connor v. Bd. of Educ., 645 F.2d 578, 581–82 (7th Cir. 1981) (reversing and remanding prelimi-
nary injunction requiring school to allow female student to try out for the boy’s basketball team 
where the school offered a girls’ basketball team on a similar rationale), remanded to, 545 F. Supp. 
376, 384 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (granting summary judgment for defendants); Yellow Springs Exempted 
Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Ohio High Sch. Athletic Assoc., 647 F.2d 651, 658 (6th Cir. 1981) (upholding 
sex-based classification of athletic competition and noting the state’s interest in promoting girls’ 
athletics by retaining talented female athletes on girls’ teams rather than losing them to boys’ 
teams). 
635. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(b). 
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Thus, female athletes have been denied the right to try out for all-male 
teams in contact sports, even though they have no other opportunities to 
participate in that sport.636
The contact sports exemption greatly restricts the opportunities for 
female athletes to participate in traditionally male sports. Contact sports 
are defined broadly under the regulation to include “boxing, wrestling, 
rugby, ice hockey, football, basketball and other sports the purpose or 
major activity of which involves bodily contact.”637 A sport may qualify 
as a contact sport even though the rules of the sport prohibit bodily con-
tact, as long as bodily contact does occur in the sport and is expected to 
occur.638 The breadth of the exception leaves few traditionally male 
sports outside the category of contact sports. 
At the same time, the regulation does little to provide women inter-
ested in playing a contact sport with a team of their own. OCR has 
interpreted the regulation governing contact sports to require schools to 
provide contact sports to members of an excluded sex only if “[t]here is 
sufficient interest and ability among the members of the excluded sex to 
sustain a viable team and a reasonable expectation of intercollegiate 
competition for that team.”639 Thus, it is possible that although Title IX 
does not provide female athletes with the right to play on the boys’ or 
men’s team in a contact sport, it may nevertheless require schools to 
provide female athletes with their own team in that sport. Unfortunately 
this modest concession is of limited practical significance. Few female 
athletes will be able to affirmatively demonstrate enough interest and 
ability to support a viable team in a contact sport that has not been of-
fered to them since female students at the school would have been 
denied access to any school-supported competition in that sport. Conse-
quently, OCR’s regulatory interpretation does not provide female 
athletes with an equal opportunity to participate in contact sports.640 In-
 
636. See, e.g., Barnett v. Tex. Wrestling Ass’n, 16 F. Supp. 2d 690, 694–95 (N.D. Tex. 1998) 
(dismissing Title IX challenge by two female wrestlers to association rule forbidding female wres-
tlers to compete against boys in the North Texas Open Wrestling Tournament). 
637. 34 U.S.C. § 106.41(b). 
638. See Williams v. Sch. Dist. of Bethlehem, Pa., 998 F.2d 168, 172–74 (3d Cir. 1993) (hold-
ing field hockey may be a contact sport); see also Renee Forseth & Walter Toliver, Casenote, The 
Unequal Playing Field—Exclusion of Male Athletes From Single-Sex Teams: Williams v. School 
District of Bethlehem, Pa., 2 Vill. Sports & Ent. L.F. 99, 125 (1995) (noting that the court’s broad 
definition of contact sport may ultimately decrease athletic opportunities for women by preventing 
female athletes from participating on all-male teams in sports not offered to females). 
639. Policy Interpretation, supra note 6, at 71,418. 
640. One women’s club team was successful in using this opening to obtain a varsity women’s 
ice hockey team at their institution, which had offered varsity ice hockey to men only. See 
Heckman, Scoreboard, supra note 148, at 409 & n.85 (discussing settlement in Bryant v. Colgate 
Univ.); see also Suzanne Sangree, Title IX and the Contact Sports Exemption: Gender Stereotypes 
in a Civil Rights Statute, 32 Conn. L. Rev. 381, 437 (2000) (arguing that it is difficult to establish 
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stead, by denying female athletes the opportunity to develop their skills 
in traditionally male contact sports, the regulation squelches the devel-
opment of female athletic interest in those sports and discourages the 
development of women’s contact sports.641 
An alternative approach that would be more consistent with the ra-
tionale underlying the three-part test would require an institution to 
offer a women’s team in a contact sport once requested to do so by a 
female student at the school, and then provide the resources and oppor-
tunities necessary to see if sufficient interest could exist for the sport. 
The contact sports exemption locks in place the construction of par-
ticular sports as predominantly “masculine” or “feminine,” and bolsters 
the construction of a dominant masculinity in sport. Just as certain jobs 
have become “gendered” based on the sex of persons who hold them 
and the sex-stereotyping of the qualifications associated with the job,642 
certain sports also have acquired a “gender.”643 For example, football, 
ice hockey, baseball, and wrestling are perceived to be masculine sports; 
figure skating, synchronized swimming, field hockey, and gymnastics 
are perceived as more feminine.644 The social attribution of a gender to 
 
existing interest and ability to participate in a contact sport when women “have always been denied 
the opportunity to try the sport and to develop proficiency at it”). 
641. See Festle, supra note 36, at 171 (discussing Title IX’s provision that schools do not have 
to allow women to play contact sports such as football, boxing, wrestling, rugby, and ice hockey, 
among other sports, unless there is a demand for an active women’s team); see also Stewart, in 
Nike is a Goddess, supra note 7 [Confirm this], at 269, 284 (“From the earliest ages, hockey organ-
izers have encouraged boys and girls to play on separate teams. Since virtually every top notch 
female player will tell you that she developed her skills playing with boys, that strategy seems de-
signed to limit the overall development of the women’s game.”). 
642. See Barbara Babcock et al., supra note 97, at 813–14 (discussing sex stereotyping of jobs 
as requiring masculine or feminine traits based on the distribution of the sex of the workers holding 
those jobs); Chamallas, Deepening the Legal Understanding of Bias, supra note 53, at 27–29 (de-
scribing the process in which jobs become “gendered” and citing to sociological research on the 
gender stereotyping of jobs). 
643. See Cahn, supra note 242, at 217–18 (discussing how particular sports are constructed as 
masculine or feminine). The process through which certain sports become “gendered” is complex, 
involving the combination of gender, race and class to produce a dominant image and identity 
associated with that sport. For example, figure skating is constructed around a certain type of femi-
ninity—a femininity that is upper class and typically white. See, e.g., Festle, supra note 36, at xx-
xxi (discussing the cultural meaning of the Nancy Kerrigan/Tonya Harding conflict and the impor-
tance of class and role-typing in defining “femininity”). 
644. See Cahn, supra note 242, at 97 (describing the development of field hockey as a sport 
for upper-class women, and noting that because of its exclusively female origins “it remained free 
from charges of mannishness”); Kidd, supra note 353, at 36 (describing historic efforts of sports 
organizers to “confine females to those sports believed to enhance middle- and upper-class concepts 
of femininity, such as swimming, tennis, and gymnastics”). The attribution of “gender” to sports is 
clearly a cultural, rather than a natural phenomenon. See Cahn, supra note 242 at 85, 98–99 (de-
scribing the evolution of basketball from a “feminine” game viewed as “too effete for rugged male 
athletes” because it was played by women indoors, “protected from the elements and from public 
scrutiny,” to a “masculine” game for men as it became associated with “ruggedness, explosive 
power, and technical precision”). 
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particular sports furthers the construction of different and diametrically 
opposed masculine and feminine sport identities. When female athletes 
compete in a “male sport,” they challenge the gendered construction of 
sport itself.645 
The law’s resistance to female athletes’ participation in traditionally 
masculine sports stems from the threat such participation presents to the 
masculine privilege conferred by such sports. This fear was expressed 
quite candidly in a 1956 decision by the Oregon Supreme Court address-
ing the constitutionality of rules excluding women from participating in 
wrestling.646 In State v. Hunter, a woman was arrested for violating a 
state law that made it a crime for women to participate in organized 
wrestling competition.647 The court upheld the law against the defen-
dant’s challenge under the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution and the Oregon Constitution, taking “judicial notice of the 
physical differences between men and women,” and the division of citi-
zens into “’two great classes of men and women.’”648 The court’s 
explanation of the justification for the law is worth quoting at some 
length to appreciate better the full flavor of the ideology behind it:  
We believe that we are justified in taking judicial notice of the fact 
that the membership of the legislative assembly which enacted this 
statute was predominantly masculine. The fact is important in de-
termining what the legislature might have had in mind with respect 
to this particular statute. . . . Obviously it intended that there 
should be at least one island on the sea of life reserved for man 
that would be impregnable to the assault of woman. It had watched 
her emerge from long tresses and demure ways to bobbed hair and 
almost complete sophistication; from a creature needing and de-
pending upon protection and chivalry of man to one asserting 
complete independence. She had already invaded practically every 
activity formerly considered appropriate and suitable for men only. 
In the field of sports she had taken up, among other games, base-
ball, basketball, golf, bowling, hockey, long distance swimming, 
and racing, in all of which she had become more or less proficient, 
and in some had excelled. In the business and industrial fields as 
 
645. See Hargreaves, supra note 1, at 283 (asserting that when women participate in tradition-
ally male sports, they create “an emergent female sports culture which is transforming those 
conventional definitions” of masculinity and femininity); cf. Whitson, Social Construction of Mas-
culinity, supra note 357, at 25–26 (contending that the presence of girls on all-male teams disrupts 
the masculinizing project of sport and threatens the opportunities for men to “rehearse their ties as 
men and reaffirm their differences from women”). 
646. State v. Hunter, 300 P.2d 455 (Or. 1956). 
647. Id. at 456–57. 
648. Id. 
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an employee or as an executive, in the professions, in politics, as 
well as in almost every other line of human endeavor, she had 
matched her wits and prowess with those of mere man, and, we are 
frank to concede, in many instances outdone him. In these circum-
stances, is it any wonder that the legislative assembly took 
advantage of the police power of the state in its decision to halt 
this ever-increasing feminine encroachment upon what for ages 
had been considered strictly as manly arts and privileges? Was the 
Act an unjust and unconstitutional discrimination against woman? 
Have her civil or political rights been unconstitutionally denied 
her? Under the circumstances, we think not.”649 
The court’s rationale, although no longer expressed in such stark 
terms, survives as the primary justification for the contact sports exemp-
tion. The contact sports exemption marginalizes and stigmatizes female 
athletes as fragile, delicate, and vulnerable, at the same time that it de-
fines male athleticism as aggressive and physically powerful.650 The 
denial of access to contact sports for female athletes conveys the mes-
sage that when it comes to highly physical sports, women’s place is on 
the sidelines and not on the field.651 Much like the restriction of women 
from combat positions in the armed services, the contact sports excep-
tion serves to reinforce a traditional, passive femininity in need of male 
protection, while at the same time preserving the institution’s masculine 
culture.652 As a facial sex-based classification that relies on gender 
stereotypes and structures sport programs to conform to traditional no-
 
649. Id. (emphasis added); see also Calzadilla v. Dooley, 29 A.D.2d 152, 157 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1968) (rejecting equal protection challenge by female wrestler to state athletic commission rule 
barring women from wrestling on the ground that “‘[t]he Constitution does not require things which 
are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same’”) (quoting Tigner 
v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 147 (1939)). 
650. See Kidd, supra note 353, at 38 (discussing Ontario Hockey Association’s refusal to al-
low thirteen year-old female from competing on an all-male hockey team, despite her success in 
making the team in a competitive try-out, and attributing the association’s stance to male fears of 
“the profound social and psychological changes that would result if women were understood to be 
fully competent in the special domain of men”). 
651. Sometimes this message is expressed explicitly. See Richard Rubin, Female Placekicker 
Files Suit Against Duke, Former Coach, The Chron. (N.C.), Jan. 13, 1999, at PC (reporting that the 
former football coach at Duke told a female place-kicker who wanted to play on the team, “You 
should have gotten over wanting to play little boy games a long time ago,” and suggested that she 
become a cheerleader instead); see also Cahn, supra note 242, at 224–25 (stating that “by barring 
women from strength-building contact sports like wrestling or football, the sports world reaffirms 
the expectation of female passivity, submissiveness, and frailty—the demeaning aspects of feminin-
ity that underlie the aesthetic”). 
652. See Karst, supra note 475, at 525, 537 (noting that the ideas underlying the combat ex-
emption are central to the ideology of masculinity); see also Sangree, Title IX and the Contact 
Sports Exemption, supra note 640, at 384 (“It is no accident that contact sports joins the military 
combat exclusion as the last bastions of facial discrimination.”). 
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tions of dominant masculinity, the contact sports exemption is inconsis-
tent with both the theory underlying the three-part test and the model of 
formal equality embraced in current interpretation of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause.653 
In practice, potential equal protection challenges for public schools 
have mitigated the impact of the contact sports exemption in public 
schools, as courts have granted female athletes the right to try out for 
all-male teams in contact sports under the equal protection clause.654 
However, since equal protection doctrine applies only to public and not 
private institutions, many female athletes are left without meaningful 
protection from exclusion in contact sports.655 Moreover, the contact 
sports exemption remains a powerful contributor to the ideology of male 
dominance and superiority in sports.656 
In addition to the contact sports exemption, which effectively ex-
cludes female athletes from playing traditionally male sports, Title IX 
polices the gender of sports by restricting the opportunities for male ath-
letes to play traditionally female sports. Under the Title IX regulations, 
male athletes seeking to participate on an all-female team in a sport not 
 
653. See Leffel v. Wis. Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n, 444 F. Supp. 1117, 1122 (E.D. Wis. 
1978) (finding that Title IX’s allowance for all-male teams in contact sports that are not offered to 
females is inconsistent with the equal protection clause). The contact sports exemption has a paral-
lel in the bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) defense under Title VII, which permits sex to 
disqualify employees for certain types of jobs. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e). Compare 29 C.F.R. § 
1604.1(a) (1999) (stating that the BFOQ defense is to be narrowly construed), with 34 C.F.R. § 
106.41(b)(1999) (defining contact sports broadly). Cf. Sangree, supra note 640, at 411 (stating that 
Title IX was enacted as a separate law, rather than as an amendment to Title VII, which bars race 
discrimination in federally funded programs, because the Nixon Administration believed that sex, 
unlike race, could justify differential treatment in education, especially in athletics). However, 
unlike Title VII, Title IX codifies an entire class of activities for which sex is a disqualification, 
with no proof that sex is a necessary qualification for each activity covered).  
654. Equal protection doctrine has enabled female athletes to try out for all-male teams in con-
tact sports that are not otherwise available to them. See, e.g., Adams v. Baker, 919 F. Supp. 1496, 
1505 (D. Kan. 1996) (upholding female student’s claim to try out for male softball team); Saint v. 
Neb. Sch. Activities Ass’n., 684 F. Supp. 626, 630 (D. Neb. 1988) (same); Lantz v. Ambach, 620 F. 
Supp. 663, 666 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (upholding female student’s claim to try out for male softball 
team); Force v. Pierce City R-IV Sch. Dist., 570 F. Supp. 1020, 1031–32 (W.D. Mo. 1983) (same).  
655. Cf. Mercer v. Duke Univ., 190 F.3d 643, PC (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that a university 
may exclude members of one sex from a contact sport, but that once it permits a student of the 
excluded sex to try out for a contact sport, and she makes the team, it can no longer exclude her 
from equal participation on the team); Abigail Crouse, Comment, Equal Athletic Opportunity: An 
Analysis of Mercer v. Duke University and a Proposal to Amend the Contact Sport Exception to 
Title IX, 84 Minn. L. Rev. 1655, 1681–82 (2000) (noting the “perverse incentives” created by the 
Fourth Circuit’s decision in Mercer because recipients can avoid Title IX claims for equal participa-
tion in contact sports simply by refusing to allow members of the excluded sex to try out for the 
team). 
656. See Sangree, Title IX and the Contact Sports Exemption, supra note 640, at 434–35 
(“While the underlying motivation of the proponents of the exemption was to protect college foot-
ball and basketball from female encroachment, the message has been that the ‘weaker sex’ must be 
protected from rough play with superior athletic males.”). 
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otherwise available to them have little recourse.657 Because males his-
torically have not had their athletic opportunities limited on the basis of 
sex, the regulation does not accord them the right to try out for a team in 
a sport offered only to females.658 The different treatment of members of 
the underrepresented sex from those of the overrepresented sex reflects 
the same concern underlying the allowance for sex-separated teams gen-
erally: a desire to preserve sufficient opportunities for female athletes 
who may otherwise be displaced by male athletes. However, this regula-
tion presents a dilemma that is somewhat different than that posed by 
the general allowance for sex-separate teams. By enabling schools to 
offer sports exclusively to female and not male athletes, the regulation 
participates in the construction of gender for particular sports. Sports 
that are typically offered to girls and not boys reflect cultural judgments 
about which sports are appropriately masculine and which are feminine. 
Softball, for example, was designed to be a “feminized version” of 
baseball.659 The regulation’s denial of the opportunity for male athletes 
to participate in traditionally female sports furthers the gender division 
between the more valued, masculine sports in which males traditionally 
compete, and the more feminine sports with traditionally female partici-
pation.  
Male students who seek to participate in traditionally female sports 
may also represent a challenge to the gender ordering of sports.660 And 
yet, the rationale underlying the regulation—preventing the displac-
ement of female athletes from the already limited opportunities for 
female athletes—is important. The challenge is to degender traditionally 
masculine and feminine sport without undercutting the opportunities for 
girls and women to participate in sports. One solution would be to en-
able males to try out for a team offered only to female students where 
the denial of the sport to males rests on cultural assumptions about the 
sport’s femininity. The concern for maintaining sufficient numbers of 
opportunities for female athletes could be addressed under the three-part 
test by continuing to ensure that the number of actual opportunities 
 
657. See, e.g., Williams v. Sch. Dist., 998 F.2d 168, 172–76 (3d Cir. 1993) (remanding to 
lower court for consideration of whether field hockey is a contact sport and whether athletic oppor-
tunities for boys in field hockey are limited in case of a boy who was not permitted to play on girls’ 
field hockey team despite absence of boys’ field hockey team); Clark v. Ariz. Interscholastic Ass’n, 
695 F.2d 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 1983) (prohibiting boy from playing on girls’ volleyball team, even 
though school did not offer boys’ volleyball); see also Petrie v. Ill. High Sch. Ass’n, 394 N.E.2d 
855, 864 (Ill. App. 1979) (rejecting male high school athlete’s equal protection challenge to high 
school association’s rule restricting participation in volleyball to girls only). 
658. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(b). 
659. See Sangree, Title IX and the Contact Sports Exemption, supra note 640, at 408. 
660. See, e.g., Lenskyj, supra note 242, at 57 (noting that the dichotomy of masculine and 
feminine sports also excludes males from “feminine” sports and casts doubt on their heterosexuality 
when they do participate in such sports). 
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available to male and female athletes—regardless of whether they play 
on single-sex or mixed-sex teams—does not discriminate against female 
students. Such a solution would meet the goal of bolstering female ath-
letic participation without strictly enforcing the gender composition of 
sports that have been deemed culturally coded as feminine, and thus in-
appropriate for male participation. Under this proposal, an athlete’s sex 
would still play a role in the assignment of athletes to teams in sports 
that are available to both males and females, but exclusion from sports 
that are available only to athletes of one sex would be subject to chal-
lenge. This modification, combined with the elimination of the contact 
sports exemption, would challenge the construction of masculine and 
feminine sports.661 The resulting greater experience with mixed-sex 
teams may help to inform continued debate about the value of sex-
separation in athletics more generally.662 
2. Challenging the Masculine Culture of Sport and Constraints on 
Female Athleticism—As discussed above, educational institutions en-
gage in a myriad of practices that contribute to the masculinization of 
sport. In the end, the gendered culture of sport may well prove more 
central to girls’ and women’s inequality in sport than the explicit use of 
sex to structure and organize competitive athletic programs. The con-
struction of sport as an activity premised on gender inequality goes well 
beyond the allocation of unequal opportunities to male and female ath-
letes. Institutional practices at play in this process include the 
maintenance of male leadership structures in sport and the protection of 
a sport culture in which aggressive and even abusive masculinity is en-
couraged and condoned. At the same time, educational institutions 
contribute to cultural constraints that marginalize girls and women in 
sport by projecting a disconnect between traditional femininity and ath-
leticism. This message is symbolized by the use of gender in team 
names, enforced through the policing of sexual orientation, and fur-
thered by the objectification of girls and women in sport.  
Title IX has not yet begun to address the deep institutional structures 
that link sport with masculinity and subordinate girls and women in 
sport. Although Title IX’s three-part participation test has been success-
 
661. For a related, though somewhat different proposal, see Dana Robinson, A League of 
Their Own: Do Women Want Sex-Segregated Sports?, 9 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 321, 354–55 
(1998) (advocating a more stringent application of the Fourteenth Amendment to sex-segregation in 
sports, such that members of either sex could try out for a team offered to the other sex if there were 
no equivalent team with equal, tangible benefits otherwise available to them). 
662. Don Sabo, Coed Sports: A Call for Needed Research, Women’s Sports Foundation, at 
http://www.womenssportsfoundation.org/templates/res_center/relib/results_topics2html?article=43
&record=24 (last visited Nov. 11, 2000) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law 
Reform) (discussing existing research disclosing positive and negative dimensions of coed sports 
participation and identifying a need for additional research in this area). 
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ful in recognizing how institutional decisions construct men’s and 
women’s relationship to sports, it has not gone beyond an analysis of 
athletic participation numbers. And yet, the male-dominant leadership 
structures of athletic programs and the perpetuation of male dominance 
in the culture of sport have at least as much to do with the structuring of 
men’s and women’s relationship to sport as the bare numbers of sport 
opportunities that institutions provide. In future challenges to the three-
part test, such as that launched by Brown University, courts should look 
beyond the numbers of participation opportunities to uncover the many 
other ways institutions construct male and female interest in sport. This 
would include an analysis of the broader opportunity and reward struc-
tures available to male and female athletes, as well as an inquiry into 
how the institution constructs the culture of its sport programs. The lat-
ter inquiry could be undertaken in the form of expert testimony and 
broad discovery into the institution’s athletic leadership structures and 
practices that perpetuate male dominance in sport, and constrain women 
in sport, in any of the ways discussed in the previous section. 
In addtion, Title IX’s standard for equality in the treatment and bene-
fits provided male and female athletes should be modified to reach 
sexism and male dominance in the culture of athletics. Title IX should 
hold institutions accountable for sex discrimination when they support a 
culture of sport that demeans and devalues women and those men who 
represent a challenge to dominant masculinity. As a starting point, Title 
IX should ensure that athletic privilege does not include the ability of 
male athletes to practice sexual dominance. Educational institutions 
should be held accountable for the construction of male dominance in 
their sport programs and for its consequences in and beyond the locker 
rooms and playing fields.  
Meaningful protection under Title IX from sex discrimination in sport 
would encompass the full range of institutional structures that suppress 
female athletic interest while inflating and privileging sport participa-
tion by males. Title IX law does not yet recognize this vision of equality. 
But the seeds for such a vision can be found in court decisions such as 
Cohen v. Brown University, and a critical approach to sex difference that 
focuses on how the institutions that are governed by Title IX construct 
sex inequality in sport. 
Conclusion 
As scholars who study sport have increasingly recognized, women’s 
access to sport, and the societal and personal benefits it brings, can play 
an important role in furthering women’s power and status in life’s other 
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arenas.663 At the same time, the ongoing inequality of girls and women 
in sport, and the resilience of male privilege in sport, contributes to male 
dominance outside of sport.664 As a result, much is at stake in the contest 
over the meaning of Title IX as it applies to athletics. 
Title IX’s detractors and the leaders of the backlash against the strug-
gle for sex equality in sport do not acknowledge the responsibility of 
educational institutions for creating and perpetuating sport as a male 
activity that is not equally available or appealing to women. The critics’ 
perspective is that of formal equality—that Title IX should treat male 
and female athletes the same by similarly accommodating their respec-
tive levels of athletic interest. Understanding Title IX as a law that goes 
beyond the limited perspective of formal equality is an important start-
ing point in answering these objections. The rest of the defense of Title 
IX lies in a deeper analysis of gender bias in school sport programs than 
that yet undertaken by the courts. 
As argued above, schools, colleges, and universities actively shape 
and construct male and female athletic interest and experience in sport. 
In subtle and not so subtle ways, educational institutions create struc-
tures of unequal opportunity and cultures of sport that are hostile to 
women. Title IX law, and in particular, the three-part test, has made im-
portant inroads toward holding educational institutions accountable for 
their role in constructing men’s and women’s different relationship to 
sport. To an extent not widely recognized, Title IX courts have avoided 
some of the most blatant mistakes of sex discrimination law in other 
contexts, such as adopting an overly simplistic view of sex difference 
and its relationship to discrimination law. However, Title IX law has not 
yet applied these insights to capture the full complexity of gender ine-
quality in sport. 
A comprehensive theory of Title IX should address the construction 
of gender differences in male and female athletic interests and experi-
ences and the construction of sport itself as a male-dominant institution. 
Such a theory would place a higher value on women’s current sport ac-
 
663. See Bryson, Maintenance of Masculine Hegemony, supra note 504, at 47 (“For many 
feminists, sport has, quite rightly, been identified as a supremely male activity, and therefore es-
chewed, both in practice and as a topic of interest. However, such an attitude cannot be sustained, 
since if we are to understand the processes of our domination, we ignore sport at our peril.”); Mess-
ner & Sabo, Toward a Critical Feminist Reappraisal, supra note 146, at 4–5 (reviewing research 
suggesting that sport plays a role in increasing the empowerment and self-actualization of women 
and that women’s participation in sport challenges the public-private split that continues to privi-
lege men over women).  
664. See Whitson, Social Construction of Masculinity, supra note 357, at 23–24 (“It may be 
suggested that masculinizing and femininizing practices associated with the body are at the heart of 
the social construction of masculinity and femininity and that this is precisely why sport matters in 
the total structure of gender relations.”). 
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tivities and interests, and would recognize that providing equal re-
sources and opportunities to male and female athletes is necessary but 
not sufficient to break down the structures of male dominance in sport. 
Title IX should strive to enable women to develop and pursue their own 
interests in sports on equal terms as men, while simultaneously breaking 
down the institutional constraints that suppress and mold both women’s 
and men’s athletic interests to fit a model that is neither intrinsic nor 
fully chosen.  
Daunting as this task is, it is not without cause for hope. Because 
sport’s relationship to masculinity and femininity is socially constructed, 
there is the potential within sport for resistance and transformation. 
How men and women (and boys and girls) participate in sports, that is, 
the practice of sport, affects the structures and cultures within sport. 
When women (and men) challenge the boundaries of gender expecta-
tions in sport, sport’s connection to masculinity is weakened. At the 
same time, as women’s sports participation is valued more highly, 
through increased resources and better treatment, the celebration of 
sport is less connected to the celebration of masculinity, and sport be-
comes an activity that is equally valued for both genders. Title IX can 
play an integral role in this process, if its underlying theory is fully ap-
preciated and applied. 
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